Afghanistan and Pakistan in American Strategy

There has been a radical change in America’s strategy for dealing with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Obama administration has agreed to open channels of communication between the Taliban and the government in Kabul. The United States has secured passage for negotiators with the help of NATO forces, while at the same time tightening its grip on the Pakistani Taliban and continuing its military operations and its push in that direction. This decision is due to President Obama’s announcement after taking office that his administration would continue to confront terrorism and extremism in both Afghanistan and the Waziristan region, which is controlled by Pakistani forces that support the Pakistani Taliban (also called Tehrik-i-Taliban).

Throughout the last three years, when military force was used, it was met with devastating failure, and this period of military pressure failed to bring security and stability to the Afghan state. Instead, it caused the resistance to grow stronger, achieve victories in asymmetric warfare and gain control over the eastern regions bordering Pakistan, specifically the Helmand region. It’s worth noting, too, that there is no understanding of the prevailing historical, social, moral and cultural situation in the country, and no understanding that resistance to occupation is part of the historical political culture, as evidenced by the defeated attempts of the British and later the Soviets to occupy the country.

And now the American government, after nine years of one failure after another, is pushing in the direction of making President Karzai accept negotiations with the Pakistani Taliban and reach common ground with them. Due to the Pakistani Taliban’s conditions for such an agreement — that the American and NATO forces stationed in the territory withdraw, that Islamic law be applied and that they take the reins of power in this unfortunate state — this attempt to negotiate will fail. The continuation of a state of insecurity and instability, thus, is the most probable outcome, which will lead to more human and material losses for American and NATO International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan. Costs from the two fronts are very high in the shadow of the world financial and economic crisis, which affects the economies of both the United States and Europe. This and the ongoing human and material cost of the conflict call for a search for other solutions, including new negotiations.

As for Pakistan, relations between the two sides are very tense. It is because of this tension that there have been recent calls for direct talks under the direction of America’s secretary of state to search for partnership between the two sides.

America’s strategy relies on the continuation of military operations against the Pakistani Taliban and on keeping the supply lines from the Pakistani territories to the American and NATO forces stationed in Afghanistan open and secure. This strategy puts Pakistan in direct confrontation with the residents of Waziristan and the tribal regions that support the Taliban. The Pakistani government is thus making additional economic, financial and military support conditional, as well as the acquisition of weapons, military equipment and spare parts for its aircraft. It is also demanding that the United States pressure India to solve the perpetual Kashmir problem. The three-day long negotiations have led to the provision of $7.5 billion over a period of several years, including three billion in emergency military assistance.

The situation in this region points to the United States’ entanglement in a war without end, with material and human losses on the rise. The United States is unable to stop the war through military means, and so it has taken refuge in a change of strategy and an acceptance of indirect negotiations with the Pakistani Taliban, by way of the Karzai government in Kabul. Perhaps these negotiations will be a lifeline, and if they succeed will provide a means of escape and free the United States from this entanglement, allowing it to leave the country and its people’s problems behind. Since the beginning, American strategy made a mistake by occupying the country and searching for extremists within the population. It’s not easy to deal with war for groups whose members lack knowledge of, and familiarity with, the land, its topography and the wars. The American government has thus failed to win the battle, and today it is forced to negotiate in order to fully extricate itself from this quagmire.