Georgia: Politics & Tragedy of Large vs. Small Nations
Published in Wen Wei Po
(Hong Kong) on August 14, 2008
by He Liang Liang (link to original)
With the Caucasus region a long distance away from the United States, from the heart of Europe and from NATO, Georgia cannot simply turn away from the East and cozy up to the West. After all, what is the likelihood of the U.S. and NATO going to war against Russia over Georgia? President Saakashvili and Georgians will eventually just have to coexist peacefully with the Russians.
Russia announced a ceasefire in Georgia, but the fighting has not come to a complete halt. Russia evidently has control of not only South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but also the central city of Gori (Stalins hometown), leaving Georgia very much subordinated.
The situation in Georgia is indeed a tragedy for the people of this small nation. But the Western media has been too quick to frame the crisis as a product of mighty Russia muscling into Georgia. On the contrary, the problem of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has been around for ten years now. Russians form the ethnic majority of these two territories and Russias small peacekeeping force is sanctioned under a treaty with Georgia. It was Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili who first attacked, sending battalions into South Ossetia on the day of the Olympic Games Ceremony. Russia did not commit a sudden invasion of Georgia.
Provoking a dispute with Russia to gaining favor with the West
Georgias leaders chose to act quite the opposite. President Mikhail Saakashvili rose to power through the U.S.-backed color revolutions. Ignoring Georgias geopolitical realities, Saakashvili provoked Russia in order to gain favor with the U.S., the E.U. and NATO. The aim: to have Georgia (a small country in Western Asia) become not only a European nation and NATO member, but also a partner in the U.S. missile defense system. Saakashvili knows that the problems of ethnic tension in South Ossetia and Abkhazia cannot be resolved by force alone. Russia intervenes out of necessity in order to protect her own citizens in the Russian-concentrated areas, a measure that should not be confused as the bullying of Georgia.
Saakashvili has started a war that Georgia has no way of winning. Russia has even gained the strategic opportunities: control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in one fell swoop and the possibility of merging of South and North Ossetia. Georgia can only shrivel under the iron grip of Russia.
In an attempt to be considered Europeans, Georgia even went to the lengths of sacrificing, from her already-humble armed force, 2000 soldiers to Iraq in a show of support for the U.S. Georgia held the naïve belief that should she enter a crisis, a grateful U.S. would come forth with aid. When Tbilisi came under air raid attacks and Gori saw Russian military occupation, the U.S. took little concrete action, offering only words of moral support. Georgians were hugely disappointed.
Small countries are but a pawn in the U.S. strategy plan
Russia still has to pay for her past actions. When leaders of Ukraine, Poland and the three Baltic states converged in Tbilisi to show support for Saakashvili, it was an exercise of historical remembrance. At the same time, there has been an outpouring of sympathy for Saakashvili from Western public opinion. But the general public hardly understands the South Ossetia problem and do not know that Saakashvili was the one who initiated the conflict. They pity the weak, berating Russia in sympathy for Georgia- but this is how it has always been for Russia.
So why does the U.S. pay so much attention to Georgia? As John McCain encapsulates: the U.S. is worried that Russian control of Georgia will jeopardize U.S. oil interests in the Caucasus, Caspian Sea and Black Sea region.
Does the U.S. care about the peoples of small nations? Those who think so are naïve. The U.S. only looks after its own interests; small nations are but pawns in her game of strategy. This was the case during the Cold War and it still is the case today. The American public may not know much about South Ossetia, but U.S. policymakers certainly do. Leaders of the E.U. and other NATO member nations are more clear-headed over this issue: they know that the U.S., without a sense of justice, cannot mediate effectively between Russia and Georgia. The E.U. is not that fair a player either, but is relatively more enlightened.
When a rejuvenated Russia is excoriated by the West for acting to safeguard her legitimate interests and geopolitical advantages, it is hardly a good thing for Europe. Looking back at their history, Europeans should be well-aware of this. (Cultural & Political Affairs Forum)
* The writer is a Phoenix Satellite TV commentator.
Russia announced a ceasefire in Georgia, but the fighting has not come to a complete halt. Russia evidently has control of not only South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but also the central city of Gori (Stalins hometown), leaving Georgia very much subordinated.
The situation in Georgia is indeed a tragedy for the people of this small nation. But the Western media has been too quick to frame the crisis as a product of mighty Russia muscling into Georgia. On the contrary, the problem of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has been around for ten years now. Russians form the ethnic majority of these two territories and Russias small peacekeeping force is sanctioned under a treaty with Georgia. It was Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili who first attacked, sending battalions into South Ossetia on the day of the Olympic Games Ceremony. Russia did not commit a sudden invasion of Georgia.
Provoking a dispute with Russia to gaining favor with the West
Georgias leaders chose to act quite the opposite. President Mikhail Saakashvili rose to power through the U.S.-backed color revolutions. Ignoring Georgias geopolitical realities, Saakashvili provoked Russia in order to gain favor with the U.S., the E.U. and NATO. The aim: to have Georgia (a small country in Western Asia) become not only a European nation and NATO member, but also a partner in the U.S. missile defense system. Saakashvili knows that the problems of ethnic tension in South Ossetia and Abkhazia cannot be resolved by force alone. Russia intervenes out of necessity in order to protect her own citizens in the Russian-concentrated areas, a measure that should not be confused as the bullying of Georgia.
Saakashvili has started a war that Georgia has no way of winning. Russia has even gained the strategic opportunities: control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in one fell swoop and the possibility of merging of South and North Ossetia. Georgia can only shrivel under the iron grip of Russia.
In an attempt to be considered Europeans, Georgia even went to the lengths of sacrificing, from her already-humble armed force, 2000 soldiers to Iraq in a show of support for the U.S. Georgia held the naïve belief that should she enter a crisis, a grateful U.S. would come forth with aid. When Tbilisi came under air raid attacks and Gori saw Russian military occupation, the U.S. took little concrete action, offering only words of moral support. Georgians were hugely disappointed.
Small countries are but a pawn in the U.S. strategy plan
Russia still has to pay for her past actions. When leaders of Ukraine, Poland and the three Baltic states converged in Tbilisi to show support for Saakashvili, it was an exercise of historical remembrance. At the same time, there has been an outpouring of sympathy for Saakashvili from Western public opinion. But the general public hardly understands the South Ossetia problem and do not know that Saakashvili was the one who initiated the conflict. They pity the weak, berating Russia in sympathy for Georgia- but this is how it has always been for Russia.
So why does the U.S. pay so much attention to Georgia? As John McCain encapsulates: the U.S. is worried that Russian control of Georgia will jeopardize U.S. oil interests in the Caucasus, Caspian Sea and Black Sea region.
Does the U.S. care about the peoples of small nations? Those who think so are naïve. The U.S. only looks after its own interests; small nations are but pawns in her game of strategy. This was the case during the Cold War and it still is the case today. The American public may not know much about South Ossetia, but U.S. policymakers certainly do. Leaders of the E.U. and other NATO member nations are more clear-headed over this issue: they know that the U.S., without a sense of justice, cannot mediate effectively between Russia and Georgia. The E.U. is not that fair a player either, but is relatively more enlightened.
When a rejuvenated Russia is excoriated by the West for acting to safeguard her legitimate interests and geopolitical advantages, it is hardly a good thing for Europe. Looking back at their history, Europeans should be well-aware of this. (Cultural & Political Affairs Forum)
* The writer is a Phoenix Satellite TV commentator.