Question to Uncle Sam: 'If Not China, Then Who?'

Neither the global order as it stands nor the policy of China itself should lead Washington to fear China's emergence as a challenge to American primacy. However, according to this op-ed article from the State-run People's Daily, sooner or later, 'the decline of U.S. primacy is inevitable,' and the article asks, 'if not China, then who.'

November 21, 2005

Original Article (English)

On September 21, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick delivered a speech, entitled "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility," at the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in New York. I think highly of this speech for three reasons.

First, it clearly demonstrates that President George W. Bush is in firm command of Washington's policy toward China, and won't hesitate to steer the debate over U.S.-China relations in the right direction. The content of Zoellick's speech indicates that President Bush, just like the previous six U.S. presidents, simply doesn't buy into the conservative idea of confronting China and pursuing more aggressive containment. The administration believes that the national interests of the United States will be better served by integrating China so that it is a full member of the international system.

Second, the Bush Administration explicitly recognizes that the "China of today is simply not the Soviet Union of the late 1940s: it does not seek to spread radical, anti-American ideologies; it does not see itself in a twilight conflict against democracy around the globe. It does not see itself in a death struggle with capitalism; it does not seek to overturn the fundamental order of the international system."

This judgment is a prerequisite for the two great powers to develop a more cooperative relationship, and to better cope with the plethora of global challenges in the years ahead. Confronting as it does the chorus on the "China threat," I think this is one of the most important conclusions that the Bush Administration has come to.

Third, for the first time the United States has publicly treated China as a "stakeholder" in the international system, and invited China to play a more important role in strengthening that system. This is another way of recognizing China's enhanced status and showing that Washington sees Beijing as a more valuable partner.

The essentially positive tone of Zoellick's speech has yet to be fully appreciated, and will play a key role in building a more constructive relationship in the years to come.

Having said this, I could not but comment on another concept that Zoellick has brought into American policy toward China: The Hedging Strategy. Hadley said, "For the United States and the world, the essential question is: How will China use its influence? ÝÖ Uncertainties about how China will use its power will lead the United States - and others as well - to hedge relations with China."

I have a few thoughts on this hedging strategy:

Abandoning the phrase "containment" and instead introducing the concept "hedging relations" does beneficially direct the attention of the American people to a concept that is more constructive than containment. This should improve the general atmosphere. But this "Hedging Strategy" is not much different than containment. In essence, is what is known as "congagement" (containment-engagement).

The United States will continue to employ all available means - economic, scientific, cultural, diplomatic and especially military - to prevent China from rising "too rapidly" and becoming a challenger to U.S. primacy. Therefore, I don't see Zoellick's speech as a significant shift away from America's congagement strategy.

With the "Hedging Strategy" in place, American policy toward China is a "paradoxical unity of opposites." The intensity of the hedging shows the degree of sincerity the U.S. feels for developing cooperative relations with China. The need to cooperate may have to give way to a greater need for containment. The "China threat" school will, more or less, exert its influence, relations will most likely remain "neither too bad nor too good," and full of ups and downs. With such restrained cooperation, neither country will find it possible to reap the best results.

An American strategy of "Hedging" is definitely not in China's interests, and it isn't in the interest of the United States, either. And the strategy will come at a price. It will take up enormous resources which could otherwise be used productively. Hedging will offset future risk, but when it is discovered that no such risk exists, the resources allocated to this effort will be wasted, and many opportunities missed.

For this reason, U.S. policy makers will have to negotiate among themselves a crucial question: Will China really threaten or challenge the primacy of the United States?

Evidence abounds repudiating the notion of a "China threat." I would just draw the attention of American policy makers to three basic facts that mitigate against China emerging as a challenger to U.S. primacy:

(1) China has no such strategic plan;

(2) China won't gain such capabilities for the foreseeable future;

(3) Given the development of globalization and a multi-polar world, the international environment wonít easily allow for such an emergence.

But if not China, then who? Sooner or later, the decline of U.S. primacy is inevitable; history has taught us so. My advice is: Uncle Sam, watch the rapid development of globalization and multi-polarization. They will gradually bring to the world a new democratic international system that will not welcome such primacy, in any case. The United States may just be the last State in human history to achieve such primacy, and it really need not worry about the emergence of any potential challenger.

If policymakers can overcome this "China threat syndrome," we will definitely see a new horizon for U.S.-China relations in the years to come.

The author is a senior fellow at the China Reform Forum, carried on China Daily newspaper, November 21, 2005