Purely Contrived Propaganda
Published in Junge Welt
(Germany) on 9 April 2009
by Knut Mellenthin (link to original)
Last Sunday in Prague, President Barack Obama announced to tens of thousands of people that the United States was setting out to “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” There was jubilation in the public square and later, also, in the media. But please, make no mistake: “This goal will not be reached quickly -- perhaps not in my lifetime.”
The man is now 48 years old. Global Zero, one campaign among several supported by many politicians to rid the world of nuclear weapons, figures on a 20- to 25-year gradual reduction until there are none left.
Neo-conservatives in the U.S. and Europe will undoubtedly home in on Obama’s “vision,” as he, himself, called it. William Kristol, a spokesman for the neo-con clique who writes a regular column for the Washington Post, already weighed in saying, “Of course, we had a world without nuclear weapons not so long ago -- say, in 1939,” which is the neo-con’s standard argument, meaning that without American nuclear weapons, we’ll soon have to deal with Hitler or one of his understudies. Kristol noted a lack of warlike language directed at North Korea and Iran in Obama’s Prague speech. Not that the president failed to mention either; he just neglected to threaten them with nuclear annihilation if they failed to give in, Kristol complained. Besides, Kristol insisted, as long as the world fails to work in the way he imagines it rightly should, the U.S. needs its nuclear weapons. But don’t let this aggressive background music (which will surely get louder in the near future) confuse you just because of the fact that we know when neo-cons bay that loudly the liberals must be right.
On the agenda since 1953
During the campaign, Obama repeatedly mentioned his “vision.” He did during his speech at Berlin’s Victory Column last year, as well: “This is the moment when we must renew the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.” He gave a preview of his Prague speech two days earlier in Strasbourg: “Even with the Cold War now over, the spread of nuclear weapons or the theft of nuclear material could lead to the extermination of any city on the planet. And this weekend in Prague, I will lay out an agenda to seek the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.”
In the February 16th edition of Newsweek, Henry Kissinger correctly pointed out that a world without nuclear weapons has been a goal of every president since Dwight D. Eisenhower. Kissinger was first National Security Advisor and then Secretary of State from 1969 to 1977, under Presidents Nixon and Ford. Together, with three other prominent statesmen – George P. Schultz, William J. Perry and Sam Nunn – Kissinger published numerous plans for a “nuclear-free world” and organized a conference on that subject at Stanford University in October 2007.
Among ex-presidents, the most astounding dissertation on the subject came from Ronald Reagan, who not only expressed agreement with his predecessors’ desire to rid the world of nuclear weapons; he went so far as to condemn them as “totally irrational, totally inhuman, good only for killing, destructive for life on earth and civilization.” Along with then-Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, Reagan almost succeeded in banning all nuclear ballistic missiles at their meeting in Reykjavik, in October 1986. But only almost. The agreement fell apart because of details like Reagan’s insistence on developing a missile shield, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
Basically, the U.S. and Soviet Union were already near that goal two decades earlier: Article VI of the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (ratified later in 1970) said, “The states undertake to pursue 'negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament'," and toward a "treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."
When Obama talks of a “vision” that will be realized only after he, perhaps, is no longer alive, is he just indulging in a long tradition of empty promises? Is he merely building castles in the air? Actually, it’s a lot worse than that. In Prague he said, “Today, the Cold War has disappeared, but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold.”
Obama obviously borrowed the basic theme of his speech from Henry Kissinger, who wrote in Newsweek, “But the end of the Cold War produced a paradoxical result. The threat of nuclear war between the superpowers has essentially disappeared. But the spread of technology—especially the technology to produce peaceful nuclear energy—has vastly increased the feasibility of acquiring a nuclear-weapons capability . . . Proliferation of nuclear weapons has become an overarching strategic problem for the contemporary world.”
Kissinger expressed it even more sharply and unilaterally in an article he wrote in collaboration with Schultz, Perry and Nunn, published in the neo-conservative Wall Street Journal on January 15, 2008: “The accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how and nuclear material has brought us to a nuclear tipping point. We face a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands.”
From this standpoint, the threat doesn’t come mainly from those nations who already possess nuclear weapons, but from those who do not possess them (like Iran) or at least have no militarily deployable nuclear weapons (like North Korea). And, although a disarmament schedule for some countries has only a hazy outline and may take place in future decades, disarmament for others is characterized as being of the utmost immediate importance, impossible to put off and absolutely necessary within the next year or two. This way or that, under the umbrella of “all options.” The “vision” of a world free of nuclear weapons in such a scenario is in danger of assuring only extortion at best and possible war at worst, but it will do little to further nuclear disarmament.
Let’s take a look at the “concrete steps” President Obama mentioned in his Prague speech.
1. The role of nuclear weapons in America’s national security strategy will be lessened. Obama, however, gave no details about a time frame nor did he give concrete examples. Currently, the role of such weapons is still theoretically central to U.S. strategy. The use of such weapons against nations who have no nuclear capability is admittedly considered possible. The only nuclear power to thus far reject the doctrine of first use is China.
2. A new agreement is to be signed with Russia, limiting strategic nuclear weapons. This is inevitable and already a done deal, because the current Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I), signed in 1991 and put into effect in 1994, will expire on December 5th of this year. Both sides obligated themselves with this treaty to limit their respective arsenals to 6,000 nuclear warheads and bombs and 1,600 long-range missiles.
In the meantime, the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), ratified in 2003, limits deployed warheads and bombs to between 1,700 and 2,000 for each side. This treaty contains loopholes, but it’s possible that the upper limits agreed to with SORT could serve as a starting point for to the treaty that will replace START-I. Obama has, in fact, already suggested a non-binding number of 1,000, a figure that would still give the United States and Russia a big edge and would allow continuation of the doctrine of “mutually assured destruction” against any credible opponent. Besides that, the U.S. and Russia presumably would reduce weapons stockpiles in tandem with reductions by all other nuclear powers.
3. Obama intends to champion the cause for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the U.S. Congress. This 1996 treaty replaced the 1968 treaty, which banned all nuclear tests except for those conducted underground. The treaty is still not in force because of opposition to it in the U.S. Senate. In practice, however, the Soviet Union and Russia had abstained from testing since 1991, and the U.S. has abstained since 1992. Ratification would ensure the technological superiority of U.S. and Russian weapons over other nuclear powers, while simultaneously making development more difficult for latecomers like India and Pakistan, and practically ensuring newcomers would never develop a nuclear capability. The CTBT, thus, would serve mainly U.S. interests, despite contrary opinions from the U.S. Congress.
4. The U.S. government intends to push for a verifiable international treaty forbidding the production of nuclear materials for atomic weapons. That would freeze the current balance of power in place – Russia and the U.S. currently possess around 95 percent of the world’s nuclear armaments - and effectively prohibit the ascendance of new nuclear powers.
5. The United States government wants to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). First and foremost, that will forbid the enrichment of uranium (including for purposes like the production of fuel for nuclear power plants) for any country that doesn’t already possess nuclear weapons. Supplies to such nations would be controlled by an “international bank” for nuclear fuel that would be overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a branch of the United Nations.
6. Any breach of “the rules” (especially of the increasingly restrictive NPT rules) would bring obligatory punishment in the future. The purpose of this is to put a set of general rules in place that could be easily invoked to prevent countries like Russia and China from interfering in any aggressive punitive action against Iran or North Korea sought by the U.S., and would circumvent any lengthy international negotiations and discussions.
7. There must be certainty that terrorists will never gain access to nuclear weapons. To accomplish this, Obama wants to “secure” all “vulnerable nuclear material.” This is aimed primarily at Russia (but also at Pakistan), where the U.S. would like very much to gain greater access to and control over fissionable materials. In addition, he seeks stepped-up action to prevent the illegal trade of nuclear material. Obama has announced he will seek a “nuclear security summit” to be held this coming year in the U.S.
The next NPT Review Conference, scheduled for early 2010, will be an even more important event in connection with all this. The NPT prescribes such conferences every five years, to be attended by all signatories to the treaty. The last one took place in May 2005, and lasted nearly a month. As early as that meeting, the U.S. and several of its allies attempted to force through several major changes to the treaty under the guise of “strengthening the NPT”, which would have worked to the detriment of those countries that possess no nuclear arsenals.
The centerpiece of the change was America’s attempt to forbid any uranium enrichment, as well as the processing of waste material from nuclear reactors, in any country that didn’t already have such technology and wasn’t already involved in such processing. Both are part of the civilian use of atomic energy, and the practice of doing both are guaranteed to signatories by Article IV of the NPT as “ inalienable rights.” On the other hand, both technologies could be used in the production of nuclear weaponry.
Regular inspections by the IAEA would ensure that material wasn’t used in this manner. To avoid such control and inspection, a nation would have to deny IAEA inspectors access to facilities and withdraw from the NPT, something North Korea has already done twice. In reality, withdrawal is made extremely easy by Article X of the NPT: A nation need only cite “extraordinary circumstances” that are not defined in the treaty and give 90 days notice prior to withdrawal.
Red herring
As an instrument intended to prevent other nations from becoming nuclear powers, the NPT was recognized to be a relatively ineffective instrument, already rife with loopholes, right from its creation in the 1960s. In order to understand that, one first has to realize that the treaty created two separate and very unequal classes of nations signing on to it. On the one side, the group consisted of those nations that had already “successfully” produced nuclear weapons and tested at least one of them prior to the deadline of January 1, 1967. On the other side, were the vast majority of nations that now were obligated to refrain from doing likewise, just because they signed the treaty.
They swallowed that pill with the help of a “sweetener”, not only guaranteeing them free access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes – albeit under the watchful eye of the IAEA – but with the understanding that they would also receive generous support and “know-how” from the nuclear powers (Article IV, 2). The concessions used to lure non-nuclear armed nations into signing the treaty also included uncomplicated future withdrawal procedures and a rather weak control system that has meanwhile been strengthened via voluntary amendments between the IAEA and individual nations.
Thirteen nations currently operate enrichment facilities: Argentina, Brazil, China, Germany, France, Great Britain, India, Iran, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia and the United States. Presumably, Israel belongs on this list, despite the fact that its nuclear program is officially kept strictly secret. All other nations are forbidden to enrich uranium, according to the U.S. policy set by George W. Bush. The U.S. and its allies also place special restrictions on Iran, which already possesses advanced knowledge of enrichment technology and has been ordered to shut down and destroy all its enrichment facilities. Further tightening of NPT requirements deal with making withdrawal from the treaty more difficult and introducing a mandatory system of punishment for infractions.
Will the U.S. be able to force through its plans for treaty “strengthening” in the coming year? That’s uncertain. According to Article VIII-2, any modification to the treaty requires approval by a majority of the signatories. That would be a probable certainty. But, in addition to that, all nations possessing nuclear weapons have to concur, as must all 35 members of the Board of Governors of the IAEA. Except for nations possessing nuclear weapons, membership on this board is on a rotational basis. The United States government will first try to reach agreement with Russia and China, both of which agree in principle to limiting the number of nations with nuclear weapons technology. In addition, Russia, in cooperation with Kazakhstan, strives to be the sole source for nuclear reactor fuel to whom future customers (i.e., those nations forbidden by the treaty from enriching their own uranium) will be obliged to go. The Russian government, with its close ties to energy companies, is of course very interested in such a modification of the NPT.
With his propaganda line, “a world without nuclear weapons,” Obama is attempting, among other things, to rebut the argument made until now by the NPT Review Conference, namely, that in the 40 years the treaty has been in force, the nuclear powers haven’t really tried seriously to reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons. Besides that, Obama may be driven by a motive similar to that motivating Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968, when he suddenly escalated military action in Vietnam while simultaneously pushing for the NPT: The operative term is “red herring.”
The man is now 48 years old. Global Zero, one campaign among several supported by many politicians to rid the world of nuclear weapons, figures on a 20- to 25-year gradual reduction until there are none left.
Neo-conservatives in the U.S. and Europe will undoubtedly home in on Obama’s “vision,” as he, himself, called it. William Kristol, a spokesman for the neo-con clique who writes a regular column for the Washington Post, already weighed in saying, “Of course, we had a world without nuclear weapons not so long ago -- say, in 1939,” which is the neo-con’s standard argument, meaning that without American nuclear weapons, we’ll soon have to deal with Hitler or one of his understudies. Kristol noted a lack of warlike language directed at North Korea and Iran in Obama’s Prague speech. Not that the president failed to mention either; he just neglected to threaten them with nuclear annihilation if they failed to give in, Kristol complained. Besides, Kristol insisted, as long as the world fails to work in the way he imagines it rightly should, the U.S. needs its nuclear weapons. But don’t let this aggressive background music (which will surely get louder in the near future) confuse you just because of the fact that we know when neo-cons bay that loudly the liberals must be right.
On the agenda since 1953
During the campaign, Obama repeatedly mentioned his “vision.” He did during his speech at Berlin’s Victory Column last year, as well: “This is the moment when we must renew the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.” He gave a preview of his Prague speech two days earlier in Strasbourg: “Even with the Cold War now over, the spread of nuclear weapons or the theft of nuclear material could lead to the extermination of any city on the planet. And this weekend in Prague, I will lay out an agenda to seek the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.”
In the February 16th edition of Newsweek, Henry Kissinger correctly pointed out that a world without nuclear weapons has been a goal of every president since Dwight D. Eisenhower. Kissinger was first National Security Advisor and then Secretary of State from 1969 to 1977, under Presidents Nixon and Ford. Together, with three other prominent statesmen – George P. Schultz, William J. Perry and Sam Nunn – Kissinger published numerous plans for a “nuclear-free world” and organized a conference on that subject at Stanford University in October 2007.
Among ex-presidents, the most astounding dissertation on the subject came from Ronald Reagan, who not only expressed agreement with his predecessors’ desire to rid the world of nuclear weapons; he went so far as to condemn them as “totally irrational, totally inhuman, good only for killing, destructive for life on earth and civilization.” Along with then-Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, Reagan almost succeeded in banning all nuclear ballistic missiles at their meeting in Reykjavik, in October 1986. But only almost. The agreement fell apart because of details like Reagan’s insistence on developing a missile shield, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
Basically, the U.S. and Soviet Union were already near that goal two decades earlier: Article VI of the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (ratified later in 1970) said, “The states undertake to pursue 'negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament'," and toward a "treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."
When Obama talks of a “vision” that will be realized only after he, perhaps, is no longer alive, is he just indulging in a long tradition of empty promises? Is he merely building castles in the air? Actually, it’s a lot worse than that. In Prague he said, “Today, the Cold War has disappeared, but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold.”
Obama obviously borrowed the basic theme of his speech from Henry Kissinger, who wrote in Newsweek, “But the end of the Cold War produced a paradoxical result. The threat of nuclear war between the superpowers has essentially disappeared. But the spread of technology—especially the technology to produce peaceful nuclear energy—has vastly increased the feasibility of acquiring a nuclear-weapons capability . . . Proliferation of nuclear weapons has become an overarching strategic problem for the contemporary world.”
Kissinger expressed it even more sharply and unilaterally in an article he wrote in collaboration with Schultz, Perry and Nunn, published in the neo-conservative Wall Street Journal on January 15, 2008: “The accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how and nuclear material has brought us to a nuclear tipping point. We face a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands.”
From this standpoint, the threat doesn’t come mainly from those nations who already possess nuclear weapons, but from those who do not possess them (like Iran) or at least have no militarily deployable nuclear weapons (like North Korea). And, although a disarmament schedule for some countries has only a hazy outline and may take place in future decades, disarmament for others is characterized as being of the utmost immediate importance, impossible to put off and absolutely necessary within the next year or two. This way or that, under the umbrella of “all options.” The “vision” of a world free of nuclear weapons in such a scenario is in danger of assuring only extortion at best and possible war at worst, but it will do little to further nuclear disarmament.
Let’s take a look at the “concrete steps” President Obama mentioned in his Prague speech.
1. The role of nuclear weapons in America’s national security strategy will be lessened. Obama, however, gave no details about a time frame nor did he give concrete examples. Currently, the role of such weapons is still theoretically central to U.S. strategy. The use of such weapons against nations who have no nuclear capability is admittedly considered possible. The only nuclear power to thus far reject the doctrine of first use is China.
2. A new agreement is to be signed with Russia, limiting strategic nuclear weapons. This is inevitable and already a done deal, because the current Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I), signed in 1991 and put into effect in 1994, will expire on December 5th of this year. Both sides obligated themselves with this treaty to limit their respective arsenals to 6,000 nuclear warheads and bombs and 1,600 long-range missiles.
In the meantime, the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), ratified in 2003, limits deployed warheads and bombs to between 1,700 and 2,000 for each side. This treaty contains loopholes, but it’s possible that the upper limits agreed to with SORT could serve as a starting point for to the treaty that will replace START-I. Obama has, in fact, already suggested a non-binding number of 1,000, a figure that would still give the United States and Russia a big edge and would allow continuation of the doctrine of “mutually assured destruction” against any credible opponent. Besides that, the U.S. and Russia presumably would reduce weapons stockpiles in tandem with reductions by all other nuclear powers.
3. Obama intends to champion the cause for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the U.S. Congress. This 1996 treaty replaced the 1968 treaty, which banned all nuclear tests except for those conducted underground. The treaty is still not in force because of opposition to it in the U.S. Senate. In practice, however, the Soviet Union and Russia had abstained from testing since 1991, and the U.S. has abstained since 1992. Ratification would ensure the technological superiority of U.S. and Russian weapons over other nuclear powers, while simultaneously making development more difficult for latecomers like India and Pakistan, and practically ensuring newcomers would never develop a nuclear capability. The CTBT, thus, would serve mainly U.S. interests, despite contrary opinions from the U.S. Congress.
4. The U.S. government intends to push for a verifiable international treaty forbidding the production of nuclear materials for atomic weapons. That would freeze the current balance of power in place – Russia and the U.S. currently possess around 95 percent of the world’s nuclear armaments - and effectively prohibit the ascendance of new nuclear powers.
5. The United States government wants to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). First and foremost, that will forbid the enrichment of uranium (including for purposes like the production of fuel for nuclear power plants) for any country that doesn’t already possess nuclear weapons. Supplies to such nations would be controlled by an “international bank” for nuclear fuel that would be overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a branch of the United Nations.
6. Any breach of “the rules” (especially of the increasingly restrictive NPT rules) would bring obligatory punishment in the future. The purpose of this is to put a set of general rules in place that could be easily invoked to prevent countries like Russia and China from interfering in any aggressive punitive action against Iran or North Korea sought by the U.S., and would circumvent any lengthy international negotiations and discussions.
7. There must be certainty that terrorists will never gain access to nuclear weapons. To accomplish this, Obama wants to “secure” all “vulnerable nuclear material.” This is aimed primarily at Russia (but also at Pakistan), where the U.S. would like very much to gain greater access to and control over fissionable materials. In addition, he seeks stepped-up action to prevent the illegal trade of nuclear material. Obama has announced he will seek a “nuclear security summit” to be held this coming year in the U.S.
The next NPT Review Conference, scheduled for early 2010, will be an even more important event in connection with all this. The NPT prescribes such conferences every five years, to be attended by all signatories to the treaty. The last one took place in May 2005, and lasted nearly a month. As early as that meeting, the U.S. and several of its allies attempted to force through several major changes to the treaty under the guise of “strengthening the NPT”, which would have worked to the detriment of those countries that possess no nuclear arsenals.
The centerpiece of the change was America’s attempt to forbid any uranium enrichment, as well as the processing of waste material from nuclear reactors, in any country that didn’t already have such technology and wasn’t already involved in such processing. Both are part of the civilian use of atomic energy, and the practice of doing both are guaranteed to signatories by Article IV of the NPT as “ inalienable rights.” On the other hand, both technologies could be used in the production of nuclear weaponry.
Regular inspections by the IAEA would ensure that material wasn’t used in this manner. To avoid such control and inspection, a nation would have to deny IAEA inspectors access to facilities and withdraw from the NPT, something North Korea has already done twice. In reality, withdrawal is made extremely easy by Article X of the NPT: A nation need only cite “extraordinary circumstances” that are not defined in the treaty and give 90 days notice prior to withdrawal.
Red herring
As an instrument intended to prevent other nations from becoming nuclear powers, the NPT was recognized to be a relatively ineffective instrument, already rife with loopholes, right from its creation in the 1960s. In order to understand that, one first has to realize that the treaty created two separate and very unequal classes of nations signing on to it. On the one side, the group consisted of those nations that had already “successfully” produced nuclear weapons and tested at least one of them prior to the deadline of January 1, 1967. On the other side, were the vast majority of nations that now were obligated to refrain from doing likewise, just because they signed the treaty.
They swallowed that pill with the help of a “sweetener”, not only guaranteeing them free access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes – albeit under the watchful eye of the IAEA – but with the understanding that they would also receive generous support and “know-how” from the nuclear powers (Article IV, 2). The concessions used to lure non-nuclear armed nations into signing the treaty also included uncomplicated future withdrawal procedures and a rather weak control system that has meanwhile been strengthened via voluntary amendments between the IAEA and individual nations.
Thirteen nations currently operate enrichment facilities: Argentina, Brazil, China, Germany, France, Great Britain, India, Iran, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia and the United States. Presumably, Israel belongs on this list, despite the fact that its nuclear program is officially kept strictly secret. All other nations are forbidden to enrich uranium, according to the U.S. policy set by George W. Bush. The U.S. and its allies also place special restrictions on Iran, which already possesses advanced knowledge of enrichment technology and has been ordered to shut down and destroy all its enrichment facilities. Further tightening of NPT requirements deal with making withdrawal from the treaty more difficult and introducing a mandatory system of punishment for infractions.
Will the U.S. be able to force through its plans for treaty “strengthening” in the coming year? That’s uncertain. According to Article VIII-2, any modification to the treaty requires approval by a majority of the signatories. That would be a probable certainty. But, in addition to that, all nations possessing nuclear weapons have to concur, as must all 35 members of the Board of Governors of the IAEA. Except for nations possessing nuclear weapons, membership on this board is on a rotational basis. The United States government will first try to reach agreement with Russia and China, both of which agree in principle to limiting the number of nations with nuclear weapons technology. In addition, Russia, in cooperation with Kazakhstan, strives to be the sole source for nuclear reactor fuel to whom future customers (i.e., those nations forbidden by the treaty from enriching their own uranium) will be obliged to go. The Russian government, with its close ties to energy companies, is of course very interested in such a modification of the NPT.
With his propaganda line, “a world without nuclear weapons,” Obama is attempting, among other things, to rebut the argument made until now by the NPT Review Conference, namely, that in the 40 years the treaty has been in force, the nuclear powers haven’t really tried seriously to reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons. Besides that, Obama may be driven by a motive similar to that motivating Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968, when he suddenly escalated military action in Vietnam while simultaneously pushing for the NPT: The operative term is “red herring.”