Will Iraq Become a Satellite of Iran?

Edited by Laurence Bouvard


U.S. senators have recently accused the Iraqi authorities of providing assistance to Bashar al-Assad’s regime or, more precisely, of providing an air route for Iranian planes carrying weapons for Syrian government troops. This scandal clearly shows the weakness of American influence on Nouri al-Maliki’s Shiite government, and raises the question: Has he decided to start playing his own games in the Middle East?

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki says with confidence that the resumption of planes flying through his territory was merely to transport humanitarian aid, and that the U.S. has not yet provided evidence of the delivery of military equipment and weapons from Iran to Syria.

If we assume that al-Maliki and Iran are acting in Shiite solidarity, then the question becomes considerably more important than that of Iran (with the cooperation of Iraq) merely providing assistance to Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. In the event of a military confrontation between Israel (or Israel and the U.S.) and Iran, Iraq would hypothetically be able to switch to Iran’s side (even if not openly), or at least secretly support Iran.

Were Iraq to completely reorient itself toward Iran, then it goes without saying that this would radically change the entire balance of power in the Middle East. This would mean not only the loss of U.S. allies in the region (which took so much money and U.S. soldier blood to achieve), but also that neighbors Iraq and Iran, under the control of Shiite governments, could become a powerful force, capable of dictating their will to other neighboring Arab countries.

In that case, the fact that Bashar al-Assad is losing power in Syria is no longer important to the Iranian mullahs’ regime. If it is already impossible to keep al-Assad in his post as president then, instead of Syria, they have another potential ally in Iraq, under the leadership of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. In this way, Iran is carrying out its very own geopolitical shuffling.

Iraq’s closer relations with Iran may lead to the “Kurdish Spring,” which is already making itself known in the region. This doesn’t mean that the “Arab Spring” is in decline. Iran has an extra interest in the fact that after the fall of al-Assad’s regime, the Kurdish question will become even more relevant, and the autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan will provoke the population of Iranian Kurdistan into action.

We have seen hints of a “Kurdish Spring” in the clashes between Kurds and the regular army in Turkey, and in the coordination of Kurdish action on all sides of the Kurdistan area borders. It would seem that the Kurdish people now consider that all the mess in the Middle East could help them to create an independent Kurdistan and, consequently, to begin controlling the flow of oil not only in Iraq, but also in Syria.

So that the Kurds will not be able to carry out their plans of finally pulling Iraq away from the influence of the United States, Iran wants to make Iraq into its very own satellite state. Since the U.S. completed the removal of its armed forces from Iraq at the end of 2011, Iraqi-Iranian ties have begun to grow noticeably stronger. For example, the revolutionary guards, “al-Quds Brigade,” have acquired a significant presence in Iraq.

Recently, more and more signs have been appearing to suggest that Iraq has the intention of becoming a satellite state of Iran. The presence of the “al-Quds Brigade” is one example of the strengthening of Iranian influence on Iraqi politics. Not only this, but the leader of the Brigade, Qasem Soleimani, recently boasted in the Arab press that Iran is already in control of Iraq and Southern Lebanon.

For this reason, American experts consider that “as Baghdad establishes closer and closer ties with Tehran, it would be necessary to reconsider [Iran’s] intentions to deliver 96 F-16 fighter aircraft to Iraq before 2015 as, given the situation in which Iraq currently finds itself, this would be a bad idea.”*

The Iranian clerical regime is fully backing Nouri al-Maliki, and emphasizes that, by establishing closer ties, it appears to be raising the level of security in the region, and in Iraq. This is regardless of the fact that in doing so, it is lending its support to dictatorial power in the country, and also that the majority of Iraqi people insist on al-Maliki leaving his governmental post.

Their reasons for lack of confidence in al-Maliki consist of his complete loyalty to Iran, constant meddling in the work of the judicial and legislative branches of government, his total failure to manage the country and his commitment to the bloody regime in Damascus.

Aside from this, though, al-Maliki’s sympathies toward Iran also hinge on the impossibility of his personally confronting his opponents throughout the current political crisis in Iraq caused, on one hand, by opposition to the prime minister and, on the other, by radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of Iraqi Kurds Massoud Barzani and by former head of the interim government Ayad Allawi.

So, in this way, Iranian interference in order to support Nouri al-Maliki shifted to a tacit agreement: that the prime minister would support Bashar al-Assad’s regime and permit the transfer of equipment and weapons from Iran to Syria.

According to our information from confidential sources, the Iranian proposition includes: support for al-Maliki with the aim of keeping him in his governmental post; the prevention of any manifestation of the public’s lack of confidence in him; and support for his candidature to the post of leader of the Iraqi parliament for a third term. In return, the Iranian military will open limited passage through Iraqi territory to Syria, in order to make the collapse of al-Assad’s regime impossible.

Since Iran has in its possession information suggesting that the fall of Bashar al-Assad is imminent, a large number of Iranian forces will act to protect and support al-Maliki in his post as prime minister.

It would seem that in attempting to prolong his own political career, the Iraqi prime minister has decided to compromise the administrative possibilities of his country, and practically its sovereignty as well. But will Iraq’s deliberate strengthening of ties with Iran come at too high a cost?

We have information that the U.S. is prepared to respond by deploying its fighter aircraft at military bases in Kirkuk, Northern Iraq, and at Nasiriyah in the south, in order to confront potential Iranian intervention in Iraq during Iran’s mission in the military aid of Syria.

American fighter aircraft will stay at these bases until the situation in Syria has stabilized after Bashar al-Assad’s fall from power. America wishes to retain the possibility of using troops to bar Iranian military intervention in Syrian affairs from Iraqi territory, and of using its air defense system to protect Iraqi cities from Iranian or Syrian attacks.

Today, Iraq is becoming a victim of Iranian intervention in its affairs. The cases of mass murders, terrorism and genocide against the Iraqi people, as well as the activities of armed terrorist groups on Iraqi soil, are a direct consequence of interference by the Iranian mullahs’ regime. This is the main reason for the extremely unstable and volatile situation in the country.

Iran wants to control Iraq. If it succeeds, Iraq could become Iran’s political key to controlling the whole Middle East, not just Syria and Lebanon. It is obvious that Tehran has done everything possible to block the feasibility of a smooth transfer toward Western-style democracy. But the paradox of Iraq’s policy toward Iran is that the mullahs’ regimes do not want a strong Iraq as their neighbor, even if Shiite Muslims were to come to power in the country.

Today, Iran has a lot of influence in Iraq. We must include the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and intelligence officers, who have been working in Iraq for many years and who, at the time of the U.S. troops’ withdrawal, had a complex, strong network of agents in the country.

Iran would like to aggressively threaten American interests, not just in Iraq, but in the whole Middle Eastern region, using the wide range of methods available to it.

As a consequence, U.S. attempts to neutralize Iran’s efforts to form an unstable situation in Iraq will play a key role in determining to what extent Tehran will be able to influence the wider political changes in the region.

*Editor’s Note: Although this quote is accurately translated, the original English source could not be verified.

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