Removing N. Korea from U.S. Terror List Is Unacceptable

The U.S. government made up its mind for North Korea’s removal from the terrorism list. It says the decision will promote progress on North Korea’s nuclear issue, but was it really necessary?

The Bush administration promised to remove North Korea from the terror list in exchange for reports on its nuclear program as well as dismantlement of its nuclear facilities based on the Six-Party agreements. It ordered the removal to the U.S. Congress once in the end of June this year, but the nuclear reports were incomplete. Strict inspection was indispensable, but North Korea refused to comply, and the U.S. side delayed its removal from the list.

The U.S. changed its own trajectory when Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the U.S. representative of the Six-Party talks, visited North Korea and agreed on the inspection criteria with his North Korean counterpart earlier this month.

The agreement centers on the report on North Korean nuclear facilities the government provided, and mutual consent is required for inspecting the unreported facilities. It is unthinkable for the North Korean government to permit entry into its military bases and the like. And it is difficult to clarify the uranium-enrichment programs and suspicion over transfer of nukes. In that context, the U.S. has largely been compromised.

It was the North Korean side that demanded Hill’s visit to North Korea. Bush’s term of office will expire on January next year. The U.S.-North Korea talks will be resumed under a new administration. It is clear that North Korea intends to acquire as much advantages as possible for time being. The North also seemed to read Bush’s mind, which was hasty for diplomatic success during his presidency.

North Korea stopped the nuclear dismantling process and resumed operating nuclear facilities after the removal was delayed. It also banned staff of the International Atomic Energy Agency from entering the nuclear facilities, strengthening its pressure on the U.S.

The nuclear crisis may recur if it is left out. One can see that delisting was inevitable to pull North Korea back to the Six-Party talks and find a progress on the nuclear issue. Nevertheless, the U.S. should not agree on a compromise that limits the next U.S. administration’s policy options towards North Korea.

North Korea must have thought that its usual ploy to demand a compromise by “nuclear shakedown” is still effective. If so, hen it will never abandon nukes. It will certainly employ the same tactic if things do not suit North Korea’s convenience even after resuming the Six-Party talks.

The decision by the U.S. government can damage trust on and Japan-U.S. alliance. The menace of North Korea that Japan and the U.S. feel is fundamentally different from one another. Japan can’t easily compromise on removal of the terrorist country that kidnapped Japanese citizens.

North Korea promised to aim at finalizing the investigation this fall as well as establishing a committee regarding the kidnapping, but the reality is that nothing is in progress. The U.S. should have considered Japan’s position before removing North Korea from the list.