Europe’s Honeymoon with Biden Will Benefit Russia, Too


Brussels, the capital of both NATO and the European Union, have announced the reset of relations with the United States under Joe Biden’s presidency. The European Commission expects that after Donald Trump’s departure, the political alliance of Western countries will strengthen to “counter Russia” and “promote democracy worldwide.” In practice, this means new sanctions, revolution and conflict, but some of Russia’s problems, on the contrary, will be solved.

The last U.S. president prior to Trump who did not go to war was Jimmy Carter. The paradox is that this happened for diametrically opposite reasons.

Carter was (and still is, as he is now 96 years old) a man of ideology. He can be characterized as a president for human rights or even as a pacifist president (which, however, did not prevent him from directly funding the Mujahedeen after the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan). Trump’s views on foreign policy are guided by three mundane things: family needs, respect for status and making money.

If Trump’s son–in-law and closest adviser is Jewish and a big supporter of Israel, the U.S. helps Israel. If the Poles are ready to praise the U.S. and bow to the U.S., it will support Poland. If Saudi Arabia wants to buy weapons from the U.S. in record-making deals, the U.S. will be friends with Saudi Arabia. And since the Saudis are somehow the enemies of the Jews, the U.S. will reconcile with them for the common good.

Trump is not an ideologue, not a diplomat, not a geopolitical or security expert, but a businessman. He has been a developer for almost half a century, has known success, and complacently relies on personal experience. For the hark of capitalism from good old America, family, status and money are of great importance. But money, of course, comes first.

Most of the time that Trump devoted to foreign affairs was characterized by cutting public spending and supporting American manufacturers, primarily the sponsors of the Republican Party (for example, almost all the nongreen energy companies) and those sectors of the economy and individual states that created jobs for conservative voters.

The idea of global control and investment was something that Trump did not understand, because it did not produce long-term profit; on the contrary, it guaranteed losses. Conducting wars, maintaining military troops in other countries, funding NATO, the endless “chess game” in the Middle East – everything is expensive. Therefore, the 45th president refrained from new interventions, hardly financed the opposition in foreign nations, reduced U.S. military presence, withdrew from international agreements that were imposed on the United States, and regularly quarreled with NATO partners, demanding that they bear part of the costs of maintaining this entire trans-Atlantic machine.

“Frankly, I do not know whether NATO would have survived another four years of Trump,” worried German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Trump himself did not worry about such things in principle – nothing personal, it is just business.

Russia was largely satisfied with Washington’s policy, although it also meant significant costs for the country and its allies, whether we accept American resistance against Nord Stream 2 for the benefit of American LNG producers or pressure on the Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela for the sake of the American “oil industry.”

Maduro, by the way, was among the first to congratulate Biden on winning the election, because the United States’ relationship with Venezuela cannot get worse than it was under Trump. But the E.U.’s jubilation is more reasonable: it is frankly tired of both Trump’ bargaining habits, in view of which he casually initiated political conflict (for instance, his trade war), and his aggressive lobbying of American manufacturers to the detriment of European manufacturers (despite the fact that Trump’s protectionism is easy to understand – in the U.S., you cannot delegate state subsidies to a particular sector of the economy, as in Europe for example, by subsidizing farmers so that they remain farmers).

In addition, very importantly, Trump was considered to be part of the same trends that the EU elite reasonably perceived as destructive and dangerous for itself. These trends include Brexit, the crisis of the traditional political party system, and the success of euroskeptics in elections – the same comeback of nationalism, isolationism and national egoism, but now on European soil.

Biden is about different “isms” – he supports globalism, like the Brussels bureaucracy. This is important, among other things, for the financial elite – the main sponsors of the Democratic Party. Not that they were poor under Trump, on the contrary – the economic success of his administration and tax cuts made them even richer. But Wall Street businessmen operate more in line with the ideas of new liberalism, global control and long-term investment . All of which the White House will now pursue (unless a miracle happens and Trump manages to defend his presidency in court).

The restoration of relations between Washington and Brussels, which were damaged under Trump the businessman, will take place primarily on an ideological basis. Its principles have already been laid out: uniting the allies, promoting the Western democratic model, supporting liberal values and fighting trade barriers.

In practice, this means that transnational structures like NATO and opposition to governments in those countries considered undemocratic in the West will have more money. In parallel, propaganda and financial pressure will mount on human rights violators and all those whose interests run counter to the interests of globalists, whether they are nationally oriented politicians or traditional energy tycoons.

Simply put, there will be a a great deal of sanctions and blacklists, perhaps new revolutions and wars, and inevitably summits where Biden and EU leaders will demonstrate the inviolability of their union in the face of external challenges. Most of all, in the face of Russia. Biden has a special relationship with China, as did the EU during Trump’s presidency. Though originally conceived in defiance of Washington, the Europeans are unlikely to to abandon this relationship.

This will bring new expense, new challenges and new problems for Russia. There will be less predictable pragmatism and more dogmatic ideology. The fact that the U.S.-EU alliance is being constructed against us is not a secret and is firmly emphasized, and the alliance maintains that while Moscow tried to play on the contradictions within a united West, this window of opportunity is now almost closed for good.

But there are exceptions – room to maneuver amid the oases in a minefield of challenges. There are at least three of them.

Another honeymoon between Washington and Brussels promises new agreements in the spirit of détente, at least – on arms control (this is one of Biden’s favorite policies), which could not be achieved under Trump.

In addition, the U.S. will no longer be able to defend its business interests as before, which would have continued to create discord in its relations with the main European powers. That is, in theory, America will ease the pressure on European companies in connection with Nord Stream 2, extremely significant for Russia.

Finally, the internal political conflict in the U.S. will prevent Washington from being distracted so often by foreign affairs. And if it does, it may also be amusing, entertaining to the point of buffoonery. After all, the EU is going to promote the Western model of democracy in alliance with a man whom almost half of the country considers to be an illegitimate president who stole the election through fraud.

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About Nikita Gubankov 99 Articles
Originally from St. Petersburg, Russia, I've recently graduated from University College London, UK, with an MSc in Translation and Technology. My interests include history, current affairs and languages. I'm currently working full-time as an account executive in a translation and localization agency, but I'm also a keen translator from English into Russian and vice-versa, as well as Spanish into English.

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