Election of Iran's Hard-Line President Just a Nuclear Smokescreen
Is it possible that Iran's Mullahs orchestrated the election of hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to act as a lighting rod for Western anger while Tehran pushed forward with its nuclear program? According to this analysis from France's Liberation, after it realizes its nuclear ambitions, Iran's leadership plans to replace Ahmadinejad with a reformist figure, which they believe will placate Western fury.
By Frédéric Tellier*
Translated By Pascaline Jay
April 14, 2006
France - Liberation - Original Article (French)
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad:
Have the Mullahs Put One Over on Him and Us? (above).
[
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad]
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Rapid Rise to the Presidency Has
Been Accompanied By Charges That He Was Involved in the
Iran Hostage Crisis. He Denies Being the Man to the Right of
the American Hostage (below), Parading Him for the Cameras.
Iran's Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khamenei,
the Real Power in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Here is the
Great Man Meeting Government Officials Last Year. (above).
[
Khamenei Shrine, For The Real Fan]
From Left to Right, Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khamenei, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and Hashemi Rafsanjani Take a Stroll Together
Before the Presidential Elections Last Year. (below)
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Has
Teheran already won its nuclear bet? Now that the step of enriching uranium has
been achieved, mastering the complete nuclear fuel cycle is only a matter of
time. Soon, Iran won't need anyone else to complete its walk toward a nuclear weapon. In
terms of the war of wills with the West, Teheran walks serenely. Its strategy
is more of a methodical walk forward rather than a sprint.
The only
real threat Teheran ever took seriously, the American military threat, is
eroding more and more every day, due to the human, military and financial cost
of the Iraq War. The Iranians know it: the instinctive reluctance of Westerners
to trigger a crisis with the country has now reached America. These factors
taken together reinforce the paradoxical effects of the Bush Administration's Middle
East adventures. This unprecedented situation has created a path, narrow but clear,
which Teheran has intends to follow in order to obtain a nuclear weapon.
Indeed,
who really wants a crisis with Iran? The Americans as well as the Europeans use
the word "sanction" in dribs and drabs. This is the condition under
which the Russians and Chinese are willing to join the debates at the Security
Council. Teheran has long understood that, and is already looking beyond the
Security Council.
It is
possible that Iran's strategy is centered on the concept of appeasement, once it
completes the necessary technological steps to master nuclear technology. Despite
himself, President Ahmadinejad has a role to play in this strategy.
Iran's
nuclear strategy utterly escapes the Iranian president. Ahmadinejad carries no
weight in Iran's nuclear program, but the mullahs have taken him in and given
him a role. The chronology of events clearly establishes this: the decision to
re-launch sensitive nuclear activities had already been taken before
Ahmadinejad came into office. Even before the election of its new president,
the Islamic regime knew that its nuclear program would trigger unprecedented
tension with the Western world. So the regime orchestrated, with the help of
electoral fraud, the arrival of that contentious personality just as it was
entering the most contentious phase of its nuclear strategy. The two events intentionally
coincided.
And for
what reason?
Ahmadinejad
and his torrent of rhetoric have contributed to a personification of the crisis
and have promoted the idea in the West, the clearly incorrect idea, that the
new president is responsible for all this. Because of the rupture of recent policy
that the Iranian president seems to impose, the international community tends
to believe that there has been a sudden turning point in Iranian nuclear
strategy, which appears associated with the return of the extremists. Rather,
is the careful execution of a plan that far transcends the games between
factions. In spite of himself, by keeping up the appearance of this quid-pro-quo,
Ahmadinejad has cleared the Islamic system itself. By attracting the thunder of
the Western world to himself, isn't he just the regime's lighting rod?
And this
has been done with no intention other than to get rid of him early to better legitimize
a successor much more acceptable to the Western world. And who better than this
predecessor to take charge of the nuclear issue?
The image
of Iran would then improve, inviting Westerners to consider a more moderate
approach, so as not to compromise hopes of a positive evolution of the regime. Iran
hasn't changed course on the nuclear issue, but it is betting on the fact that
the arrival of a more pragmatic or a new kind of reformer would be enough to assuage
Westerners reluctance to interfere with what appears to be the favorable evolution
of Iran's politics.
Solid
proof of such a strategy exists. Ahmadinejad has already survived two attempts
on his life. Moreover, the great leader of the Revolution [Atatollah Khamenei] who,
after entirely fabricating the career of Ahmadinejad, reinforced the power of his most
determined rival, [former president] Hashemi Rafsandjani.
The
Islamic system has already begun to prepare for Ahmadinejad's succession. And it
is entirely possible that the Western world will be so pleased to have him
replaced, that it will concern itself only with appearances. Because today, when
confronted with the excesses of Ahmadinejad, the Western world tends to recall
the dark past associated with Islamic Iran, but will it so remember when faced
with a more accepted interlocutor?
Mohammad
Khatami's eight years in power showed that the Western world, especially
Europe, could minimize or even completely forget this painful past. The heart
of the Iranian bet is that the future will be the same, and that Europe, but
not only Europe, after having witnessed a democratic changeover in Teheran, will
accept and minimize its criticism, as it did in the past, so as not to
compromise a political process apparently moving in the right direction.
A winning
strategy mustn't be changed, and that is why Iran is betting that history will repeat
itself.
*Frédéric
Tellier is a researcher at the Institute of Strategic and International Relations
in Paris. His latest book is "Iran's Hour (l'Heure de l'Iran)," published
by Ellipses.
VIDEO FROM DUBAI: 'SHIITES MORE LOYAL TO IRAN THAN TO IRAQ'
Al-Arabiya TV, Dubai: Excerpts from an interview with Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, Apr. 8, 00:04:58, Via MEMRI
"Not "on the brink." Civil war has more or less broken out. ... The Shiites are always loyal to Iran. Most of them are loyal to Iran and not to the countries in which they live ..."
Egyptian President Husni Mubarak