Crossing the Threshold

Edited by Tom Proctor

 

In November 2011, it became clear that the Iranian saga entered a new phase. These conclusions were drawn in a new report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran’s nuclear program that led to these changes: Until 2003, Tehran had conducted research aimed at producing nuclear weapons, while also implementing other research and testing programs in this field. But most importantly, such activities are possibly being continued today. In addition, the report contains evidence that, for example, the Islamic Republic has been developing the means of delivering missile warheads.

Although the report did not directly claim that Tehran is presently working directly on developing nuclear weapons, its content clearly indicates that the progress of the country is at a state in which it would be able to create such weapons in case a political decision approving it was made. The country is on the verge of creating nuclear weapons and, so far, the international community has failed to do anything about it.

The International Atomic Energy Agency report has changed the dynamics of the nuclear dispute about Iran; the Iranian authorities now have a hard time trying to convince the world that their country’s nuclear program has an exclusively peaceful nature. In fact, the document proved to be the trigger that undermined the delicate balance of the system of international relations in the Gulf region. Also, it was the starting point of a chain reaction of events that set the modern world on the brink of the most ambitious political and military crisis of the new millennium.

Thus, the agency’s official confirmation of America’s multiple statements and warnings regarding Iran’s ignorance of the requirements of the international community to stop the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and means of their delivery, untied Washington’s hands.

Avoiding procrastination on the harmonization of the retaliatory actions through the U.N., the U.S. imposed an unprecedented package of unilateral sanctions against Iran in November 2011. The Iranian petrochemical and energy sectors, as well as all natural and legal persons providing assistance to Iran in the exploration and production of energy resources, have been affected by these sanctions.

After Tehran realized that it had nothing to lose, it began to actively flex its muscles, providing Americans with new evidence of its dangerous intentions. The new year has begun with reports that Iran has put its nuclear center into operation. It will allow Iran to triple the production of enriched uranium up to 20 percent and to begin exporting nuclear energy-related services. It turned out that the International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly appealed to the authorities of the country with requests for additional information on this subject, but so far these requests were rejected. At the same time, the Iranian authorities have said that they have successfully created a fuel rod for a nuclear reactor for the first time.

2011 ended with the news of the large-scale exercises in the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Hormuz initiated by Tehran, which have demonstrated the major achievements of the Iranian Navy. A series of such exercises continued in January and February 2012.

Last year brought to the fore the achievements of the Iranian missile technology. Iran held many successful test launches of missiles of various classes, including anti-aircraft missiles fully designed and assembled in Iran that are similar in their characteristics to Russian S-300s. Iran has launched satellites orbiting the Earth—the latter one, by the way, was launched last week— space flight devices and a capsule with living organisms. During the first month and a half in 2012, the Iranian military have managed to test its new long-range surface-to-sea and surface-to-surface missiles (2,000 km range) and also launched another satellite. Generally speaking, Washington has more than enough arguments justifying the development of a missile defense system on the European, if not the American, continent.

The U.S. and its allies could no longer ignore this course of events. Tehran found itself under heavy pressure in the economic and military fields from the West. Following the U.S., the E.U. has also imposed unprecedented sanctions, including an embargo on Iranian oil imports and measures against the Iranian Central Bank, which limited the country’s ability to conduct international trade transactions.

In the meantime, the most powerful naval strike group, including three American carriers striking forces’ compounds (In March, the fourth compound is to join them.), amphibious assault ships with the Expeditionary Battalion of Marines on board and a group of British ships have been concentrated in the Persian Gulf. Along with that, the U.S. has implemented an ambitious program of arming its Middle Eastern allies. The arguments for increasing Washington’s military presence are a threat to Iran’s leaders to respond to the E.U. sanctions with a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, which accounts for roughly 40 percent of all world-traded oil.

All these developments make it possible for political scientists and experts to draw a picture of an apocalyptic future war in Iran, which will first draw in all the Gulf countries and then will involve the entire Middle East, the Caucasus and the Black Sea region. This can potentially lead to a World War, as the U.S. and the E.U. have an approach to the Iranian events that is diametrically opposed to that of Russia and China.

At the same time, the local conflict would have a significant impact on the states located far from the Persian Gulf, with our country among them. The unprecedented spike in oil and gas prices would basically destroy the domestic economy and hit well-established economic and trade relations; it would lead to an utter crash of the miraculously balanced nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Considering these scenarios, it should be borne in mind that any of the potential war participants do not need them, and they will exhaust every effort to resolve the crisis in other ways. However, anybody who could benefit from it would use the tensions over Iran to solve their own problems.

Above all, it is true of Iran itself. The upcoming parliamentary elections in March 2012 could significantly affect the position of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iranians still remember the protests of thousands that accompanied his scandalous re-election to a second term. In addition, the contradictions between Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khomeini, the country’s spiritual leader, are no longer a secret.

All this testifies to the precariousness of the political position of the Iranian state’s head. Even an inexperienced reader can understand that only some extraordinary events could change the situation in his favor under these circumstances. Of these, the simplest and most obvious are the successes of the current government’s nuclear program, which are quite popular in Iranian society. Well, the president’s team would benefit from escalating an aggravating foreign policy situation to exploit an enemy’s image to mobilize Iranian voters—and, especially, the protesting youth—into supporting the main contender for the presidency.

In addition, the increasingly edgy course of Iran can be explained by the desire of the country’s leadership to obtain a more favorable starting position in its negotiation process with the international community on the prospects of its nuclear program.

At the same time, the majority of international experts are inclined not to dramatize the situation, as they believe that Tehran is hardly ready to unleash a war by deliberately exacerbating the situation in the Persian Gulf. In spite of its radicalism, the Iranian leadership is well aware that even with significant military power, the country will be unable to resist the coalition of the U.S., Israel and U.S. allied states of the Arabian Peninsula. They can demonstrate the infinite power of the “mosquito fleet” of the Revolutionary Guards, threatening aircraft carriers with suicide bombers on board speed boats. However, these asymmetrical actions are unlikely to cause more damage to the Western coalition than the Japanese kamikazes that threatened the U.S. Navy during World War II.

That is why Tehran, despite all its threats, did not proceed in its intention to block the passage of tankers through the Strait of Hormuz and focused on measures that would allow it to overcome the economic impact of the sanctions instead. This is a re-adjustment of oil imports from Europe to Asia and developing trade and economic relations with neighboring Turkey. In particular, at the Turkish-Iranian economic forum, which was held on Jan. 20 in Ankara during the visit of the head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, A. Salehi, to Turkey, the parties agreed to strengthen financial and trade cooperation. At the same time, the Turkish representatives said that their country would become a bridge used to transport Iranian natural resources, particularly oil and gas. (This statement, by the way, is worth attention in Ukraine, given the policy of the country’s government to seek alternative sources of energy supplies.)

The U.S. is also not interested in starting a military conflict in the Persian Gulf. The reason is not only the fabulous expenses for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also the political state of affairs on the eve of the presidential election in November 2012. The incumbent U.S. administration does not need “a small, victorious war” to convince American voters. First, the war against Iraq is unlikely to be small and triumphant. Second, American society is already fed up with the never-ending struggle against terrorists by eliminating overseas regimes hostile to the United States. To ensure success during the election, the current ruling Democrats need new achievements, preferably in the economic field.

The same is true of France, which will hold presidential elections soon. President Nicolas Sarkozy, who actively supported his country’s military involvement in the NATO-led operation in Libya, does not need any issues with potential Iranian military adventurism. Therefore, Sarkozy urges in public speeches that strikes on the Iranian nuclear facilities are avoided, which “will cause war and chaos” in his opinion.

The U.K. is among the leading world countries whose leadership is wise enough to not wage a war against Iran without the U.S., its main ally. London is ready to demonstrate its military pressure to Tehran and its military presence at some key points of oil routes, but it is only ready to go further with Washington’s support.

Israel remains the only influential regional player able to independently cross the threshold between the current fragile stability in the Persian Gulf and general chaos. This week, the British Sunday Times reported that the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces, Martin Dempsey, who visited Israel last weekend, has been advised that Tel Aviv will not ask for Washington’s permission to carry out a military operation against Iran. Moreover, Israel will supposedly notify the U.S. about its strike on the Iranian nuclear facilities just twelve hours before it actually starts. Now, that is a serious bid for a military solution to the Iranian problem.

In general, many experts expected this pace of development. Immediately following the public disclosure of the findings presented in the IAEA report in November, they came up with the hypothesis that Israel will wage a formal war against Iran and that Western leaders will stay aside.

However, Israel possibly has no intention to fight alone. Strikes against the Iranian facilities may, in fact, engage the U.S. into the conflict. Tel Aviv has no serious chances of achieving anything on its own except leading to major trouble, like a retaliatory missile strike and massive attack by Lebanese “Hezbollah.” Since nuclear weapons are unlikely to be used in the conflict, Israel simply does not have the physical ability to inflict significant damage to Iran. (The converse, of course, is also true.) From a military point of view, an Israeli attack on Iran is a daunting task. Before the destruction of the Iranian nuclear facilities themselves (highly protected from an engineering point of view), the attacking side will have to break the echeloned air defense and the missile defense on both the Iranian territory and the objects themselves. This will require careful planning, use of the full range of offensive weapons and a lot of time.

Moreover, an Israeli strike against Iran is questionable in terms of its consequences from a political point of view. As a result of the “Arab Spring,” the influential secular regimes in the region were toppled. Instead, they were replaced with moderate Islamists who have revised their predecessors’ pragmatic approaches in their relations with Israel. Therefore, Tel Aviv finds itself in a situation where it can no longer use the disagreements in the Arab world.

In addition, the conflict may involve not only Near Eastern countries. It is worth paying attention to the radical statements made by Pakistani and Chinese senior military personnel —who, by the way, remain nuclear states— of their readiness to side with Iran in case of the conflict’s escalation. Also, influential Russian analysts have published detailed projections of the participation of the Russian armed forces in a possible conflict—on the Iranian side, of course.

Finally, Israel has found itself in a tricky situation with previously loyal Turkey. On the one hand, Ankara has demonstrated its rejection of force against Iran. On the other hand, the U.S. has recently been diplomatically courting the Turkish leadership, hoping to place elements of the currently created missile defense system in its territory. No one can guarantee Tel Aviv that it will not remain with Iran alone if Americans have to make a choice. In the situation where American stability is at stake, the usual postulates declaring special relations between Israel, the U.S. and the pro-Israel lobby in Washington is unlikely to remain unrevised.

Tel Aviv understands this quite well. Therefore, there is a hope that the current hype about Israel’s readiness to attack Iran, created by mass media, is nothing (for now, at least) but pure propaganda. The Israelis want to tease Tehran with such statements to provoke belligerent rhetoric and reckless actions, making the world believe that Iran has the desire and intention to destroy the state of Israel.

If this is the case, and Tel Aviv has been bluffing, then the probability of an Israeli attack on Iran today remains low, provided that neither party does not make any silly mistakes. Tehran, on its part, will obviously make an attempt to somehow restore cooperation with the IAEA in order to gain some time and to trump its allies in the U.N. Security Council.

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