Weakening Hamas a Necessity
Published in Volkskrant
(Netherlands) on 10 April 2009
by Paul Brill (link to original)
Obama's Middle Eastern politics can lead to a swampy marsh
The road to hell is paved with good intentions. I encountered a striking illustration of this distressing saying in Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East, by Martin Indyk. This former American ambassador to Israel reports, in his book published at the beginning of this year, on his diplomatic experiences in the Middle East, which took place mostly during the presidency of Bill Clinton, and during the first White House months of George Bush. Since then, he follows (and travels) the region as an employee of the Brookings Institute, a prestigious, predominantly Democratic think tank in Washington.
Sidelight
Indyk casts an interesting sidelight on the Palestinian elections of January 2006, which resulted in a victory for Hamas. Contrary to most observers, Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority since early 2005, could see what was coming: Hamas was well-organized, his own Fatah was divided and, because of its bad managerial record, unpopular. By postponing elections, he was hoping to turn the tides. With that goal in mind, he approached Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who, of course, would not benefit from a reinforced Hamas. Sharon had to help him find a credible excuse to cancel the elections.
Difficulties ensued
For example, problems developed from imposing restrictions on the candidacy in East Jerusalem, a matter that already had led to earlier difficulties. Sharon wanted to help Abbas, but he placed one condition: The Bush government had to cover his back by refraining from criticism. Both Sharon and Abbas even sent an envoy to Washington, to make sure that the United States would not make trouble.
They returned with a clear message: Bush wanted the elections to continue according to plan. He trusted in a favorable outcome and was convinced that participation in the political process would have a moderating effect on Hamas.
As Indyk sighed: The rest is history.
But it is a history that still puts a heavy mortgage on the Middle East and the already diminished chance for peace - not that Hamas is unique in that respect, because there is unfortunately no shortage of roadblocks in the region.
Pavement
But the naive expectations of Bush did not come to pass; his good intentions became the pavement on the road to an evil destination. Participation in the political process and administrative responsibility have not fundamentally changed Hamas. Rejection of Israel and anti-Jewish thinking have remained the core of its philosophy, which has saddled the other parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with a distasteful dilemma. I think the greatest chance for success lies in working with Syria. To summarize concisely: Business cannot be done with Hamas, but neither can it be done without Hamas. The movement is after all, a power factor of significance.
It is a dilemma that has become even more difficult to manage, now that a government resides in Washington, different from the previous one, which has been seriously committed, from day one, to a peace arrangement, while in Israel a government has come to power that has very little trust in a political settlement, with a prime minister who can barely utter the words, "two-state solution".
Way out?
Is there a way out, after all? The simplest and also most often-heard answer is: Washington, especially, should put much heavier pressure on Israel. Pressure is needed now, indeed, and it will come and will undoubtedly produce some effect, because, despite all resistance to concessions, Benjamin Netanyahu is not the kind of person to knowingly offend his big ally. But it is an illusion to think that Israel will completely let the U.S. decide, especially if the country thinks that its existence is in danger. In its turn, the White House, even that of Barack Obama, will think twice before giving up the strategic relationship with Israel.
Weaken
Perhaps a second path will have to be created, weakening Hamas in such a way that it becomes increasingly difficult for the movement to hold fast to its radical agenda. This is not the least of the goals for the improved relationship the Obama government is attempting to build with Iran and Syria, the guardians of Hamas. However, it also should be noted that the power of the leaders of Hamas will significantly decrease if other interests become more important in Tehran and Damascus.
I think the greatest chance for success lies in working with Syria, for three reasons: The alliance with Iran is not an intimate connection; the minority government in Damascus has to be careful in its actions; and an agreement on the Golan Heights does not have to be a Herculean job. In the past, Israel has repeatedly shown its willingness for complete return of the area in exchange for security guarantees. The danger is, however, that Lebanon will pay the price.
Iran
Closer contact with Iran is a much more difficult and uncertain task, not only because of the extremely hybrid power structure in Tehran, but also and mainly because a hard, antagonistic attitude towards the U.S. and Israel is the glue between the regime and the fanatic (and heavily armed) core of its followers.
With the outside chance that Obama's good intentions do not pave the way to hell, they do create the path to a swampy marsh.
The road to hell is paved with good intentions. I encountered a striking illustration of this distressing saying in Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East, by Martin Indyk. This former American ambassador to Israel reports, in his book published at the beginning of this year, on his diplomatic experiences in the Middle East, which took place mostly during the presidency of Bill Clinton, and during the first White House months of George Bush. Since then, he follows (and travels) the region as an employee of the Brookings Institute, a prestigious, predominantly Democratic think tank in Washington.
Sidelight
Indyk casts an interesting sidelight on the Palestinian elections of January 2006, which resulted in a victory for Hamas. Contrary to most observers, Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority since early 2005, could see what was coming: Hamas was well-organized, his own Fatah was divided and, because of its bad managerial record, unpopular. By postponing elections, he was hoping to turn the tides. With that goal in mind, he approached Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who, of course, would not benefit from a reinforced Hamas. Sharon had to help him find a credible excuse to cancel the elections.
Difficulties ensued
For example, problems developed from imposing restrictions on the candidacy in East Jerusalem, a matter that already had led to earlier difficulties. Sharon wanted to help Abbas, but he placed one condition: The Bush government had to cover his back by refraining from criticism. Both Sharon and Abbas even sent an envoy to Washington, to make sure that the United States would not make trouble.
They returned with a clear message: Bush wanted the elections to continue according to plan. He trusted in a favorable outcome and was convinced that participation in the political process would have a moderating effect on Hamas.
As Indyk sighed: The rest is history.
But it is a history that still puts a heavy mortgage on the Middle East and the already diminished chance for peace - not that Hamas is unique in that respect, because there is unfortunately no shortage of roadblocks in the region.
Pavement
But the naive expectations of Bush did not come to pass; his good intentions became the pavement on the road to an evil destination. Participation in the political process and administrative responsibility have not fundamentally changed Hamas. Rejection of Israel and anti-Jewish thinking have remained the core of its philosophy, which has saddled the other parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with a distasteful dilemma. I think the greatest chance for success lies in working with Syria. To summarize concisely: Business cannot be done with Hamas, but neither can it be done without Hamas. The movement is after all, a power factor of significance.
It is a dilemma that has become even more difficult to manage, now that a government resides in Washington, different from the previous one, which has been seriously committed, from day one, to a peace arrangement, while in Israel a government has come to power that has very little trust in a political settlement, with a prime minister who can barely utter the words, "two-state solution".
Way out?
Is there a way out, after all? The simplest and also most often-heard answer is: Washington, especially, should put much heavier pressure on Israel. Pressure is needed now, indeed, and it will come and will undoubtedly produce some effect, because, despite all resistance to concessions, Benjamin Netanyahu is not the kind of person to knowingly offend his big ally. But it is an illusion to think that Israel will completely let the U.S. decide, especially if the country thinks that its existence is in danger. In its turn, the White House, even that of Barack Obama, will think twice before giving up the strategic relationship with Israel.
Weaken
Perhaps a second path will have to be created, weakening Hamas in such a way that it becomes increasingly difficult for the movement to hold fast to its radical agenda. This is not the least of the goals for the improved relationship the Obama government is attempting to build with Iran and Syria, the guardians of Hamas. However, it also should be noted that the power of the leaders of Hamas will significantly decrease if other interests become more important in Tehran and Damascus.
I think the greatest chance for success lies in working with Syria, for three reasons: The alliance with Iran is not an intimate connection; the minority government in Damascus has to be careful in its actions; and an agreement on the Golan Heights does not have to be a Herculean job. In the past, Israel has repeatedly shown its willingness for complete return of the area in exchange for security guarantees. The danger is, however, that Lebanon will pay the price.
Iran
Closer contact with Iran is a much more difficult and uncertain task, not only because of the extremely hybrid power structure in Tehran, but also and mainly because a hard, antagonistic attitude towards the U.S. and Israel is the glue between the regime and the fanatic (and heavily armed) core of its followers.
With the outside chance that Obama's good intentions do not pave the way to hell, they do create the path to a swampy marsh.
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