HOME	Where the World's Views of America Come into Focus

May 2, 2005

Original Article (Italian)

The omitted sections tell who began shooting, but also describe a series of incredible communication failures between U.S. Forces responsible for policing the road where the incident occured.

The names, the errors, the delays: Here is what was omitted [from the publicly released Pentagon report]. The soldiers who shot at Calipari were on high alert because they were apparently unaware that [U.S.] Ambassador John Negroponte had already returned safely to Baghdad by helicopter, and would not be passing through the checkpoint.

ROME – The "omissions" of the final report of the commission investigating the Calipari case can be subdivided into three sections: a first section, more or less up to page 23, describes the situation on the long "Route Irish." [An East-West road along south Baghdad. It is approximately 12km-long and runs from the International Zone in downtown Baghdad to the Baghdad International Airport. The highway is a four-lane road with a 50-meter-wide median], commonly referred to as " the deadliest road in Iraq;" the training of the soldiers at several checkpoints; the rules of engagement. They have also omitted sections that show the names of the battalions involved in these operations.

The second part (up to page 37) describes the [friendly fire] incident, the men who were involved with the shooting, the American chain of command and the problems that arose that day [March 4^th]. Here, the results of the report were classified (and, therefore, covered), above all, the names of the soldiers involved, the communication problems, nearly all of which involved the the "procession" of the “Very Important Person" (Ambassador John Negroponte) who was to pass along that road.

The last section of the report contains recommendations in response to the events, including changing the procedures and the organization of checkpoints in war zones to prevent any repeat of this incident.

THE 'IRISH ROUTE' AND THE CHECKPOINT

The first major erasures regard the names of the battalions involved in the vicissitudes of traffic control at Post 541 [the checkpoint where the events occurred]. They are: the 3^rd Infantry Division, A Company of the 1-69th Infantry (connected to the 2^nd Combat Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division), and the 1-76 Field Artillery Battalion.

In the first part of the document, the omitted text covers, above all, the difficult situation on the section of road that connects Baghdad to its airport: the many attacks that have taken place there recently, several of the techniques used by terrorists to place  [explosive] devices on the road, etc.

Here the paragraph titles introduce the various erased sections: "The Local Security Situation," "Enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures," "Effectiveness of their attacks,""Recent incidents and victims at checkpoint 541," "Experience of the units involved in the area of Baghdad," "Actions of the Soldiers manning the Traffic Control Point," "Training of the soldiers manning the Traffic Control Point," and "Rules of engagement and training received by soldiers of traffic control post 541."

THE INCIDENT AT CHECKPOINT 541

Recalling that that Traffic Control Point 541 had the task of "sealing" access to the "Irish Route" in preparation for the passage of U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte and of preventing unknown vehicles from approaching the main road, the primary omissions were the names of the soldiers manning Checkpoint 541.

They are:

Captain Michael Drew, the commander of Company "A," which had the task of controlling the "Route Irish" and establishing and managing the necessary traffic control posts. He is a member of the New York National Guard and Sergeant with the New York Police Department.

First Lieutenant Robert Daniels, Executive officer of “A" Company. He is also a member of the New York National Guard.

Second Lieutenant Nicolas Acosta, platoon leader at Checkpoint 541, and a member of the Louisiana National Guard.

Sergeant Sean O'Hara of the Louisiana National Guard supervised the “overwatch vehicle" (a special armored vehicle responsible for actually Checkpointing the road).

Sergeant Luis Domangue of the Louisiana National Guard was the second rifleman in the vehicle.

Specialist Kenneth Mejia, Louisiana National Guard, was the driver of the overwatch vehicle at Checkpoint 541, and a trained combat lifesaver.

Sergeant Michael Brown, of the New York National Guard and member of the New York police. He was the acting Platoon Sergeant at Checkpoint 541 and the truck commander of the checkpointing vehicle.

Specialist Mario Lozano, New York Army National Guard, was the gunner on the checkpointing vehicle at BP 541 on 4 March 2005. He had been an M240B and M249 gunner in previous assignments.

Specialist Mario Lozano of the New York Army National Guard was the gunner on the checkpointing vehicle, and the man who began shooting.

Specialist Brian Peck of New York Army National Guard was the driver of the checkpointing vehicle at Checkpoint 541.

Sergeant First Class Edwin Feliciano of the New York Army National Guard was with the Company commander’s vehicle.

The other protagonists are, obviously, Nicholas Calipari, Giuliana Sgrena and Andrea Carpani, the third man in the Toyota Corolla, who was also a major with the Italian intelligence service.

THE COMMUNICATIONS

Successive omissions in this section discuss communications in regard to the convoy of U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte, that because of bad weather had to travel by road [the Route Irish] to Camp Victory [the largest Coalition military facility in Baghdad], rather than take a helicopter.

In two crossed-out paragraphs, the report explains that communications from the Negroponte convoy reached the 1-76 Field Artillery Battalion, but not the 4th brigade, which was in control of the road.

In the successive pages the report discusses the dynamics of the incident. Here, in truth, there is little new information. The report says that the car was traveling at an elevated speed (50 miles per hour) and that the car followed correct procedures. What was omitted from the report was the name of the soldier that fired first.

Now we know that person to be Specialist Mario Lozano, a New Yorker of Hispanic origin. He's the man who shot.

{The following is the section of the report that relates directly to the shooting.}

Both Specialist Lozano and Sergeant Domangue perceived the car to be traveling in excess of 50 mph.The car crossed the Alert Line still heading towards the Soldiers’ position without slowing down. Specialist Lozano continued to shine the spotlight, and shouted at the vehicle to stop, a fruitless effort, but an instantaneous reaction based on his training. Without slowing down, the car continued toward the Warning Line with the spotlight and laser still on it.

The car continued to approach at a high rate of speed, coming closer to the Soldiers than any other vehicle that evening. When the car got to the Warning Line, Specialist Lozano, while still holding the spotlight in his left hand, used his right hand to quickly fire a two to four round burst into a grassy area to the on-coming vehicle’s right as a warning shot. The vehicle maintained its speed as it went beyond the Warning Line.

Staff Sergeant Brown, a New York City Police Officer trained in vehicle speed estimation, estimated the car was traveling at 50 mph and believed that it would not be able to stay on the road around the curve at that speed.

Specialist Lozano dropped the spotlight and immediately traversed his weapon from his left to his right, without having to move the turret, to orient on the front of the car. With both hands on the weapon, he fired another burst, walking the rounds from the ground on the passenger’s side of the vehicle and towards the car’s engine Checkpoint in an attempt to disable it

Mr. Carpani reacted by saying into the phone, “they are attacking us," not knowing who was shooting at him. He stepped on the brakes, curled up on the left side of the car, and dropped the phone.

Specialist Lozano stopped firing as he saw the car slow down and roll to a stop. Approximately four seconds had elapsed between the firing of the first round and the last round, and no more than seven seconds from the time the car crossed the Alert Line until it came to a stop.]

All these events happen around 8:50 pm.

Within that hour, at 7:45 pm, the convoy of John Negroponte quietly left Baghdad’s international Zone and arrived at Camp Victory at 8:10 pm, from where he was to board a helicopter back to Baghdad a little after the 10 pm [weather conditions had cleared by then].

The ambassador probably flew over the heads of U.S. troops on high alert along Route Irish. In short, because of bad communications with the command, Captain Drew did not know that Negroponte had already returned to Baghdad by helicopter. Theoretically, if he had known, Drew would have removed the traffic control post, and the car with Calipari and Sgrena would have passed uneventfully.

THE RECOMMENDATIONS

In the final part of the document, there are "recommendations" for improving procedures and to avoid repeating incidents like this one. In particular, the report urges the consideration of the placement of "non-lethal measures," (e.g., spike strips, temporary speed bumps, and wire) to slow down or stop vehicles before the use of disabling shots.