The Hard-to-Win Afghan-Pakistan War

With the support of the U.S., Pakistan’s government’s military carried out an attack against the Taliban force recently. During the attack, Pakistan’s military intended to crush about 10,000 Taliban members using 30,000 soldiers. But Pakistan’s military stated frankly that this round of attacks is likely to be longer than expected, due to the complex topography and vigorous resistance of the enemy.

Not long ago, a summit of the leaders from the U.S., Afghanistan and Pakistan was held in Washington and the U.S. declared a “three-in-one” Afghan-Pakistan strategy. This crushing attack is no doubt an extension of Obama’s Afghanistan War and the description of “Afghan-Pakistan War” is quite appropriate.

The decision not to set up a missile defense system in Eastern Europe temporarily eases the tension with Russia. Obama seems to have undertaken some flexible and moderate strategies toward the Islamic world. In addition, besides persuading Europe to actively stimulate the economy more and sending more troops to Afghanistan, he has little interest in other affairs. Undoubtedly, Obama has shifted the focus of his diplomacy to Afghanistan and Pakistan. He is trying hard to amend the swamp created by Bush’s Iraq War. However, he is likely to fall into another swamp.

As for the Afghanistan situation, no matter how many soldiers the U.S. sends there, it would be in vain (Europeans are completely indifferent about sending troops to Afghanistan). That is because the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are always in the dark. This is the biggest difference between new-style wars and old-style wars: The pain of old-style war is temporary but the new so-called anti-terrorism war is never ending–full of the politicians’ strategies, the helplessness and hopelessness of the soldiers, the hysteria of the extremists and the bloody tears of the civilians.

According to reports, since August this year, in south Waziristan, where 600,000 people originally resided, about 100,000 people were forced to flee from their homes. This data from the United Nations shows that there are 500 people leaving their homes every day.

Obama’s focus shift from Iraq to Afghanistan and Pakistan may not be wise. In regards to this war, there are two visions worth mentioning: First, if the U.S. really wants to be “anti-terrorist,” then the most effective way ought to be utilizing strengths from many countries to ease up the local situation such as Iran. Iran is Afghanistan’s neighbor country, and the turmoil in Afghanistan is of no benefit to Iran.

A important reason for Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize is that he has is “anti-monopolarity.” Therefore, he indeed ought to respond to the “summons” of this Nobel Peace Prize and seek help from many countries. Besides, the U.S. should increase economic aid for this region. Only the end of U.S. military force and increasing economic aid will bring welfare to local residents, as well as bring down the foundation of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

Second, the above intention to “end terrorism” is not the main reason for the war; the desire to protect the U.S.’s interests in the East (in particular the Middle East) is well known by everyone. Although the unstable regions are the most valuable regions to exploit, the investment of military force will always be unequal to what comes out in the end. The number of armed terrorists crushed can not represent how victorious the war is, just as the pretty data of every country’s economic recovery can not cover the suffering of the economic crisis.

Looking at this angle, the offshore balance strategy believed by realist Mearsheimer is better than the new protectionism and solving problems by military force. He advocates carrying out the balance strategy in the distant region and let the “chess pieces” of that region balance themselves to ensure the interests of the U.S.