An Amateur’s Plan

Right from the outset of his term, Barack Obama made the war in Afghanistan his own war. Since then, he has done everything in his power to make sure he loses that war. His national security team exhibits a measure of amateurism that’s not unusual for the early phases of a presidential administration. That can, however, lead to total defeat for his administration and for Afghanistan’s future.

After announcing a new Afghanistan strategy in March, Obama proceeded to appoint a new military commander for the region. He also asked the new commander to put his new strategy to the acid test. The new commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, wrote a rigorous analysis that was to serve as a justification for the new strategy.

The Taliban would be delighted

The outcome of this exercise, promulgated by the targeted indiscretions of a general who is totally aware of his own importance, was reduced to a duel between two personalities: if Obama approved sending 40,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, then McChrystal would have emerged victorious. If fewer soldiers were committed, then Vice President Joe Biden’s faction would be the winners, since their position is to reduce the U.S. military presence in favor of commando-style raids from within.

The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, former Gen. Karl Eikenberry, is now also in Biden’s corner on the issue. Thus the power struggle in Washington has been carried over to the security zone in Kabul, something sure to please the Taliban as much as it does the de-legitimized President Hamid Karzai.

All the bickering over troop levels has pushed actual goals and strategy offstage and out of sight. The plan should be the quickest possible withdrawal of 71,000 foreign troops from the country while preventing a civil war from breaking out and resulting in both Afghanistan and Pakistan being overrun by the Taliban. These dangers can’t be dismissed out of hand.

Afghans won’t be defeated; they’ll just choose sides

The path to this has to be crystal clear as well. Three major developments must quickly take place. First, daily life has to become safer for everyone, something that will require protection by more soldiers – both Afghan and international troops.

Second, for the Kabul government to be seen as a legitimate power factor and a just entity, it will have to rid itself of all the corrupt politicians in its ranks. And third, a program of reconciliation with the Taliban must be initiated because an insurgency cannot be defeated militarily, only politically.

Afghan history shows that most of its wars were ended by a change of loyalties. Afghans aren’t defeated, they just choose the stronger side because they know that’s the only guarantee they will survive and continue to live.

In the dispute over which strategy should follow which, it’s now down to the right sequence of steps and how to take them, such as the question of troop strength. Politicians like Gordon Brown and Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (Germany’s new Minister of Defense) have already warned Hamid Karzai they expect him to take action against corruption and incompetence in his own government.

Admittedly, they can put only limited pressure on him because Karzai knows that the ultimate threat, total troop withdrawal (which would be his death knell), would also expose the West’s weaknesses, thereby ensuring final defeat for the United States as well.

All the players must now exhibit unanimity and coherence, as well as their willingness to exert massive pressure. Obama and his team will be under the microscope because their decisions will be critical in the final phases of the campaign.

It all comes down to a demonstration of political and military power, a demonstration of superiority. That’s the only way to reach the critical mass necessary to give new hope to Afghans and allies alike. But the squabbles in Washington don’t exactly inspire confidence.