Overload Danger

In politics, metaphors are dangerous, especially if we begin to consider their meaning.

Thanks to the vice president of the U.S., Joe Biden, “reset” became the main concept in Russian-American relations. It sounds nice and modern. But what does it literally mean?

Resetting involves putting new software into the computer. When applied to the relations between two countries, it apparently deals with changing priorities to find common ground. We can make progress in this area because the spring 2009 agenda is noticeably different from the one that was in effect half a year ago.

Resetting is connected with a change in the operating environment. Our new environment is the global recession. It’s difficult to compare Russia’s and America’s problems, but there is one common factor: the economic downturn forced both Moscow and Washington to reduce their ambitions, and to clearly define their priorities.

Obama’s administration has to sort out the devastating mess left by its predecessor. This requires separating primary and secondary tasks, and trying to quickly get rid of the simpler difficulties. Russia is not one of Washington’s priorities, and therefore doesn’t interest it much. But Moscow’s cooperation (or, at least, a lack of resistance) is important in dealing with several priority issues. These issues are Iran, Afghanistan, and arms reductions. In order to assure that Russia will play a positive role, the U.S. has to improve the overall atmosphere, and it’s currently making specific efforts to achieve this result.

It’s possible to make progress because the two major irritants – NATO’s expansion to the Ukraine and Georgia, as well as the missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic – are not as important to Obama as they were to Bush. It just so happens that these projects were a top priority for Obama’s predecessor, especially during the last phase of his presidency. Now, the new administration has a good opportunity to postpone both projects, and try to make Moscow pay a higher price for this goodwill gesture. At the same time, as the oil and gas “doping” decreases, so too will Russia’s claim to global power. Russia’s priorities are focused on Europe and Eurasia, and the improved political climate is designed to, among other things, help attract investments, which will probably be needed soon.

It’s possible for the two countries to reach an agreement in the area of nuclear weapon negotiations. Russia and the U.S. have a a lot of experience in this type of dialogue, and they love to conduct it. For Moscow, this issue is particularly important because it’s the only area where Russia and the U.S. are still equals. This is psychologically significant, especially after Bush simply refused to talk about it.

However, there is a danger of overloading (and not resetting) the nuclear issue with expectations. An attempt to accomplish everything at once, especially at short notice (START-1 Treaty expires in December), can have the opposite effect. There are plenty of disagreements. Perhaps, it makes more sense not to seek a new long-term parity agreement, but instead take small steps. Besides, in terms of impacting the atmosphere, a series of small accomplishments may be more effective than a single large accomplishment.

The situation is worse with respect to Washington’s two other priorities. Barack Obama’s decision to make Afghanistan the “central front” could be a fatal mistake. It’s not only impossible to win there, but it’s also extremely difficult to determine what exactly would constitute a victory.

When the Afghan operation began seven and a half years ago, its goal was clear: retaliation for the 9/11 attacks and the destruction of Al-Qaeda’s military infrastructure.

Then, the White House got carried away with Iraq, and Afghanistan became a periphery. Obama called for a return to the real fight against terrorism. Perhaps it was a tactical move; a strong justification is necessary for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq. But either way, the promise must be kept. More importantly, NATO has an unenviable position in Afghanistan, and if the mission fails the alliance will face a huge crisis.

The main problem is that the Afghan campaign’s ultimate goal isn’t clear. For a long time, no one has said that the goal is to get the country under control, or to build a democracy. At some point, the so called real “Iraqi” goal will have to be formulated for Afghanistan: creating decent withdrawal conditions. But unlike Iraq, where there’s still at least some hope of building a political structure that can function autonomously, doing so in Afghanistan is virtually impossible. At the very least, no one has even started addressing this problem. Also, taking into account nearby bubbling Pakistan, the mission is simply impossible.

Russia has to play a strange role. Moscow has to help make NATO and the U.S.’ stay in Afghanistan more comfortable, because the Taliban’s return to power does not bode well. But at the same time, it has to prepare for the imminent departure of the coalition, and the unpredictable developments in Central Asia. Therefore, Russia’s priorities will have to pick up where the American priorities left off.

Iran presents an even more complicated problem. It’s difficult, though not theoretically impossible, to imagine an agreement which will result in Moscow taking a firmer position on the UN Security Council and Washington making some concessions.

The question is: what should be done in the more-than-likely scenario where the sanctions don’t work and Tehran continues its approach to nuclear status? The U.S. will face a serious dilemma. One option is to come to terms with a nuclear Iran, which would be a very serious political defeat for Washington. The other option, to which neither Bush nor Chaney could resolve, is to take action. It seems that no one else has other means of influencing Iran, and Russia is no exception. Moscow, by the way, has to once again ponder what to do with the consequences of the unresolved Iranian problem. After all, Russia is much closer to the potential nuclear power.

There is no compromising in the post-Soviet arena, where the programs don’t change. Russia will not abandon its claims to special rights, and America will not recognize them. We can only hope that both sides’ reckless pursuit of self-interest will slightly cool off.

It’s important for this “reset” not to acquire another meaning. Your computer gets reset if it crashes. Perhaps the state of Russian-American relations by the end of the George W. Bush presidency really can be called a crash. The screen had the same boring picture stuck on it, and it was impossible to escape from it because none of the buttons on the keyboard responded. This type of situation makes the user irritated, which leads to him randomly hitting different buttons, thereby only exacerbating the situation.

There’s only one solution: pushing the reset button. The disgusting image disappears, the computer turns off, and then it comes back to life and starts to work again. Did anything change? Of course not, because the computer still has the same programs. The user can expect another crash. And if this is the type of reset that the U.S. has in mind, it will cause an even bigger irritation in the very near future.