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By Véronique Roger-Lacan*

June 21, 2005

Original Article (French)    

The French no vote [on the European Constitution] will have no impact on the European Security and Defense Policy. France, Germany and the United Kingdom will continue to develop the policy through trilateral negotiations. The question that remains is that of the relationship between the European Union (E.U.) and NATO: the no vote expressed the desire to regain sovereignty and a quest for independence vis-à-vis the Americans.

Talks on E.U. defense policy, which were put on hold during [this week’s] E.U. summit, have been focused on a few main stumbling blocks: gaps in military capacity, command arrangements for civil and military operations, expansion of the scope of the Union’s missions, and closer cooperation. The group’s consensus on these points has reinvigorated the dynamic of the E.U.’s defense pact. At the same time, however, partly due to the French and German position on the Iraq War, the British and Americans have protested some of these proposals, saying they seem too much like collective defense.

The Constitution took these positions into account. It calls for the enlargement of the E.U.’s defense pact for the prevention of conflict and the bolstering of global peace and security, the creation of a European defense agency, the principle of solidarity in the face of natural disasters and acts of terrorism within the Union, and closer cooperation.

Not at all defense, but mutual assistance in the case of armed aggression, backed up by NATO’s principle of a collective defense. This point of equilibrium allowed Europeans to launch the most symbolic of these initiatives: a Defense Agency and the principle of solidarity.

What should be the objective of these negotiations? For Laurent Fabius [former economic advisor to President Francois Mitterrand], it is a matter of creating a European army. This implies the delegating to Europe of sovereign jurisdiction over its defense, a European defense White Paper, a strategy for territorial defense and a joint chiefs of staff.

To this end, some have said that, “the draft treaty makes NATO, which is under American command, the foundation of European defense and the governing authority over its implementation.” So the Constitution “obliges Europe to align itself with NATO and to become a back-up force for the United States and its aggressive foreign policy.”

Does leaving Europe’s security at the mercy of trans-Atlantic relations favor the creation of a European army?

France’s traditional policy with regard to NATO has been to define a security model, with European interests at its core, which avoids the formation of two blocs, one led by Washington and the other led by Moscow. This has meant French strategic autonomy within a variety of international organizations, but never a European army, not for the Jospin government or for the subsequent Raffarin government. The objective is to allow the E.U. to manage crises, such as those in Bosnia or Kosovo, without the Americans.

Let us remember: right after the Cold War, France understood the consequences of the redefinition of American involvement in Europe. At Maastricht in 1991, it proposed transferring the authority of the Western European Union to the E.U. The idea was rejected by the United Kingdom, and was dropped. The resources and capabilities of the W.E.U., however, were nonetheless made available to the E.U. in 1997.

[Editor’s Note: The Western European Union was created in March 1948. Its main feature was the commitment to mutual defense should any of the signatories be the victim of an armed attack in Europe. The U.S. has never been a member. Most believe that the transfer from the W.E.U. to the E.U. made Washington uncomfortable, so the British refused.]

In 1998, cooperation with British troops in Bosnia having worked well, France’s position on NATO evolved and Great Britain took note of America’s redeployment outside of Europe. It has become increasingly clear that the only way Europeans will be able to improve their military will be within a multilateral organization. Since the Saint Malo summit (1998), European defense has been built upon Franco-British momentum stimulated by Franco-German goading.

This “equilibrium” [between independence and integration with the U.S.] is the prevailing ideal behind the construction of the E.U.’s defense pact. In other words, an autonomous capacity of the E.U. calling on structures outside of NATO, when that organization is not involved. There is no decoupling or discrimination or duplication between a European defense pact and NATO: France is working to ensure that this “equilibrium” is never challenged in favor of greater trans-Atlantic integration. It is this “equilibrium” that is reflected in the E.U. constitution.

The French no vote has little operational effect on the E.U.’s defense pact. The Treaty of Nice [the treaty that created the European Union] offers a solid institutional basis for present arrangements to continue. The issue is a political one. Will the British continue to play along with a partner that they may view as weakened [the E.U.]? Will they push for more Euro-Atlantic integration? Will the Germans persevere in supporting European defense?

France could be tempted to contest any imposition of “Anglo-Saxon” free-market policies on the EU economy. In response it could move forward, with Germany, on fiscal harmonization, closed to the world and protectionist. But this would be contrary to its vision of Europe as a power multiplier that is responding to the pro-sovereignty vote of May 29.

While avoiding a complete shift toward a common defense, Paris will continue to favor strategic autonomy for the E.U. London and Berlin will continue to play the trilateral game, despite the option of reinforcing the transatlantic partnership. None of the three are interested in fusing the E.U.’s defense pact defense with NATO. That would risk seeing France pull out of negotiations and losing the leverage it now has with Washington. Germany is oscillating between a very Atlantic-oriented military and a European army serving a Union of security and defense, but with the expected return of the Christian Democrats to power in September, Germany will return to more classical defense posture [More favorable toward the U.S.].

What remains of the E.U.-NATO relationship within the global security system should be reconsidered. NATO intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo and the waning interest of the United States in binding coalitions have opened up a space for Europe. NATO is setting aside its traditional role of leading and winning wars in order to build a community of security and is leaving Paris, Berlin and London with no choice but to embark on the construction of a common European defense to ensure the security of the old continent.

This assumes that London plays the European game without involving the United States, that Paris willingly allows NATO to be transformed into an organization of collective security to demonstrate the necessity of a common European defense and that Berlin chooses a European future over its trans-Atlantic loyalty. This would then give the Union a unique legal status, which is the only true path to power, notably when it comes to the area of defense.

*Veronique Roger-Lacan is an expert on European defense policy and a member of the French Ministry of Defense’s Strategic Businesses Delegation.

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