The US Return to Strategy

The onslaught of the Islamic State fanatics in Iraq and Syria forced the U.S. to focus its interest once again on a territory it has wanted to disengage from to the greatest possible degree. For U.S. President Barack Obama, strategy in the Middle East and Central Asia was mainly based on targeting strikes against terrorist organizations and a steady withdrawal of military forces from Afghanistan, as had been the case in Iraq in 2011. The day before yesterday, during his speech, Obama announced the plan for taking down terrorists of the self-proclaimed Islamic State and signaled a dynamic comeback to the territory with a strategy that holds both hope and risks.

On the eve of the 13th anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, Obama had two objectives concerning his fellow citizens: first of all, to persuade them that Islamic State poses a severe threat to U.S. security and its interests, and second, to reassure them that he does not intend to lead the country into another war. The Islamic State has already proved how dangerous it is. However, Obama had to convince the public that he would not repeat the mistakes of the disastrous 2003 invasion of Iraq and its subsequent occupation. He underscored that the U.S. was forging a broad coalition with Arab, Muslim and European countries against the Islamic State; while the U.S. would provide aircraft and military advisers, the Iraqi military, Kurdish fighters, Shiite militia and other members of the coalition would conduct ground operations. The plan is to create a wall of countries sharing borders with Iraq and Syria, to reinforce the enemies of Islamic State — both national and religious groups — inside Iraq and Syria, and to recruit countries like Saudi Arabia, which is accommodating a military base for the training of Syrian fighters. The atrocities of Islamic State jihadi have even led some of their former supporters to join forces with rivals in order to eliminate a greater threat than others they had faced. So, the U.S. is collaborating with Iran and the Iraqi army with the Kurds, while Iran and Saudi Arabia are on the same side for the first time. Collective strategy might work in Iraq but only if the country’s Sunnis, particularly the extremists who support or tolerate the Islamic State, embrace the mostly Shiite government in Baghdad, being persuaded of its intention for them to participate and not be excluded.

Collective action toward a common enemy might open up new channels of communication among the leading players in the area. There’s a risk, however, that one group might be reinforced to the detriment of the others, leading to instability. The U.S. intends to strengthen anti-regime war groups, the government and Islamic State. Their dominance would possibly lead to a similar situation prevalent after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the dissolution of state institutions and security forces led to chaos, which still persists. We do not know whether part of the American strategy in Syria is that the threat of the Islamic State paved the way for political transition without the country’s collapse.