The 5 Main Points of Trump’s Policy on North Korea

Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 19 April 2017
by Wu Zhenglong (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Fiona McAllister. Edited by Christine Murrison.
After the Trump government came to power, it overthrew the “strategic patience” policy that the Obama government had adopted and declared that, for the past 20 years, the U.S. had failed to de-nuclearize many peninsulas via diplomatic or other means.

The U.S.’s failed policy toward North Korea is a widely acknowledged fact. During the three presidential terms of office prior to Trump becoming president, North Korea’s nuclear weapons tests and research were not restrained; instead, they have made remarkable progress. North Korea has currently performed five nuclear tests, and test-fired many short-range, mid-range, and long-range missiles. North Korea’s ballistic missiles are capable of a striking range that covers the major population regions of South Korea and Japan, and the country has explicitly stated that it will manufacture missiles capable of striking metropolitan U.S. areas.

After two months’ research, Trump’s government has advanced a new policy toward North Korea: maximum pressure to compel North Korea to change its behavior. Once again the target is the de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula rather than a “regime change.” Related to the recent declaration of the U.S. position, Trump’s policies toward North Korea feature the following.

First: they emphasize “peaceful means” to urge North Korea to renounce its nuclear weapons, but at the same time “consider all other alternative options.” North Korea has actively used the strategy of taunting and tempting the U.S. into a big fight despite its own smaller size for the very simple reason that it knows that neither the U.S. nor South Korea would be able to accept the consequences of a military strike on North Korea. If the U.S. started an offensive against North Korea, North Korea could retaliate against South Korea. North Korea would not need ballistic missiles or guided missiles to strike South Korea, it only needs long-distance artillery, and could turn the whole nation into a sea of fire in a flash. Therefore, there is no alternative to dialogue to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem.

Second: limit pressure. Looking back at all previous U.S. presidents’ policies toward North Korea, the policies have all been of the same stock: those of pressure and contact. The differences being that sometimes the pressure is greater, while the contact less, and other times vice versa, and other times both in equal measure. Trump’s policy cannot escape this format except for limiting the amount of pressure. It is precisely within this framework that the U.S. deployed the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier to the waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula, to be followed by two more aircraft carriers to the same location, adopting an aggressive attitude to compel talks.

Third: the limiting of economic sanctions. The U.S. will go one step further in strengthening sanctions against North Korea via the United Nations Security Council. The range, content, and domain will widen, increase, and become more extensive; this could involve finance, transportation and energy, etc., to weaken, to even go so far as to strangle, North Korea’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development capability.

Fourth: to reduce the threshold for contact between the U.S. and North Korea. The Obama government insisted that North Korea must seriously promise to renounce its nuclear weapons capability, and yet the Trump government believes North Korea only needs to “change its behavior” for talks to be held. The wording has been comparatively vague, and has more flexibility and leeway. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has stated that if North Korea halted its nuclear and missile tests, the U.S. could consider opening dialogue.

Fifth: the fixed goal of the U.S. is de-nuclearization rather than a “regime change.” North Korea currently trusts nothing except the atom bomb, and believes that possession of the atom bomb will protect the security of its regime. The U.S. has promised to remove the anxiety around North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons.

Trump’s new policy on North Korea is merely a large framework with lots of areas requiring substantiation and improvements. In reality, North Korea is never going to bow to U.S. military pressure. With the pressure of the U.S. military nearby, North Korea has claimed it is ready to carry out its sixth nuclear test at any time; it usually holds large-scale military parades for its annual “Day of the Sun” celebrations, exhibiting many kinds of new guided missile weapons; the test-firing of these weapons follows the next day. Despite test-fire failures, North Korea has undertaken a series of actions to clearly demonstrate its “super tough” position and to indicate that it will not return to the negotiating table.

China has suggested “dual-track talks” to resolve the issue on the peninsula, as well as suggested a “dual suspension” to facilitate a return to talks to create a balance and to benefit all parties involved. Facing the complicated, sensitive and highly dangerous current situation, China’s “dual suspension” suggestion could be capable of effectively lowering tensions in the peninsula and bringing all parties back to the negotiating table.

In addition, China’s idea of “dual tracks” will directly deal with all parties’ deep concerns as well as North Korea’s anxieties over the security of its regime, not only making a promise of security of its regime, but also making plans and arrangements for the security of the regime, primarily removing its reliance on the possession of nuclear weapons. We just need to reach this point, then the U.S. could reverse the entire North Korean nuclear crisis. U.S.-North Korean relations have always been passive, but if they could take their passive relations and turn them into active relations, then there genuinely could be a breakthrough in the North Korean nuclear problem.

The author is a former ambassador and web commentator.



吴正龙:特朗普对朝政策的五大特点

特朗普政府上台后,便推翻了奥巴马对朝鲜采取的“战略忍耐”政策;宣布过去20年间,美国在外交或其他部分做了很多半岛无核化努力都失败了。
  美国对朝政策失败是不争事实。在特朗普总统之前的三届美国总统任期之内,朝鲜核武试验和运载工具研发,不但没有得到遏制,反而获得了长足的发展。目前,朝鲜已经进行了五次核试验,并多次试射短程、中程和远程导弹。朝鲜的弹道导弹打击范围能够覆盖韩国与日本的主要人口集中地区,朝鲜已经明确表示将制造能够打击美国本土的导弹。
  经过两个月的研究,特朗普政府提出了对朝新政策:最大限度施压,促使朝鲜改变其行为,再与其接触,目标是朝鲜半岛无核化,而不是“政权更迭”。结合特朗普政府高官近期表态,综合观察,特朗普对朝新政有以下主要特点。
  其一,强调以“和平手段”促使朝鲜弃核,但同时会考虑“所有选项”。朝鲜在与美国的互动中长期占据战略主动,“以小搏大”,原因很简单:朝鲜深知美国与韩国都无法承担对朝鲜实施军事打击的后果。如果美国对朝鲜下手,朝方可以拿韩国作为报复对象。打击韩国,朝鲜无需动用导弹或核武器,只要使用远程火炮,就可将近在咫尺、拥有韩国全国人口四成的首尔瞬间变成一片火海。所以,除对话外,解决朝核问题没有别的选项。
  其二,极限施压。回望过去历届美国政府对朝政策,一脉相承奉行的都是“施压”加“接触”的政策,不同的是有时“施压”多些,“接触”少些,有时相反,有时两者平分秋色。特朗普政策未能跳出这个巢穴,但是极限加大了施压力度。正是在这个政策框架之下,美国调派“卡尔·文森”号航母战斗群前往朝鲜半岛附近水域,后续还有两个航母战斗群将集结该地区,摆出打一场局部战争的架势,以压促谈。
  其三,经济制裁也将极限化。美国将通过联合国安理会进一步加强对朝鲜制裁,覆盖的范围、内容和领域将更广、更多、更泛,可能涉及金融、交通、能源等诸多行业,削弱乃至扼杀朝开发核武器和弹道导弹的能力。
  其四,降低美国与朝鲜接触的门槛。奥巴马政府坚持朝鲜必须郑重承诺弃核才能与其接触,而特朗普政府认为只要朝鲜“改变其行为”便可举行会谈,提法较为笼统,更具有灵活性和回旋余地。美国务卿蒂勒森表示,如果朝鲜停止核与导弹试验,美国可以考虑对话。
  其五,确定美国的目标是无核化,而不是“政权更迭”。当前,朝鲜什么都不信,只信原子弹,认为只有原子弹才能维护其政权的安全。美方承诺将在一定程度上消除朝拥核的心病。
  特朗普对朝新政只是一个大的框架,还处在形成过程,不少地方尚需进一步充实和完善。事实上,朝鲜对美国极限军事施压并不买账。在美国大军压境的情况下,朝鲜声称已做好随时进行第六次核试验的准备;平壤在“太阳节”照例举行大规模阅兵,展示多种新型导弹武器;次日又试射导弹。尽管试射失败了,但朝方连串行动凸显其“以超强硬对强硬”,并没有回到谈判桌的迹象。
  中方提出的解决半岛问题的“双轨并行”思路以及作为启动对话第一步的“双暂停”倡议,是平衡对等的,兼顾各方的利益,谋求各方共赢结果。面对当前半岛复杂敏感高危的形势,中方的“双暂停”倡议,能够有效降低半岛紧张局势,为把各方重新拉回谈判桌创造条件。
  此外,中方“双轨并行”思路,将直击有关各方的关切以及朝鲜政权安全保障的心病,不但将对其政权安全作出承诺,还将对保障其政权的安全作出设计和安排,从根本上解除其对拥核的依赖。只有做到这一点,美国才能扭转从第一次朝核危机至今,在美朝互动中一直处于战略被动的局面,化被动为主动,真正实现解决朝核问题的突破。(作者是前驻外大使、环球网特约评论员)
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