By Kim Young-soo*

October 11, 2006
South Korea - JoongAng Ilbo - Original Article (English)    

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, center, with three former
Presidents: Kim Dae-jung, left, Kim Young-sam, second from left,
and Chun Doo-hwan, right. They met to discuss how to respond
to the North Korean Nuclear test, Oct. 11. (above).

—BBC NEWS VIDEO: North Korea's Nuclear 'strongly
condemned' by U.N. Security Council, Oct. 9, 00:02:31

[SLIDE SHOW: North Korean Nuclear Test].

North Korean soldiers stand guard at the truce village of Panmunjom,
in the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, Oct. 11. (below).





South Korea's top military commanders at an emergency meeting
at the headquarters of the Defense Ministry in Seoul, Oct. 10. (above).


Children of U.S. military personnel or civilians attached to
the U.S. military perform a rescue drill at their school in the
headquarters of U.S Forces Korea, Seoul, Oct. 10. (below).


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Now that North Korea is armed with nuclear weapons, a dark cloud of danger hangs over South Korea. If the first inter-Korean Summit held on June 15, 2000 was a green light for North-South relations, this crisis is a significant and inauspicious flashing red light.

Why did Pyongyang proceed with an underground nuclear test less than a week after proclaiming its intention to do so? By making good on its pledge, Pyongyang sent a message that puts it in a far stronger position for the inevitable bargaining to come, over the nuclear crisis it has precipitated. By word and deed, Pyongyang has shown that it isn't the "boy who cried wolf."

Moreover, it took the spotlight off of its hindrance of Six-Party talks by putting the blame for its latest drastic action squarely on Washington's shoulders. To have delayed its nuclear test would only have made the situation less advantageous for them.

Another direct cause of the test is the extraordinary domestic situation. Although the test is said to have lifted North Korean military morale for the first time since the missile tests on July 5, recent flooding has left North Korea with a severe shortage of food, and even soldiers were left with nothing but meals of corn. The flood also resulted in drastic price increases and a surge of North Korean defectors crossing the border. The well-connected are abusing their power to accumulate wealth, meaning the rich are getting richer while the poor are getting poorer.

In addition, the North Korean government has been unable to completely shut off the flow of information into the country, so North Korean residents are increasingly aware of the situation they face.

Kim Jong-il was undoubtedly very upset over the domestic instability. After all, unless the regime remains very tightly bound, Pyongyang will be unable to impose communism on South Korea and manage a showdown with the American imperialists. Therefore, to try and maximize the unity of the regime, he decided to play the nuclear card.

The proof of this is Pyongyang's praise of the nuclear test as, "an historic event that greatly encouraged and pleased the Korean People's Army and the people that have wished to have a powerful and self-reliant defense capability."

So how will the United States handle North Korea at this juncture? First of all, Washington will establish a framework for global cooperation on sanctions. Not only will it propose a strong resolution at the United Nations Security Council, but it will raise the intensity of the economic sanctions. The justification for the sanctions is so clear that even China, Russia and South Korea are bound to go along.

But the great likelihood is that each country will have different positions on military sanctions. Beijing and Moscow will at first oppose them, and the South Korea, after having nurtured inter-Korean ties, will find it hard to join in the military sanctions backed by the U.S. and Japan.

Meanwhile, North Korea will hint that it is ready to return to Six-Party Talks if the U.S. shows that it will end its hostile policies by first lifting economic sanctions.

Pyongyang must have determined that it would be advantageous for them to provoke the pride of Washington's neocons. Under this theory, if United States doesn't back down and cooperate with their plans, it will play the missile card again and show that it can deliver a nuclear warhead.

As the situation had worsened, the eyes of the international community have become focused on China's role. But unlike its position in the past [being opposed to a nuclear-armed North Korea], we cannot rule out the possibility that China might decide that a nuclear armed North Korea is beneficial to Chinese security.

Beijing might have a secret plan that disposes it to cooperate with a nuclear North Korea, so as to more effectively restrain the influence of the United States and Japan in regard to China.

Kim Jong-il: Not 'the boy who cried wolf.'


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Pyongyang is very much in tune with the inner workings of Beijing, and knowing very clearly that it is its ally, Pyongyang notified China of the nuclear test 20 minutes beforehand.

Now that a nuclear test has been conducted right under its nose, the Republic of Korea finds itself in a most pitiful situation. The longstanding basis of South Korea's foreign, security and unification policies has been not to tolerate a North Korean nuclear program.

Now the South Korean government must chart a new course. With North Korea joining the nuclear club, a Northeast Asian arms race will follow and tensions on the Korean Peninsula are sure to increase. We don't have the luxury of arguing over who is responsible for the crisis. It is extremely urgent that we come up with a strategy for national survival in the face of a nuclear-armed North Korea. We mustn't add to the crisis with internal discord.

*The writer is a professor of political science at Sogang University.