It Cannot Be Said that They Don't Love Us

American Attitude Toward Russia is Not “Stuck on Negative”

Andrey Shitov, Washington.

American researcher and consultant William Dunkerley compared the fluctuation of public opinion in the United States toward Russia to fortune telling with daisy petals: “They loves Russia. They love Russia not.”

He analyzed the results of Gallup’s sociological surveys on this topic and combined them into a single graphic table with his own comments about possible reasons for dramatic drops in numbers.

It turned out to be really visual. Goodwill towards Russia embraced two-thirds of the US population twice: August 8-11, 1991, when, as Dunkerley reminds us, the collapse of the Soviet bloc was happening; and in February 2002, soon after Moscow gave a helping hand to Washington after the tragic acts of terrorism of 2001.

It is significant that during the coup in August 19, 1991, the number of Americans expressing positive opinions about Russia immediately decreased by 30 percent to approximately 36 percent. According to the table, there had not been any other changes in public sentiment toward Russia that dramatic for the last two decades. The reason is reflected in a comment: “Coup against Gorbachev”. A week later the level of goodwill toward Russia came back to the 60 percent point.

Dunkerley explains other reasons for the drop of Russia’s “positive ratings” to 40 percent and lower, by reminding us of certain coinciding events. These are: the beginning of the war in Kosovo in 1999 (back then the Russian government was warning about the possibility of a “World War”); the second war in Chechnya and Gusinsky’s PR campaign a year later; with the beginning of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, (Russia, as is known, was against that risky venture); and finally, with the “Georgian War” in 2009.

It is doubtful whether these statistics need additional comment. Except that it’s worth pointing out Dunkerley’s certainty that, in a number of cases, negative attitudes toward Russia increased as a result of “organized PR campaigns.” Besides the situation with Vladimir Gusinsky, who was successful enough to pass himself off as the victim of “attacks on freedom of the press,” Dunkerley brings up issues such as the “deaths of journalist Anna Politkovskaya, and reputed spy Alexander Litvinenko,” as well as the debates around energy supplies and the Georgian War mentioned above.

The main conclusion that the author of the research makes out of the work done is quietly optimistic. “American public opinion about Russia is not stuck on negative,” he writes. “It is malleable.” “Constructive and cooperative engagement” can, Dunkerley believes, move the situation in a positive direction; but threatening political tones or deliberately denigrating and deceptive “PR campaigns” have a negative influence on it.

Certain grounds for optimism are found, apparently, in the demographic information gleaned from the whole picture. Dunkerley was trying to find the breakdown of overall goodwill towards Russia as it relates to age groups. Gallop’s service was missing that data, but Dunkerley found one-shot research results of another authoritative sociology firm – the Pew Research Center – from 2007. Back then, twice as many people over the age of 50 held negative opinions about Russia than those aged 30 and younger. “That’s quite a difference!”- Dunkerley highlights. He also reminds us, by the way, that in the distant year 1954, only 5 percent of the US population had a positive attitude toward Russia.