Egypt and the Failure of American Diplomacy

On June 4, 2009, in an epic speech — as it was considered at the time, since the new American leader represented the hope of change in the world — Barack Obama suggested a fresh start in relations between the Muslim world and the West.

This proposal was made in the midst of an image void that Washington was experiencing in the Muslim world, generated by the previous, warrior Bush administration. Four years later, in Tahrir Square where Obama held his spectacle-like speech, the Egyptian Armed Forces were opening full fire, killing over 600 people, according to an unfinished report of the darkest day in the recent history of the most populated Arab country.

Not only was that fresh start delayed, just as the widely acclaimed “fresh” relationship with Russia failed to happen, with no chances of ever happening for that matter, but the Obama administration seems to be falling down the same pit of resentment because of the confrontational policy to which the White House is still holding, despite some poor attempts to break away from his Republican predecessor. Moreover, America’s crass inability to break this pattern is now clearly visible in Egypt.

Since the beginning of the “Egyptian Spring,” which brought down Hosni Mubarak, Washington has had the wrong approach toward Egypt. This led to many hesitant messages sent to Cairo. Egypt was already a much too sensitive matter for the Americans, as it represented — and maybe it still does — Iran’s regional counterweight and followed American policies regarding the Jewish country.

Apart from their uncertain position during the Cairo riots in the winter of 2010 to 2011, Americans continued to send out disparate messages to both the Islamists and the liberals in Egypt. They opposed the removal of Mohammed Morsi, the first Egyptian president to be elected democratically in the last five decades, with the purpose of not invalidating the free elections and setting a bad example, as well as creating a precedent in a region where the Arab Spring left behind a lot of instability.

After July 3, the White House struggled to explain whether what Cairo had experienced was a military coup d’etat. It never said it in so many words, for fear of becoming even more estranged from the Egyptian army whose vast majority of generals are the result of the military aid Washington gave to Egypt during Mubarak’s leadership.

After the massacre on Wednesday, the U.S. condemned the army’s actions, but failed to mention suspending the annual aid of $1.5 billion given to Egypt, a fair amount of money by any consideration, especially for a financially decaying country, and consequently a successful pressure lever for Washington. Across the ocean, many are raising their voices, asking the White House to adopt a clearer position.

Settling for sentencing 600 people to death after having overlooked a coup d’etat means directly cancelling, not just undermining, the democracy campaign that, among others, stood behind the recent conflicts generated by the United States in the Muslim world. Hence, Washington’s lack of a categorical attitude only leads to the conviction, both in Egypt and elsewhere, that it supports a military regime that has the power to overturn at any time the results of democratic elections and even more, to trample the human rights that were once the headstone of the Arab Spring and the same human rights that Obama wanted to export to the Muslim world in 2009. In a nutshell, America is on the verge of becoming the perfect example of hypocrisy.

The Americans wanted to build in Egypt a model of democratic transition to serve for other nations escaping from a long dictatorship. They failed big time. Anyone who is elected as the next president of Egypt will lack legitimacy and will probably lack reformist enthusiasm for fear of being another disturbance. Moreover, the massacre on Wednesday will strengthen the Muslim’s Brotherhood conviction that it is politically oppressed, just as it was under Mubarak, which will only lead to them gaining an electoral advantage.

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