Obama's Wager

Barack Obama seems to have softened his tone on Iran. The American president is critical of Iranian leaders for the repression of strikes in the country, yet begrudgingly so.

It was necessary, however, to remind them of the issues: “How [Iran] approaches and deals with people who are, through peaceful means, trying to be heard . . . sends a pretty clear signal to the international community about what Iran is and is not.”

The president has reacted to a resolution voted on by Congress, supporting “all Iranians who defend the values of freedom, human rights, public liberties and the rule of law,” and affirming “the importance of democratic and free elections.”

He also responded to a speech by the revolution’s compass, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, head of the regime, given Friday in Tehran, qualifying the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as “definitive” and “absolute,” and addressing the potentially severe consequences to agitators.

Obama, however, refuses to openly support the reformers against those in power in Tehran.

It’s a question of being realistic. The pre-electoral polls, one of which was commissioned by the Washington Post, exhibited a two-to-one lead by Ahmadinejad over his closest competitor, Hossein Moussavi. Ahmadinejad did, indeed, prevail, albeit by a smaller margin. The anomalies highlighted during the vote on June 12 are then much less serious than reported, and of doubtful utility – just a bit too flagrant, in certain cases. In any case, they deprived reformers of the second round that could have permitted the “miracle” they’ve been waiting for.

Obama’s “outstretched-hand” policy was not an issue in the electoral campaign. All candidates claimed to be ready to compromise with the new American president.

If it influenced events, it is notably because of the almost unconditional “enthusiasm” exhibited by Moussavi. He outraged his conservative rivals, of course, but also certain reformers – his “exes” in the secular left. In the decade after the revolution, they applauded his identification of hostage-taking at the American Embassy as a foundational element of the Islamic Republic.

Even if spread out over two decades, it’s a brusque change that is difficult to assimilate. These “exes” have, at least in part, rallied the camp of Ahmadinejad, who is leftist in his own way, identifying with the disenfranchised – incorruptible, strict and spartan in his daily life. He was a layman, as well, and, of course, Islamist, though hostile toward corrupt mullahs associated with the clan of ex-president Hashemi Rafasandjani. [The latter], nicknamed, “the Shark,” has landed, by circumstance, in the reformer camp, even if he does not openly support them. Though not the formal authority, it is often these “exes” who furnish the political machinery that counts and reports the vote.

The present crisis complicates the Iran-U.S. dialogue, but it is the most pressing issue on the agenda for everyone in Iran. All kinds of dangers linked to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan weigh on the Islamic republic. The current crisis could easily aggravate and amplify them. For better or for worse, it will be necessary to look to the U.S.

Obama’s wager is simple: Where the political regime in Iran is concerned, there is greater opportunity for change in keeping the lines of communication open, than there is in cutting them.