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September 20, 2005

Original Article (English)

The 'Dear Leader' and His Generals Strut Their Stuff for the Cameras.

Pyongyang: A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry issued a statement at the close of the fourth round six-party talks. The full text reads as follows:

The second phase of the fourth round of six-party talks on the nuclear issue between the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea and the United States, that opened in Beijing on Sept. 13, drawing the attention of the international community, closed on Sept. 19.

The talks that began in August 2003 due to North Korea's positive initiative have been held several times for over two and a half years,  undergoing through many twists and turns.

The talks, however, had repeatedly proven fruitless and unproductive due to the conflicting stands among the parties, contrary to the unanimous wish of the international community to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. We have approached the talks with magnanimity, patience and sincerity, proceeding from a principled, fair and aboveboard stand to achieve the basic goal of denuclearizing the peninsula at any cost. As a result, we have at last succeeded in meeting these challenges, making it possible to agree on a joint statement of "verbal commitments."

Korea at Night. From North Korea, No Light Escapes.

The joint statement reflects what has been our consistent position on how to settle the nuclear issue between North Korea and the U.S. and, at the same time, U.S. and South Korean commitments to denuclearize the entire peninsula. As is already known, the issue over which North Korea and the United States have had the most serious differences is the issue of the former's right [North Korea's right] to peaceful nuclear activity, specifically, the question of America's provision of light water reactors to the former. It was due to these differences that the first phase of the fourth round of talks held last August was forced into recess without yielding the desired fruit. The present U.S. administration, denying in principle North Korea's right to peaceful nuclear activity - which pertains to the independent rights of a sovereign state - insisted that it could not in any case provide the light water reactors, under the pretext that Pyongyang had pulled out of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and is no longer member of the IAEA. Opposing Washington's incorrect stand, we made it clear that the only basis for finding a solution to the nuclear question between us is to wipe out the historic distrust we share, and that the best way to do this would be to lay the groundwork for building bilateral confidence - that is - for the U.S. to provide the light-water reactors to North Korea. So we demanded that the U.S. remove the root cause of our withdrawal from the NPT by providing us with light-water reactors.

At the talks, all the parties except the U.S. supported the idea of respecting North Korea's right to peaceful nuclear activity and providing it with reactors.

This time the U.S. delegation, under pressure due to the general trend of the talks, contacted Washington several times and in the end had no option but to withdraw its assertion. The six-parties agreed to harmoniously implement, in phases, the points agreed to in the joint statement in line with the principle of "action for action" in the days ahead.

As is made clear in the joint statement, immediately upon the provision of light-water reactors by the United States, we will return to the NPT and sign and comply with the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. To us, this is the basis of confidence-building.

As we have already clarified more than once, we would feel no need to keep even a single nuclear weapon if North Korean-United States relations were normalized, bilateral confidence were strengthened and we were no longer exposed to the U.S. nuclear threat.

What is most essential is, therefore, for the U.S. to provide reactors to North Korea as quickly as possible, in order to substantially prove its recognition of our right to nuclear activity for peaceful purposes.
The U.S. should not even dream that North Korea would dismantle its nuclear deterrent before providing it with light-water reactors, which is a physical guarantee of confidence-building. This is our just and consistent position, which is as solid and as a deeply-rooted rock. Up until now, we have shaped our policies as a reaction to the U.S. hardliners,  and will continue to do so.

We will wait and see how the U.S. behaves in the "action for action" phase of the agreement, but should it again insist on "North Korean dismantlement of nuclear weapons before the provision of light-water reactors," there will be no progress over the nuclear issue between the two sides, and the consequences will be very serious and complicated.

If the U.S. opts to renege on its promise, we will forge ahead without even a hint of hesitation along the road indicated by the Songun line, which is our faith and signpost.

[Editor's Note: The "Songon Line" or the Songun Ideal are said to have been introduced by Kim Jong-il in 1995 as an offshoot of the "Juche" Ideal, which means, essentially, "Self Reliance." The Songun Line is like Stalinist Communism on steroids. Like the former Soviets, it emphasizes the military over the quality of life of its people as a necessary stage in the nation's development. This is how the regime explains why the "Worker's Paradise" is more like a living hell. Here is an excerpt from a Korean News article that seeks to explain the Songun Ideal:

Songun means regarding military affairs as the greatest of State affairs ... Some people ask: "Why do north Koreans pay priority to military affairs while going hungry?" and "Can the gun feed people?" As they say, the gun cannot give people food. But the essence of the Songun idea is that Even though the gun of the revolutionary army cannot make a meal, it can create something even more valuable. Those with the guns of revolution have it within their power to create ideological and political life].