Subtle Shifts in the U.S.-Japan Alliance May Not Benefit China

The Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies at Harvard recently hosted a special lecture on the topic of the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The lecture featured Mr. Koda Yoji, a member of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, whose 2007 promotion to commander makes him the highest-ranking Japanese official to visit Harvard. Koda commented that as Japan’s biggest diplomatic achievement since World War II and long-time bedrock of its foreign relations, the U.S.–Japan alliance exerts substantial influence in many areas, including but certainly not limited to cooperation in security affairs.

As of now, quite a large portion of observations and research conducted on the U.S.–Japan alliance in our country seem to suggest that power shifts among China, the United States and Japan have led to a gradual decline of the alliance and that soon it will need to undergo fundamental changes. Personally, I believe such views are overly optimistic. Recent fractures between the United States and Japan, which stem from changes in the Japanese government, are insufficient to threaten the stable alliance that the two nations have established over such a long period of time.

For starters, the U.S.–Japan alliance has never been an equal “partnership.” The United States shelters Japan with its nuclear powers and ensures the national security of Japan. Ever since the beginning of their alliance, Japan has been “the protected” and America “the protector.” Their roles remain the same to this day.

What’s more, even today the U.S.–Japan alliance is still Japan’s “pass” to acceptance and recognition in the international community. In the mere 10 years or so following World War II, Japan swiftly rebuilt its economy, democratized its politics, achieved demilitarization and successfully hosted the 1964 Olympic Games. The Olympics success indicated that the “democratic, civilized” Japan “reshaped” by the United States had finally obtained acceptance from Western mainstream ideologies. In the minds of Japanese people, all this was to be accredited to the establishment of the U.S.–Japan alliance. In other words, the alliance has been and will continue to be the foundation for and assurance of Japan’s international “status.”

In view of the illustrations above, as fundamental shifts in their alliance would undoubtedly result in mutual damage, neither the United States nor Japan would want to substantially alter it. Of course, this does not mean that the U.S.–Japan alliance is fixed to any degree. In fact, in response to changes in the global climate, the alliance has already undergone several minor changes regarding its core missions. When the Taiwan crisis and North Korean conflict broke out in the 1990s, Japan and America expanded their military cooperative zone to all areas “near Japan.” In 2005, with initiatives led by Prime Minister Koizumi, the U.S.–Japan alliance extended its powers to anti-terrorism, peacekeeping and aid efforts in the Middle East and around the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the alliance has recently been expanding its scope. This growth also includes the hunt for the “potential enemy” of the two countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

Although the Futenma issue has aroused a series of problems between Japan and the United States, I believe the Japanese Democratic Party (JDP) insisted on its policies despite U.S. dissent due to the obligation to fulfill campaign promises and to maintain public support for its government. The JDP has little if any space to implement strategic plans concerning the structure of the U.S.–Japan alliance under current international circumstances. In the long run, China will inevitably become an imaginary enemy to both sides of the alliance. Although the U.S.–Japan alliance is increasingly targeting different areas and issues in an increasingly covert manner, its strong presence will undoubtedly return if the situation suddenly becomes unstable in Taiwan or North Korea.

We still have more to worry about. As an increasing number of Japanese demand that modifications be made to Article 7 of the Japanese constitution, it is highly likely that Japan will be free from the legal obligation to remain “demilitarized” and rebuild its army in the near future. When that happens, as explained by the solid military trust between the two countries in the above examples, Japan certainly will not lower its demand of American military support; China will have to deal with Japan’s growing military powers and the strong alliance between Japan and the United States. Thus, I believe that while the U.S.–Japan alliance is adapting to become more globally comprehensive, multidimensional and covert, China’s security prospects are not as positive. Our policy makers should certainly be more cautious when assessing forecasts and analyses of the U.S.–Japan alliance.

(Mr. Zhang is a scholar in the East Asian Studies department at Harvard University.)