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By Frederic Bobin

August 13, 2005

Original Article (French)    

For Iran and North Korea, the two centers of nuclear crisis that are once again dominating the summer, being denounced as part of George W. Bush's “axis of evil” is not the only thing they have in common. They also reveal, each in its own way, the pivotal role of China. First of all because Beijing's record of proliferation has directly or indirectly fed the two, but mostly because any solution will require Beijing's imprimatur.

Hu Jintau With Kim Jong-il

When one remembers China's absence from or passivity during recent international conflicts, specifically the two wars in Iraq, China's growing level of influence in global affairs is plain to see. The obvious must be admitted: Beijing's shadow looms over the two crises of the moment.

In the case of Iran, China is essential. Thanks to its veto power, it holds the key to indicting Tehran before the United Nations Security Council. In the case of North Korea, it is a mediator. Because of its history, Beijing is the only capital that has any influence over Pyongyang.

Leader of the six-way talks (between China, the Koreas, the United States, Japan and Russia) that aim to neutralize North Korea's nuclear program, four attempts at which have been made since 2003, the Chinese have gone to great lengths to build an image of a responsible power.

The only problem is that so far the discussions have failed and China's willingness to use the full weight of its influence on its North Korean neighbor is in doubt. We should be prepared for the fact that Beijing has its own strictly national interests in North Korea as well as Iran that it would not like to confuse with those of the West.

In the case of Iran, Chinese diplomacy will not engage in anything that would alienate its friendship with Tehran. It is a friendship that has been fueled in recent years by a single obsession: oil. A thorn in the side of its economic miracle, China now finds itself with an energy dependence that carries heavy geopolitical consequences.

The Strait of Hormuz, Controlled By the U.S. Navy

Since 1993 it has been a net importer of the black gold. It buys a third of its supply abroad, a rate that will rise to 50% by 2020 and probably 80% by 2030, according to predictions by the International Energy Agency. From this perspective, Beijing is in a state of strategic insecurity - as nearly two thirds of these imports come from the Middle East (a proportion that is also likely to rise). Aside from the instability that characterizes the region, this oil is brought to China by sea, 7,456 miles, or 12,000 km separating Shanghai from the Straits of Hormuz, a sea lane controlled by the U.S. Navy.

The Chinese must thus loosen this American stranglehold by cultivating close ties with the oil states while treating Washington delicately. The ideal would be for them to increase access to the central Asian corridors thought to be more reliable. Iran thus has a double advantage. In 2004, the two countries signed an agreement under which China paid $70 billion for oil and gas to be delivered over 30 years. Under this scheme, the Chinese will participate in the exploitation of deposits in Yadavaran, which is situated near the Iraqi border. Beijing also hopes to get involved with an oil pipeline project that is to cross Iran to the Caspian Sea, where it could link up with another pipeline connecting Kazakhstan to western China.

The American presence in Central Asia after the war in Afghanistan clearly interfered in these plans by reviving Beijing's strategic fear over these alternative oil routes through Asia. This reinforced Chinese anxiety of being caught in a vice to the east and the west. For this reason Beijing and Tehran, which share the same aversion to Washington's presence in the region, have consolidated their partnership.

Tehran's stated objective is to make China the number one buyer of its oil and gas, instead of and in place of Japan. Under these conditions, it is hardly surprising that in 2004 the Chinese foreign minister, Li Zhaoxing, opposed bringing the Iranian nuclear issue before the Security Council. Will Beijing continue to protect Tehran if the challenge launched today by President Ahmadinejad turns into a bitter international crisis?

In the case of the Korean peninsula, it is not a question of oil but of the influence that Beijing claims as a natural part of its imperial maneuverings. The North Korean nuclear issue marks a turning point. China was instrumental in the setting up of a regional security mechanism - in the form of the six-way talks that it hosts. In the past it had preferred bilateral approaches. There are two factors that have inspired this conversion to a multilateral approach.

Quid Pro Quo? Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian

The first is a gesture of goodwill toward the Americans, who are impatient to see Beijing exercise a moderating influence over Pyongyang, hoping for a future quid pro quo in their contentious dispute over Taiwan. Even if they don't say much about it, the Chinese have always linked their mediation with North Korea to halting Washington's arms sales to Taipei. The calculation has partially worked: even though military shipments to Taiwan haven't ceased, George Bush has, nevertheless, used his influence to temper any attempt at independence by Chen Shui-bian, the president of the island.

NEW 'GREAT GAME'

The second reason for Beijing's involvement has to do with a more immediate worry: the nuclearization of North Korea would spark an arms race in the region. Japan or even Taiwan could be tempted to cross the nuclear threshold, which would not be in China's interest, whose growth requires a peaceful strategic environment.

In reality, Beijing would like nothing more than to maintain the status quo on the Korean peninsula. Aside from the danger of an unbridled nuclearization, the most catastrophic scenario would be a collapse of the regime in Pyongyang, leading to a reunification dominated by the South, allied with Washington. The mere idea that American troops could be stationed at its borders is a nightmare to China.

This fear explains why Beijing exercises only friendly persuasion with North Korea, which acts as a buffer zone that wards off the danger of American encroachment on its doorstep. Although its food and oil assistance keeps the North Korean regime dependent, Beijing has always refused to impose the slightest sanction on its neighbor, whose whims it finds exasperating. The risk of a destabilization that would lead to an expansion of the Pax Americana into the Far East is too great.

Beijing prefers to consolidate the North Korean regime by converting it to the virtues of the capitalist economic model which has worked so well for the Chinese Communist party. To do this, it is necessary to eliminate the heavy paranoia in Pyongyang, where sectarian autocracy has always prevailed. But sanctions will never even be considered.

Under these conditions, it is easier to understand why the Kim Jong-il regime sometimes seems to have a sense of impunity in this game of nuclear poker. If China doesn't wave the red flag, who will? Like Iran, North Korea is a strategic pawn in the new “Great Game” that will pit China against the United States in the coming years. Beijing will not give them up easily.