Possible Way for U.S.-Iran Strategic Talks

A Possible Way Forward for U.S.-Iran Strategic Talks

The following is an interview with Mr. Keyhan Barzgar, International Relations professor at Islamic Azad Science and Research University. He has published a large number of articles in English for scholarly journals concerning Iranian-American relations.

About three decades ago, diplomatic ties between the U.S. and Iran were severed. In the following years, there have been numerous ups and downs in bilateral relations. However, the basic question is why these countries have not resumed formal relations after thirty years.

The relationship between Iran and America is affected by various external, internal and regional factors. One factor is the power struggle inside Iran, but bilateral relations go beyond this to include ideological and regional issues. Ever since Iran assumed a greater role in the region, due to a series of global and regional events, the dynamics of the states’ relationship changed. Iran’s regional role became more pronounced when the U.S. failed in its management of regional crises in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. Every powerful country in the region seeks to exert influence regionally and even globally. This is especially true in Iran, due to the country’s vast resources and long history as a center of power in the region. However, I’m not sure if I agree with your summary of contemporary U.S.-Iran relations.

Some insiders believe that when Iran is in a weak position, it does not benefit from talks with America. For example, in the Algiers Accord [the agreement that ended the Iran Hostage Crisis], Iran had to give long-term concessions to America. On the other hand, the government has come to the conclusion that it has much to lose if bilateral relations remain tense. Additionally, as the Middle East is in such a great period of transition, with the roles of regional actors in flux, hostile relations with America will only have a negative impact on Iran. Iran’s administration is trying to enter into a dialogue with America by adopting a strong stand and exerting leverage through issues such as their “independent nuclear program.” It has always emphasized the importance and legitimacy of nuclear independence and has internal consensus on the issue. In my view, stressing its intent to achieve nuclear independence could somehow raise Iran’s bargaining position in dealing with America. Nuclear independence has given Iran a strategic playing card that can level the playing field for bilateral talks with new parameters.

Then, do you think the nuclear policy of the regime has succeeded?

I think the policy of emphasizing and insisting on nuclear independence has succeeded because both parties have now accepted that this should be part of negotiations. In my opinion, the Americans never talk to their negotiating counterpart unless they are sure the party has attained strategic parity on some issue. For example, in the 1960s, the U.S. entered into a strategic dialogue with Russia in order to seriously debate nuclear deterrence. In the 1970s, the U.S. negotiated with China because China began to deal with America in a strategic and constructive manner. In the past thirty years, Iran and America have had issues of mutual concern, such as the Arab-Israeli peace process, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and so forth, but the Americans never seriously initiated talks with Iran because these issues were not considered to have the strategic importance warranting such action. It is only Iran’s nuclear program that is strategically worthy [of talks] to the Americans and brought them to the negotiating table. An atomic Iran has become the red line for U.S. national security.

The Clinton administration’s attempts to engage Iran and the resumption of relations proposed by Clinton and [Secretary of State] Albright clash with your analysis, as Iran’s nuclear program had not been an issue at that time.

When Clinton was in office, Iran turned down America’s proposal because there was the conventional worry about the political disparity that would exist in bilateral talks. Therefore, Iran was concerned about the talks resulting in a loss for the country.

But you said Americans never enter into dialogue unless they believe the opposing party to be at some degree of strategic parity with them. Since Iran did not have this level of strategic importance during the Clinton presidency, why did the Clinton Administration want to negotiate?

Iran was very concerned about being defeated in talks because it had no leverage. Now, Iran wants to hold talks with the U.S. thanks to the leverage it gained from its independent nuclear program. Iran-U.S. talks are held for red-line issues like nuclear programs rather than marginal issues. For example, after the presidential election, Obama was called to talk with Iran about its internal affairs, but he refused to do so, saying the U.S. engages Iran on strategic issues like its nuclear program and other peripheral issues cannot take precedence.

You mean if the status of Iran’s nuclear program were acceptable to the U.S., then there is no other issue important enough for the U.S. to negotiate with Iran? Is this the logic of your analysis?

Yes, I think this is the true logic of talks. Iran-U.S. negotiations are so influenced by hot-button ideological issues as well as historical mistrust, that only once there is strategic security and general agreement on the nuclear issue can both sides come closer together. Without any development on these strategic issues, the bilateral relationship will remain as it has been for 30 years.

Are you saying there will be a continued state of no war and no peace?

I believe this is the case. They might have come closer to each other in the longer run if there had been no nuclear issue. But history has now forced them to engage each other.

Does this mean that the Middle East peace process is not of sufficient importance to warrant Iran-U.S. engagement?

The Arab-Israel issue has been important over the past thirty years, but not of the strategic value to necessitate bilateral talks. The significant issue continues to be driven by internal consensus over national strategic interests. This is especially the case with Iran.

Some analysts consider Iran’s 3.5 level of enrichment to be in violation of UNSC resolutions and previous agreements resulting from Vienna and Geneva talks, all of which underscores the fact that enrichment activities must halt. Hence, they consider it an achievement that Iran was able to develop its nuclear program to such an extent thus far.

It is unimportant whether Iran’s nuclear program violates UNSC resolutions or not. What is important is that the resolutions will be marginalized if the Americans are satisfied with the results of a bilateral agreement. In such a situation, sanctions are no longer needed.

If approved, sanctions will fail in the long run. Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful and there has been no evidence to prove that enriched material has been diverted as the IAEA has claimed. The only thing that remains to be done is to build the confidence of the international community. If seen in a positive light, Iran’s nuclear program will cease to be a focus of the United Nations Security Council. As we have seen, people looked favorably at Iran when the Geneva talks proceeded well.

Iran has concluded that it can approve the framework for talks and begin to cooperate. Of course, the Western media plays a very serious role in such issues. For example, when the Iranian delegation said it approved the framework, the Western media immediately posted headlines saying Iran has yielded to America, thereby causing heightened expectations from the international community. Here, the Iranian delegation must be vigilant. Iran has accepted the framework; however, any nuclear treaty should not move forward fast. Any potential agreement should be studied and agreed upon internally. That Iran has agreed to the framework is not in itself a serious matter.

But Obama and Medvedev have said new sanctions are underway. Different signals indicate this within Iran as well. At the start of a recent interview, an Iranian Majlis speaker, Mr. Larijani, said an enriched uranium fuel swap [Editor’s note: this is one potential resolution sought by many in the West.] is a trick. Therefore, it seems the nuclear issue will decide the future of bilateral relations. And so far, post-Geneva talks have not shown any positive results.

Look, Iran’s nuclear program goes beyond technology and energy issues. The program represents Iran’s approach to the region and the world as well. One nuclear treaty should not be viewed as solely about technology and energy. It is also connected to strategic and security issues. Anyway, it is up to each administration to bring this issue to some acceptable resolution. A government is obligated to provide for the welfare of its citizens and prevent threats to their security. It must make timely decisions, as a result. Different voices can help the administration. Merely opposing the administration will damage national interests in the long run by fostering internal political weakness.

What perspective do you portray for this nuclear treaty regarding internal and external opposition?

I don’t make decisions, but as an analyst I’m saying that Iran must sign a nuclear treaty with America with terms acceptable to both sides, especially because it has its nuclear program to use as leverage. The factionalism on the other side should be used to augment Iran’s bargaining power with America, as well. The U.S. National Security Council has to manage its own opposing voices internally and create a unified voice. We should admit that there is a serious internal power struggle. Yet, strategic issues in relations between large powers always contain sensitive areas, and each side must try to understand these issues from the other’s perspective. Iran’s nuclear program could potentially serve to allow Iran to assume a position of power in the region and further build ties with the world’s superpowers.

Regarding a potential treaty, some opponents say if Iran and America agree on nuclear issues, the U.S. will turn its focus to other issues like the Middle East peace process and human rights. What do you think?

The nature of the nuclear program is different from these issues. It is wrong to think that they will become friends soon. They will not be friends because Iran claims to be a regional power. Therefore, it cannot agree on many issues with the U.S., the greatest external actor in the region. A regional power should hold nationally independent strategies in its foreign policy. Conversely, America seeks to preserve a regional power balance, which is disrupted by Iran’s nuclear program. To this end, they are attempting to place Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Israel against Iran. Therefore, no treaty will automatically create a two-sided friendship; but it could foster an era of peaceful co-existence. This is the same way relations between the U.S. and China developed, to the chagrin of those [hard-liners] seeking to maintain the status quo. China has still remained the greatest world rival of America. I think it will take years for multilateral ties between them to flourish.

Has the nuclear program disrupted the regional power balance?

Yes. This is because the U.S. is trying to harness Iran’s power by containing its nuclear program. Both Obama and Bush aimed to reign in Iran’s power and preserve the status quo in the region. But they acted differently; Bush used the language of force and threats while Obama uses the language of negotiation.

Then, what happens to the national nuclear program when the regional power balance changes?

Iran’s nuclear program allows the country to be more independent. Iran has consistently told the U.S. that it wants to have independent nuclear power because it cannot trust America. Any bilateral talks will result in friendship, an easing of tension and a mutual threat. Iran will gain security with the new energy used for development and economic growth.

What happens if talks are not held?

More sanctions might be imposed, which bears costs for both sides.

Does the U.S pay a price for sanctions imposed on Iran?

Iran might succeed in its nuclear program and reach a point that America will be unable to reverse.