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By Fabian Calle

June 23, 2005

El Diario Exterior - Original Article (Spanish)

The Venezuelan government has begun a process of military modernization. In this effort, he has signed an agreement a $120 million contract with Russia for the acquisition of 10 helicopters (7 transport helicopters and 3 offensive helicopters). In addition, the purchase of 100,000 Russian AK-104 assault rifles is expected. What's more, the acquisition of Buenos Aires of 20 advanced AMX-T trainer aircraft from Brazil's EMBRAER Corp. is taking shape, and it will soon acquire 12 Spanish-made CASA 295 cargo planes and naval vessels for patrolling the Venezuelan coast, which valued at nearly $1.7 billion.

In the case of Spain, the agreement on cargo planes and naval vessels [for Buenos Aires] was preceded by the cancellation of a sale to Colombia of 40 AMX-30 tanks and Mirage F-1 combat aircraft, which had been offered by the government of [former [Spanish President] Aznar. Also, Venezuela has shown interest in acquiring fighter aircraft like the Russian MIG-29. In this regard, conversations with Brazil for a possible joint-production on the have been taking place. All of this in the context of almost two years of extremely high oil prices (although lower in real terms than prices existing during the oil shortages of 1973 and 1979), with Venezuela the supplier of approximately 15% of the crude oil consumed by the United States and with several thousand gas stations on American territory owned by the Venezuelan State.

The decisions of Caracas have generated resentment in a diverse array of countries in the region, but especially in the United States and Colombia. Washington has expressed its restlessness over Venezuela's arms shopping spree, and especially its decision to update all of its assault rifles with a new version of Russian manufacture. The Pentagon and the Department of State are alarmed over the possible deflection of these weapons into the hands of rebel fighters in the turbulent conflict in Colombia. The Undersecretary of Defense for the Western Hemispheric Affairs, Roger Pardo-Maurer, affirmed that he himself is overseeing the development of a new U.S. policy to deal with Venezuela, and that the hour for implementing the new strategy is drawing closer.

He added that President Hugo Chávez is taking advantage of social and political instability in the region to forward his own interests on other countries, and he warned that the incorporation of advanced weaponry (airplanes, boats, etc.) from Brazil, Spain and Russia into the Chávez' arsenal of will likely bring sorrow when the weapons, rather than being used for interstate conflicts where Washington sees little risk of confronting asymmetric tactics [guerilla warfare] are handed over to rebels fighting [U.S.-backed government forces]  in Colombian territory.

The Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, General Bantz J. Craddock, [in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in March], affirmed that although the possibility of interstate wars in Latin America is low, it remains the most violent region in the world, with an average of 27.5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In arguing that the situation could easily affect the region's political and economic stability, Craddock mentioned the poverty, corruption and the injustice that characterize the area, and said it is the region's fertile agricultural regions that nurture the idea of "Radical Populism." Craddock indicated that the countries in question probably lose about 10% of their GDP every year to corruption. Finally, he praised the 3.5% to 5% increases in the Colombian Defense budget and President Uribe's decision to increase pressure on lawmakers to make the difficult fiscal choice to protect the nation's security and face the costs of the war.

In statements made at the beginning of April, the U.S. Defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, declared that the problems related to armed groups, narcotics traffickers, arms dealers and kidnappers that occur across the hemisphere and over much of the world, require active collaboration and coordination between countries. He also maintained that Venezuela is not a constructive partner in ending the conflict in Colombia, but that he had no evidence of any direct aid from Caracas to guerrilla groups. Finally, he described as "ridiculous" the idea that the United States would attack that country or Chávez.

On the other hand, Venezuela argues that its arms purchases are just a normal part of updating and replacing armaments for the military and of security, and that it’s main objective now is to fight against the increasing problem of drug trafficking and the violence of armed groups that operate along the Colombian border. It also argues that the new war material will partly compensate for the armament transfers from the United States to Colombia under the now defunct "Plan Colombia" (effective between 2000 and 2004) and now Plan Patriotic.

Those that tend to see International Relations without placing all emphasis on ideological issues remember that in 1987, Bogota and Caracas were on the verge of going to war over their still-disputed land and sea borders, much of which are considered rich in petroleum.

Also, Colombia's internal conflict seems a long way from ending. After almost two years of FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] withdrawals, a recent report by one of Colombia's main security think tanks, the Foundation for Security and Democracy, states that the FARC's present strategy of strategic and ordered withdrawal is to avoid direct confrontations with State forces, but to wear them down. It adds, that FARC is looking to not only attack mobile units Colombian Army and security units, but fixed facilities as well.

These and other factors have brought an increased number of confrontations, but of lower intensity and with fewer losses (during the government of [former Colombian President Pastrana, 1998-2002], an average of 3 guerrillas and 0.6 government troops were killed, whereas at the present time, the figures have dropped to 1.2 and 0.3, respectively). Other statistics also confirm this. Whereas the Pastrana government, according to the document, ended with a proportion of 12 guerrillas killed for each military man, in the first year of the Uribe government, the numbers were reduced to 8 to 1; and in the second Uribe year 10 to 1.

The document indicates that from the beginning to the end of the Uribe Administration it is likely that there will be a 71% increase in the number of government forces killed compared to the four years of Pastrana. Since that time, there has been a marked increase in attacks against State forces in both the South and the North of the country, which have resulted in more than 100 deaths between February and April of this year. In wider geographical terms, this suggests that the acquisitions of weapons systems from outside the area in not just a problem restricted to the North end of the Andean zone.

[Editor's Note: In other words, the Northeastern border with Venezuela is not the only place weapons transfers to rebels are a danger. To the south, Colombia has borders with Brazil, Peru and Ecuador, and attacks on U.S.-backed Colombian forces are coming from these areas with increasing frequency].

Looking further south, the nation of Chile has a Defense budget of nearly 4.2% of GDP, and maintains an active program of arms acquisition facilitated by the high price of copper and the "Secret" law that 10% of the proceeds from products produced in Chile for export go into a special fund for the Armed Forces. In this way, we know that, based on the price of raw copper over the past two years, about $240 million went to the Armed Forces for the acquisition of war material. The strong rise of copper prices during 2004 was determinative in this sense. Chile's Ministry of Defense has said that most of the funds have gone to pay the debts of previous purchases, including; the Chile's first F-16CD fighter aircraft (of a total of 10) expected at the beginnings of 2006; two Scorpene submarines of Spanish-French manufacture; as well as the decision taken by the Defense Ministry in the 2004 to pursue the purchase of frigates and missile destroyers from Holland and Great Britain (at a cost of $350 million); and consideration of accepting an offer from the Netherlands to buy at least 12 F-16B fighter aircraft. There are also plans to progressively increase the number of soldiers volunteering for military service. In connection with this, last year Chilean troops carried out exercises in the north of the country, the hypothesis of which was a simultaneous confrontation with two neighboring countries, one of which tried to invade from the sea.

The ultimate coast to the Chilean Air Force of purchasing 10 F-16CD fighter aircraft from the Lockheed Martin Corporation will far surpass the originally quoted price of $700 million, and will approach $1.3 billion. For this reason, Chile has instead been looking into air-air systems of medium reach, such as missiles, and is considering maintaining its 50 Mirage-Panther fighters (modernized with Israeli technology at the end of the 1980s and 90s) and the purchase of second-hand F-16s from Holland or Turkey.

In order to keep up the maintenance program for its [French Dassault] Mirage 50, Chile plans to purchase 12 Mirage/Cheetah aircraft from South Africa (a version modified by South Africa with Israel's assistance) to use for spare parts. With respect to the political context of the region's defense, one of the first statements of Jaime Ravinet as he took up the post of minister of defense [of Chile] in October of 2004 emphasized the need to reinforce the lines of communication and consultation between defense ministries in the region, and especially in South America, "since in the end, diplomatic tensions in many cases are related to questions of defense and the national security."

In the case of Brazil, Minister of Defense and Vice President Jose Alencar recently announced the decision to cancel plans to acquire 12 to 24 fighter aircraft (the F-16E of the United States, Mig-29 of Russia, the Swedish-Briton Gripen, the French Mirage 2000-5 or the Russian ITS-35 were all under consideration). Alencar argued that there was no immediate need for the planes and that within 3-4 years there will appear a new generation of aircraft and technologies. In addition to this, Brazil has already taken delivery of second-hand F-16s from the United States (although only equipped to shoot medium-range missies), second-hand Mirage 2000C from France, and second-hand Kfir aircraft from Israel. Holland and Belgium have offered to sell him F-16 Ts and Bs (without missiles, but equipped with software to utilize missiles). As earlier indicated, Chile's air force has also shown interest in this supply.

Despite this cancellation, the Brazilian Air Force is plowing ahead with its modernization, with 46 F5-E American-built fighter aircraft retrofitted with Israeli technology. These will be operational by 2010. The modernization of Brazil's air power will be complete with the addition of 76 Super turboprop Tucano aircraft (that will operate inside the Amazon region with special SIVAM radar [to identify natural resources and those that illegally steal them]) and 53 AMX tactical ground attack aircraft.

So, despite its decision to cancel some arms purchases, Brazil is showing the will of reinvigorate its capacity in the sector of defense and security. Minister of Defense Alencar emphasized in March his decision to fully-leverage Brazil's presence in the international and regional arms market to better-develop its military-industrial complex. Its present level of exports at nearly $300 million is a far cry from 1.5 billion levels during the 1980s. In order to accomplish this, the Ministry of Defense, private security services and arms manufacturers have recently designed a "National Program of the Military Industrialization." The plan promises fiscal incentives, export credits and research projects between universities and the private sector. In this context, in September of 2004 the Lula government authorized an increase of $300 million in the 2005 defense budget of Defense.

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