Withdrawal from Iraq: Analysis by Georges Malbrunot

Five years after having defeated Saddam Hussein’s regime, the United States, not having stabilized Iraq, having been reduced to negotiating their military withdrawal from Iraq with Baghdad’s neighbors, who are comprised of some of their worst Iranian enemies, or to a lesser degree, the Syrians. In Washington, this affair is not presented as so. However, it is not the least of the paradoxes to see the Americans forced to regionalize the issue of the Iraqi crisis, five years after their triumphant march on Baghdad.

A hasty withdrawal of American troops would have dramatic consequences for the Middle East. Post-war victor Iran would exercise a guardianship over southern Iraq, along with a tangible influence on Baghdad via its connection with Shiite factions that have dominated the political scene since 2003. Turkey, for its part, knows how to tolerate Kurdish separatists. All of these players want to get their hands on the oil rich city of Kirkuk that they lust after.

In any case, the Turkish army would mark, on its soil, the red lines established by politics in Ankara. Regarding Saudi Arabia, they would simply like, before breaking camp, the GI’s to break al-Qaida’s neck, the organization that threaten its own stability.

Happily for Washington, the chaos is so profound in Iraq that no bordering country is in the mood for the metastasis of the cancer that is spreading there. This offers the Americans a certain degree of maneuverability, all within the face of Iran. In five years, Tehran has patiently constructed a degree of tolerance, who is in fact a mandatory partner in the negotiations on the future of its former enemy. But for Baghdad, above all Tehran does not want the chaos to completely escape. Their priority is to assure the security and the durability of the Islamic Republic. It has been one week since the last round of regular meetings with American representatives in Baghdad. The Iranians reproach the CIA for exploiting their alliance with Sunni tribes into attacking their territory.

From their side, the Americans accuse the Iranians of recommencing their delivery of arms to Shi’ite groups that are hostile to them. Whatever the truth may be, no one doubts that these two enemies are going to resume contact. Even if the scope of these negotiations is limited to Iraq, it could, when the time comes, enlarge to other disagreements (nuclear energy or the support of the Lebanese Hezbollah, for example).

With the other neighboring countries of Iraq, a formal dialogue is taking place within the framework of ministerial conferences dedicated to regional security. At the center of the discussions: the cooperation of the Syrians in order to prevent to influx of foreign jihadists in Iraq. For several months now, the situation has improved. Damascus has not neglected to supplement this progress of significant gestures: an American military attaché was invited to the border with Iraq. The Syrians have equally authorized some American officials to handle the visa requests of Iraqi refugees. It remains to be seen if, in the case of a sudden rise in tension, the United States would cut off the Syrians from their Iranian allies. Nothing is less certain, Damascus has the habit of keeping several options on hand.

With their Saudi or Jordanian allies, the American game is more comfortable. Washington would up listening to recriminations on the weak position of the Iraqi government of a Sunni minority. The United States will need the cooperation of Riyadh and Amman when it becomes necessary to redeploy their troops into the interior of Iraq, through their borders.

Another case established by the beginning of an American withdrawal. Washington needs to negotiate a strategic agreement with Baghdad outlining the position of around 50,000 American soldiers that will stay in Iraq, whoever may be the future president elected in November. Yesterday in Baghdad, the two sides resumed sensitive political negotiations. How to protect such a contingent on Iraqi soil, all the while affirming that there will be no more American bases, as the Americans and the Iraqis reiterate?

Behind the complexity of the bilateral issues, control of Iraqi oil remains elusive. Could Washington authorize the Iranians to work a common land with Iraq? In case of a veto, Tehran would be able to continue to kick around the adoption of the oil law, in discussion for over one year in the parliament in Baghdad, without which the American army could operate in Iraq. There is one certainty: the United States cannot leave ancient Mesopotamia without having secured the oil issue.