The U.S Enlivens An Old Alliance

It seems President Obama is not going to exert any pressure on Israel and is planning on confronting Israeli leadership regarding the new settlements. On the other hand, he has decided to approach Prime Minister Netanyahu, but only because he is disappointed with the Arab states.

The effect is deceiving. The U.S. did not send its complete team of Middle East experts to Israel to put immense pressure on its close ally. Just the opposite: both administrations, Obama’s and Netanyahu’s, are moving towards each other. The shrill sounds of confrontation are fading away in favor of intensive talks about compromise and cooperation.

If only there were another, even bigger round of negotiations on the tenuous theme of construction: Obama’s ultimatum, a compromise-free push for a total stop of settlement, is no longer on the table; Netanyahu’s ridiculous qualification, that the growth of settlements amounts to “natural growth,” is also gone. Israel’s right-leaning administration will not erect any new settlements or carry out any new construction projects in the existing settlements. It will at least try to clear out all 22 illegal settlements. But Israelis will, like last time, be resettled on a smaller scale within regional limits and political consideration.

Barack Obama backed down, in the Israeli view, because he is disappointed in the Arab states. They have not, as he hoped, reacted to the concessions he forced from the Israelis: acceptance of a two-state solution, a willingness to negotiate without preconditions and a lessening of the settlements. Also, the building of a political alliance against Iran’s atomic program has reached its limit with Arab disinterest.

Beyond that, one realizes that, in Washington, the building of a Palestinian state out of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is simply not a possibility (as the Hamas dictator continues to rage). At the same time, the West Bank is booming, at least as far as the Palestinian population is concerned.

Netanyahu needs, in turn, more than any other Israeli prime minister in the past decades, a good relationship with the administration in Washington. His primary motivation is Iran, whose nuclear bombs and harsh words from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad threaten to destroy Israel.

It will most likely take only the most dire of cases to push Israel to act militarily against Tehran’s nuclear potential. It cannot do anything else against Iran’s nuclear program alone, without international support. Other means of prevention (or, perhaps, preemption) could only be put into effect by the international community, lead by the United States. Obama shares, in part, Netanyahu’s view that a nuclear-armed Iran would send the entire Middle East into dangerous instability with unknown consequences. It is not only Israel that is being threatened by Iran, but also the entire Arab world.

Accordingly, Netanyahu is ready to make compromises regarding the settlements in exchange for guarantees from the U.S. about fighting Iran’s nuclear program, compromises that are unsettling for him and his nationalistic coalition partners. Obama on the other hand must atone for the fact that his brisk action drove the masses of Israel into Netanyahu’s arms. He has so strongly empowered the Israeli prime minister that Netanyahu is able to not accept the ultimatum and continue negotiating for an acceptable compromise.