Honduras Under the Aristide Effect

For those who suffer from a lapse of memory, it is relevant to recall that it was not so long ago that a Haitian president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was ousted by his country’s military; reinstated by one American president; and four years later, disposed by another. One of those presidents was Bill Clinton. George W. Bush was the name of the other one, who, in true Honduran style, kidnapped a half-dressed Aristide under the cloak of night, placing him at gunpoint in a plane and unloading him in the Central African Republic 10 thousand miles away.

In the 1990 elections, the first truly free and plural elections held in Haiti in 186 years, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected after receiving more than 60 percent of the votes. In 1991, a coup d’etat, carried out by Colonel Raoul Cedras, overthrew him and forced him to seek exile in the United States.

In one of its first moves toward the left, the Organization of American States, just like the UN and the U.S., placed economic sanctions on the military regime. In October 1994, the U.S., which had occupied Haiti for 19 years between 1915 and 1934, did what it most wanted to do: deploy its marines and place Aristide back in power. For the first time, an action of this kind was hardly criticized. It was a bad action for a good cause. In any case, it set a precedent.

In 1996, Aristide was replaced through elections, returning to the presidency in 2000, when he was elected again – until the early morning of February 29, 2004, when, in the midst of uncontrollable violence and instability, a detachment of U.S. Special Forces (according to an envoy sent by the ineffable Colin Powell) appeared in the Presidential Palace, kidnapped the president and shipped him to the Central African Republic, the old fief of dictator Bokasas.

World public opinion, democratic governments, the great press and even some leftist elements looked the other way and perhaps breathed a sigh of relief, in the belief that Aristide was the problem and not the solution, and that, although there were some protests, few voices were raised to condemn an act so profusely praised in each and every official statement from the State Department and its French counterpart, Ouai d’Orsay.

After examining America’s ambiguous behavior toward Honduras, is it appropriate to wonder: Where’s the catch? And, although at times, it might seem that the U.S. is like the smug guy at the party, perhaps it is really a more elaborate maneuver designed to delay a solution, until it is clear that the administration of the Latin American left has failed, and then pressure the participants in the coup, until they are made to desist, and credit them with the reestablishment of democracy.

That soft solution could pass as an adjustment to suppress Micheleti, install a “national unity” government that includes Zelaya, carry out elections on a fixed date and create a scene of final happiness, in accordance with Obama’s smooth ways.

Or it could turn out worse. Due to America’s delaying tactics, the “coupists” could achieve a minimum of consolidation and overestimate their forces, giving rise to a situation which calls for a resort to Bush’s style, putting the matter in the hands of the Pentagon and promoting the creation of an Interamerican Peacekeeping Force in the OAS or moving the matter to the Security Council, which, under U.S. auspices, could invoke Chapter Seven of the UN charter and use force to throw out the coupists.

Personally, I do no think that will happen, because it is hardly likely that the coup’s general will resist a call from the Chief of the Southern Command, asking him to restore order in the name of democracy.

Lately, some analysts have accused the U.S. of being tepid and ambiguous, crying out for the president to exhibit greater determination. Perhaps then, these same soothsayers will maintain that they wanted Yankee leadership, but not so much. Obama is preferable to Bush, but the empire is the same. No one can ask an elm tree to bear pears. This is the problem.