A Triangle, a Warning Sign


Signs of a dangerous escalation between Beijing and Taipei involving Washington are multiplying.

China recently claimed that the Taiwan Strait midline—which has been unofficially recognized by both sides over the decades as a means to prevent conflicts with the island of Formosa—is an illusion. At the same time, after the recent visit to Taipei by the highest-ranking U.S. State Department official in four decades, the People’s Liberation Army publicized a video that simulated an attack on what appears to be Andersen Air Force Base on the island of Guam. Meanwhile, from Magong airbase in Penghu, Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing-wen asserted that the significant ruptures in the long-standing status quo, which had emerged at the end of China’s lengthy civil war, raise the level of concern regarding stability in the region one notch higher. We are not faced with an imminent risk of war, but these three above-mentioned factors are signs of rising tensions that could lead to things going south at any moment.

The politics of President Xi Jinping toward Taiwan are threatening collapse. The rush toward reunification is causing disaffection among the Taiwanese, who identify as Chinese less and less, as recent polls show. Diplomatic harassment, which has reduced the number of Taiwan’s allies to an all-time low — 15 — has translated into greater engagement with the island by those countries that do not formally recognize it but with which they share democratic values. On the other hand, the Chinese Communist Party’s relationship with the nationalist Kuomintang is at an all-time high. Some mainland foolishness has led the KMT to boycott the recent 12th Straits Forum in Xiamen, and for the first time in 11 years, Taiwanese delegates were not treated as guests of honor. The more the warnings and threats multiply, the more they encourage distancing, and the greater the chances of a hypothetical invasion of the island, Taiwanese Major General Shih Shun-wen said recently.

The U.S., a key part of this equation, is aware that Taiwan is a painful issue in China, and it is pushing the pressure to the limit. Legislation that openly supports the island, increased arms sales, closer collaboration in the most diverse areas, etc. are all such examples. Some are already advocating on Capitol Hill for the return of U.S. troops to Taiwan to avert the dangers of an attack and are calling for a tougher deterrent to what is recognized as a “red line” from a Chinese leadership that would not even dream of giving up on reunification. Furthermore, as far as Washington is concerned, its partnership with Taipei gives an added value of enormous magnitude in China’s technological struggle, through arrangements with industry-leading companies based on the island.

It is Taiwan that would bear the brunt of the tragedy that could be brewing. Since the Democratic Progressive Party took office in Taipei, open rejection of the continent-wide aspiration to advance toward reunification has stopped the dialogue. A prosperous relationship with the USA is intended to compensate for deteriorating relations with China.

Meanwhile, the nationalists do not want to improve relations with one at the expense of the other. Still, the dilemma tears them apart internally and facilitates the perpetuation of sovereignty within power. A split within the ranks of the pro-continentalists and those who defend the Taiwanization of the party cannot be ruled out.

With the United States’ endorsement, President Tsai Ing-wen is moving forward step by step with a plan that reinforces the distinct political identity of the island whose democracy stands in opposition to mainland autocracy. What has happened in Hong Kong has tilted a good part of faltering public opinion on its side and makes it easier for them to implement an anti-China agenda that would sever ties with the other side of the Strait. The narrative around a bond with the Middle Kingdom is diminishing.

U.S. interest in using Taiwan to influence China’s emergence could drag Beijing into a conflict that would destroy its already controversial image before the West and, perhaps, like Argentina, it could become a significant disruptive force. The eagerness of the CCP to secure the historic achievement of reunification at whatever cost will encourage increasingly aggressive moves, raising the bar on responses to Taipei’s actions and its main de facto ally. And Taiwan, with a mounting defensive push, confining virtually everything to Washington for the sake of having its support in case of emergency, could eventually find itself alone in the face of danger and with little ability to respond.

Working under the assumption that there will be a confrontation without much room for dialogue is extremely risky. It may turn into a catastrophe that many still see as distant and improbable. On the contrary, the uncertainty that connotes our current situation may very well lead to an unexpected and violent turn of events. In the end, skillful and decisive handling of this issue could determine the final outcome of the current global hegemonic struggle, or end in total disaster. Prevention is the best policy.

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