The Widening Gap between Jerusalem and Washington

Never has the foreign policy position of an American president harvested so much praise from countries normally so critical of the United States.

That is what the American ambassador to the U.N. reported to the White House. The leader of the Pakistani U.N. delegation even told him that every American citizen can be proud of such a president.

What is it that the American people are to be so proud of? Was he referring, perhaps, to the much-discussed speech President Obama gave in Cairo? Or maybe the new president’s glowing message to the Iranian people?

We are, in fact, referring to a comment made in October, 1956. The American president is Dwight D. Eisenhower. In the Middle East, the Sinai war rages. Israeli troops advance upon the Suez Canal through the Sinai desert. Great Britain and France threaten to take control of the canal, nationalized by Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, by force, if they have to.

Clash of Arms

The Eisenhower administration, until the very last moments ignorant of the British-French-Israeli plans, wasn’t looking to use force and was preoccupied with other goings-on in the world. Washington was preoccupied with Hungary, where a massive revolt against the communist regime had broken out.

Elections were on the horizon and, although any seasoned politician knows a break with allies is a serious electoral risk, Eisenhower pushed a major U.N. resolution through. It called for Israel to back down, imposed a weapons embargo on the region and required all parties to refrain from the use of violence.

It does not hurt to recall this episode as observers around the world loudly declare that relations between the U.S. and Israel have never been cooler. I would argue that the confrontation between Israel at the height of a large-scale military operation and Washington on the other side of the ring was of a far greater caliber than the current, petty arguments over settlement policy.

Of course, the Suez Canal conflict dates back to more than half a century ago. It is true that Israel lives in the permanent threat of a war and, back then, its military opponents were much weaker than they are now. Most importantly, the U.S. had yet to become the sole crutch holding Israel aloft in that hostile, unforgiving environment.

Close Bond

That bond became increasingly close over the years. In recent times, under George W. Bush, Israelis enjoyed unprecedented freedom of movement and sovereignty regarding both the military operations in South Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, as well as the settlement policy. Although the Bush government initially disapproved of the building of settlements in Palestinian-occupied territory, in practice, U.S. officials did little to prevent or even discourage construction.

Only the most stubborn Israeli dreamers could have thought this benevolent reign would live on after the 2008 elections. Sooner or later, a moment always comes when the American government, regardless of party lines, realizes that, despite all strategic and emotional affinity, the interests of their two countries do not run fully parallel. Many of the foreign policy experts with whom John McCain would have surrounded himself as president also believe the U.S. favors Israel too much to be a credible interlocutor in the Middle East. After all, it was a Republican government under George Bush Senior that forced the peace conference of Madrid down Israel’s throat in 1991.

Sneaking Annexation

It has been said that, in the long term, a harder American line against Israel will ultimately benefit the Jewish state. With the U.S. standing in the way of Israeli ambitions to annex currently occupied Palestinian territory, Netanyahu cannot do any further damage to the peace process and negotiations may still stand a chance. That is true to a certain extent and, from that standpoint, it is good that the White House continues to push for a complete stop to construction in outlying territories.

Not surprisingly, Benjamin Netanyahu and company resist that truth but the larger problem is that the Obama administration has so far failed to convince a substantial portion of the Israeli public that this ‘sacrifice’ is necessary, or at least worth a try, to pave the way to an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Actually, this is an unexpected disappointment for the U.S. Ordinarily, colonists can shout all they want but most Israelis simply do not care very much about the settlements. In an easier time, Israeli public opinion wouldn’t be nearly as much of a worry for the Americans.

Many moderate Israelis, however, have lost their faith in the seemingly endless peace process and have given up the age old penchant of “land in return for peace.” In their eyes, the retreat from South Lebanon has only led to rockets from Hezbollah and threats from Hamas against a background of powerful Holocaust deniers in Tehran.

Silence

Progressive policy makers in Israel hope that Obama will be able to rebuild trust by reaching out directly to the Israeli public. “The Arabs got the Cairo speech, we got silence,” Haaretz commentator Aluf Benn recently wrote in The New York Times.

Now, I do not underestimate the oratorical powers of Barack Obama but beautiful words have become so common place lately. Honestly, I think only something as bold and spectacular as Anwar Sadat’s historic visit in 1977 can bridge the gap between Washington and Jerusalem again.