If South Korea, the US and Japan Clash with North Korea, China Cannot Stop Them

The foreign ministers of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan used the meeting of the U.N. General Assembly to issue their first joint statement since 2010, regarding North Korean nuclear tests. South Korea’s minister of foreign affairs, Yun Byung-se, stated that all three parties agreed that North Korea must pay additional costs for its newest provocation. America’s secretary of state, John Kerry, urged North Korea to freeze its nuclear test plans so as to promote the start of serious negotiations among the countries involved.

Recent reports in America and South Korea say analysts believe that, based on satellite imagery, North Korea may have already finished preparatory work for its third round of underground nuclear testing; another test could begin at any time.

The three-party joint statement demonstrated their unyielding posture toward North Korea, but it also revealed serious anxiety over the difficulty of remedying the possible reality of another nuclear test with international sanctions. These three head diplomats may well be quite skeptical of the prescription they have written proving useful thus far. However, they continue to display such an unwavering stance because the three countries have already lost the creativity to otherwise deal with North Korea in their policy; regardless of whether or not it works, they only have one trick up their sleeve.

North Korea has already displayed strong resistance to international sanctions, and its goal of developing self-sustaining nuclear capabilities is largely taking shape. On the one hand, South Korea, America and Japan are strengthening sanctions as if they are trying to wring a cloth even drier, and on the other, North Korean nuclear and ballistic tests continue to produce breakthroughs. At the very least, Pyongyang will soon adopt a much more active posture.

What is worse is that the already isolated Pyongyang appears to be misusing this initiative, pushing the situation toward the brink. At present, the North Korean nuclear threat is still a theoretical one, such that some even see it as fictional. But if North Korea was to actually complete its warhead miniaturization and nuclear ballistics [project], its threat to America would become all the more real and urgent – what would happen then? Surely, the thought of impetuous conflict has flashed through the minds of those policymakers facing this problem.

China faces serious difficulties in influencing North Korea, to say nothing of satisfying South Korea, the U.S. and Japan. While we have certainly exerted much effort, it is increasingly clear that the deteriorating situation has fallen out of China’s hands. China is firmly opposed to war or disturbance in the Korean Peninsula, but this is itself only an attitude and general goal to work toward; it cannot be an absolute duty that exceeds those we have elsewhere.

If the conflict between North Korea and South Korea, Japan and the U.S. begins to become irrational, China must then consider both striving to block this conflict as well as gradually building power that will prevent its being dragged into the chaos of the peninsula. At first glance this seems quite daunting, but it is still possible.

As it stands, South Korea, the United States, Japan and North Korea all have impractical demands of China. China must make both sides accustomed to our present stance and gradually relieve them of their fantasies. On this basis, China must greatly expand its ability to guard against threats to its interests on the peninsula and publicly establish red lines, such as a minimum distance of North Korea nuclear tests from the Chinese border, that South Korean and American deployments cannot directly threaten China, and so on.

If China allows North Korea to contend against America, Japan and South Korea, if both sides wished to avoid war, perhaps by the time they became deeply concerned about a single spark igniting the fire they would be all the more willing to heed China’s view, taking a step back under China’s purview.

Maintaining a low profile during this period of time does not at all mean that China is actively abandoning its influence in Northeast Asia; we can utilize this time to improve our strategic nuclear force and to strengthen the military’s rapid-response capability regarding the peninsula, demonstrating in the end our say in the matter. As a result of both geographic and historical considerations, powerful China must speak softly and carry a big stick. The problems in the peninsula are exceedingly complex, and Chinese interests are often sidelined. The situation in the Korean Peninsula must be made cleaner and simpler; the more this is so, the less these issues can serve as a public nuisance for China.

China ought to make some preparations for the worst-case scenario on the Korean Peninsula, while simultaneously striving for the best outcome, but it mustn’t overextend itself in doing so. If China has a means to cope with the worst possible outcome, then everything else is well. In this way, we can recover a sense of strategic ease in the region.