From FDR to Barack Obama
Published in Xinhua
(China) on 25 December 2009
by Ya-Wei Liu (link to original)
After Barack Obama's visit to China, the Chinese government and media largely regarded the visit as symbolizing the beginning of the best era of Sino-American relations in history. According to the views of many Chinese scholars, China is now on an equal footing with the United States.
Whether this judgment is valid cannot be concluded at this point. To better review Obama's policy regarding China, one must apply the lessons learned from history to the current situation. This perspective will take into account how U.S. presidents treated China (before and after the establishment of the republic), the cause of their domestic and foreign policy in regards to their strategies in dealing with China, and the effects of these policies in China.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected in 1933 and died in office in 1945. In his 12-year reign, his countless policies regarding China were enormously influential: He staunchly opposed the Japanese invasion of China, though he could do little because of the U.S.'s isolationist policy; He opened the door for leaseholds in China, which forced Chiang Kai-shek to remain committed to his resistance; After Pearl Harbor, the U.S. entered World War II, and Roosevelt assigned Joseph Stilwell to direct the KMT army but later had him recalled because of pressure from Chiang; At the Yalta Conference, in exchange for the Soviet Union’s agreement to declare war on Japan, he betrayed China's interests on a large scale; He was curious to understand the Communist Party and sent U.S. observers specifically to Yan'an, but because of his busy schedule and traditional anti-Communist sentiments, there was no rigorous pursuit of diplomatic relations; During World War II, the Chinese Communist Party knew that it could not influence U.S. policy toward China. Instead, party leaders thought that what would finally sway the United States was not their ideology, but their potential power.
After Roosevelt's sudden death, Harry S. Truman hurried to succeed him. Soon after, he ordered the nuclear attack on Japan. After Japan surrendered, Truman was troubled by U.S. policy toward China. His personal sentiments and ideology made him a supporter of Chiang Kai-shek. Pragmatically speaking, other than financial and military support, there was not much he could do. In addition, he also firmly believed that a united, peaceful and democratic China was beneficial for the interests of the United States, Asia and the world. Thus, Truman immediately ordered General Marshall to mediate the crisis between the Communists and the Nationalists, who were on the verge of violence. After the Communists and Nationalists concluded the Double Ten Agreement, Marshall reported back to Washington. The moment he left, infighting began among members of the Nationalist party. Chiang Kai-shek's eventual downfall was irreversible, and the American people would have never agreed to send troops to China. Truman could only wait until the dust settled.
Mao Tse-tung's “leaning to one side” policy, the clamor raised by McCarthyism in the U.S. and Truman's decision to interfere in the Korean War set aside diplomatic interaction between China and the United States for more than 30 years.
President Truman was succeeded by Dwight D. Eisenhower. During his eight years, Eisenhower successfully neutralized the dangers of the First Taiwan Straits Crisis. But at the same time, he made the United States an ally and guardian of Taiwan. His secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, said that the hope for China to evolve into a peaceful country will be placed on succeeding generations.
Following Eisenhower in office were two democrats: John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. Both had to face accusations that they did not persecute or block the worldwide communist movement rigorously enough. They also had to face the charge that they had lost China. Because of these allegations, they were required to indicate clearly their absolute irreconcilable differences with Beijing and the communist revolution of its leaders. Though Johnson disliked wantonly engaging in military ventures, increased pressure from the Republicans caused him to drag the U.S. into the mire that was the Vietnam War.
In 1968, when Johnson decided not to seek re-election, anti-war sentiments in the United States were at a peak. The U.S. sent troops to Vietnam out of fear of the “Domino Effect” of Chinese Communists sweeping Southeast Asia. It could not extricate itself from the Vietnam situation without China's help. However, Democrats were already known for “appeasing the Communists,” so even though Johnson wanted to establish diplomatic relations with China, he didn't have the guts to do so. For Republicans, dialogue with Beijing was political suicide.
In 1969, Richard Nixon was elected into office. He implemented “Vietnamization” to deal with the Vietnam Era. At the same time, the relationship between China and the Soviet Union worsened. Washington and Beijing began their tentative interaction. Many people believed that Nixon's visit to Beijing was for the sole purpose of reaping certain benefits for the United States. After the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, Nixon visited China in February 1972 and signed the first agreement between the United States and China in Shanghai.
Following the Watergate scandal, Nixon had no choice but to resign. His successor, President Gerald Ford, also visited China but was constrained by opposition from conservative powers. Under pressure from lobbyists for Taiwan, normalization of relations between the U.S. and China could not be achieved, not even when Ford lost to Jimmy Carter in 1976.
Carter entered the White House by the grace of the Watergate scandal. In 1949, Carter had witnessed that infighting in China was drawing to an end. [Editor’s Note: Carter had first visited China in 1949 as a naval officer.] He did not understand why the United States could not establish diplomatic relations with China, disliked the conservative attitudes of Congress regarding foreign relations, and did not buy the Taiwan Lobby's statements. He authorized the extremely anti-Soviet United States National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to negotiate with the Chinese government. On Dec. 15, 1978, the two parties signed the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. Two days later, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee convened in Beijing.
In 1979, on the eve of Chinese New Year, Deng Xiaoping accepted Carter’s invitation to visit the United States. This visit aroused pro-China sentiments in the U.S, and soon after, China counterattacked Vietnam in self-defense. The Republicans did not spare Carter and took him to the Supreme Court. Congress accused Carter of selling out an ally and forced the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act. Republican candidate Ronald Reagan also accused Carter of betraying national interests.
Carter lost to Reagan in the next election. The outbreak of the Iranian Revolution prevented Carter from visiting China during his term. He has been the only U.S. president since before Nixon’s term not to have made the trip over to China. However, Carter often said that Nixon’s visit was truly ground-breaking and acknowledged that there is only one China. He was also the first American president to formally recognize the People’s Republic of China.
In 1982, President Reagan visited China and signed the third communiqué. At the time, Reagan was most preoccupied with taking down the Soviet Union and destroying the Berlin Wall, so he was willing and did yield to China's concerns. To Reagan, Moscow was the most stubborn and most dangerous enemy. Unexpectedly, he agreed to solve, once and for all, the problem of the United States' arms sales to Taiwan.
George Bush Sr. became president in 1989. Bush had been the second, unofficial ambassador to China before the normalization of relations, so Sino-American relations should have seen a lot of progress during his term. They were, however, at their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic ties. Bush withstood pressure from Congress and from the people, and let his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft secretly visit Beijing to meet with Deng Xiaoping.
Bush had indeed made strong efforts to maintain interaction with China despite pressures from the West. But during his last year in office, in order to win more votes, he approved the sale of hi-tech fighter jets, thereby unscrupulously destroying the communiqué that Reagan had built with China.
After Clinton was elected, "anti-China" policies and incidents came one after another: The U.S. government linked the most favored nation trade status with China's human rights issues; Every year, the State Department publicly denounced China's behavior on human rights and religious issues; During negotiations, the U.S. government deliberately made things difficult for China; it did not permit China to join the WTO quickly and without problems; An American warship illegally harassed, held and searched the Chinese cargo ship Yinhe; Congress approved an invitation for Li Denghui to visit the United States; U.S. military deployed two aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Strait; American Olympic Organizing Committees voted against China's right to host the 2000 Olympics; An American B-2 bomber destroyed the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia.
Of course, Clinton was not a die-hard anti-China fanatic. His policy toward China became increasingly more pragmatic. In 1998, his visit to China was the first made by a U.S. president in nine years. In Beijing, Clinton reiterated the United States’ “Three No's” principle on Taiwan. He also approved China's entry into the WTO during his term. Clinton’s behavior may be the most classic example of an American politician saying one thing during his campaign and doing something completely different while in office.
In 2001, after barely winning the election, George Bush Jr. made it clear that if mainland China dared to force reunification with Taiwan, the United States would make every effort to defend Taiwan. Soon after, an American spy plane bumped into a Chinese Navy aviator's fighter jet. The U.S. flight crew was detained and Sino-American Relations were confronted with an immense challenge. Though the incident was settled with an apology from the United States, Bush and the U.S. military held a grudge. The future of Sino-American relations depended on many variables.
9/11 fundamentally changed Bush's policy toward China. Sino-American relations transformed from strategic competition in 2001 to mutual concern for common interests in 2005. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea, and the climate change crisis put Washington and Beijing in the same boat. They were now obligated to collaborate for their common goals. Sino-American relations were beginning to be renewed.
Obama entered office in 2009. Obama's United States is no longer the same United States as it was under Clinton or Bush. Since China and the United States established diplomatic relations in 1979, Obama is the first U.S. president to visit China during his first year in office. Before his visit, Chairman Hu had already met with him three times, in London, New York and Pittsburgh. Also, Obama has expressed that Sino-American relations are the United States’ most important bilateral relations. Obama's greatest accomplishment from his visit is most likely the signing of a joint statement with China. This statement made the United States’ consideration and concern for China's interests clear. It addressed how easy it is to change the current situation between China and the United States by dealing with differences of opinion, concrete issues and questions of equality.
The balance of power is determined from the 76 years that lie between FDR and Barack Obama, as well as from 13 presidential policies toward China, diplomatic interactions with China, and domestic policies influencing China. The following conclusions can be roughly drawn:
1. The relationship between the U.S. and China is truly unique. The most notable characteristic of their relationship today is the suspicion that Americans want to "change" and "use" China. Their policies all stem from the interests of the United States and rarely take into consideration the concerns and interests of China. The inseparable, yet unmanageable relationship has always been influenced by ideology, but the motivating incentive behind the relationship is the practical interests of each country.
2. Since 1933, the United States has influenced China politically, economically and socially far more than China has influenced the United States. The American presidents with the biggest influence were Truman, Nixon, and Carter. Truman's interference in Korea in 1950 prevented peace in the Taiwan Strait; Nixon's groundbreaking trip in 1972 opened the door to diplomatic relations between the United States and China. Carter's decision in 1978 gave China the peaceful environment and technology transfer that enabled reform and an opening up to the outside world, utilizing funds and the convenient circumstances that came from abroad. As the United States' hegemonic powers decrease and China's powers increase, China's influence on the United States will also rise.
3. By taking into account the history of interaction between the two countries, Americans do not view the Chinese with animosity. However, they do not hold them in high regard either, perhaps due to the long-standing defect of racism among the descendants of the generally haughty Anglo-Saxon race. After China's abrupt rise to power, this belittling attitude may turn into distrust and fear. If China cannot properly utilize and guard its current prowess, conflict may arise with the United States; and conflict with the United States can mean large setbacks to China's development.
Whether this judgment is valid cannot be concluded at this point. To better review Obama's policy regarding China, one must apply the lessons learned from history to the current situation. This perspective will take into account how U.S. presidents treated China (before and after the establishment of the republic), the cause of their domestic and foreign policy in regards to their strategies in dealing with China, and the effects of these policies in China.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected in 1933 and died in office in 1945. In his 12-year reign, his countless policies regarding China were enormously influential: He staunchly opposed the Japanese invasion of China, though he could do little because of the U.S.'s isolationist policy; He opened the door for leaseholds in China, which forced Chiang Kai-shek to remain committed to his resistance; After Pearl Harbor, the U.S. entered World War II, and Roosevelt assigned Joseph Stilwell to direct the KMT army but later had him recalled because of pressure from Chiang; At the Yalta Conference, in exchange for the Soviet Union’s agreement to declare war on Japan, he betrayed China's interests on a large scale; He was curious to understand the Communist Party and sent U.S. observers specifically to Yan'an, but because of his busy schedule and traditional anti-Communist sentiments, there was no rigorous pursuit of diplomatic relations; During World War II, the Chinese Communist Party knew that it could not influence U.S. policy toward China. Instead, party leaders thought that what would finally sway the United States was not their ideology, but their potential power.
After Roosevelt's sudden death, Harry S. Truman hurried to succeed him. Soon after, he ordered the nuclear attack on Japan. After Japan surrendered, Truman was troubled by U.S. policy toward China. His personal sentiments and ideology made him a supporter of Chiang Kai-shek. Pragmatically speaking, other than financial and military support, there was not much he could do. In addition, he also firmly believed that a united, peaceful and democratic China was beneficial for the interests of the United States, Asia and the world. Thus, Truman immediately ordered General Marshall to mediate the crisis between the Communists and the Nationalists, who were on the verge of violence. After the Communists and Nationalists concluded the Double Ten Agreement, Marshall reported back to Washington. The moment he left, infighting began among members of the Nationalist party. Chiang Kai-shek's eventual downfall was irreversible, and the American people would have never agreed to send troops to China. Truman could only wait until the dust settled.
Mao Tse-tung's “leaning to one side” policy, the clamor raised by McCarthyism in the U.S. and Truman's decision to interfere in the Korean War set aside diplomatic interaction between China and the United States for more than 30 years.
President Truman was succeeded by Dwight D. Eisenhower. During his eight years, Eisenhower successfully neutralized the dangers of the First Taiwan Straits Crisis. But at the same time, he made the United States an ally and guardian of Taiwan. His secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, said that the hope for China to evolve into a peaceful country will be placed on succeeding generations.
Following Eisenhower in office were two democrats: John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. Both had to face accusations that they did not persecute or block the worldwide communist movement rigorously enough. They also had to face the charge that they had lost China. Because of these allegations, they were required to indicate clearly their absolute irreconcilable differences with Beijing and the communist revolution of its leaders. Though Johnson disliked wantonly engaging in military ventures, increased pressure from the Republicans caused him to drag the U.S. into the mire that was the Vietnam War.
In 1968, when Johnson decided not to seek re-election, anti-war sentiments in the United States were at a peak. The U.S. sent troops to Vietnam out of fear of the “Domino Effect” of Chinese Communists sweeping Southeast Asia. It could not extricate itself from the Vietnam situation without China's help. However, Democrats were already known for “appeasing the Communists,” so even though Johnson wanted to establish diplomatic relations with China, he didn't have the guts to do so. For Republicans, dialogue with Beijing was political suicide.
In 1969, Richard Nixon was elected into office. He implemented “Vietnamization” to deal with the Vietnam Era. At the same time, the relationship between China and the Soviet Union worsened. Washington and Beijing began their tentative interaction. Many people believed that Nixon's visit to Beijing was for the sole purpose of reaping certain benefits for the United States. After the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, Nixon visited China in February 1972 and signed the first agreement between the United States and China in Shanghai.
Following the Watergate scandal, Nixon had no choice but to resign. His successor, President Gerald Ford, also visited China but was constrained by opposition from conservative powers. Under pressure from lobbyists for Taiwan, normalization of relations between the U.S. and China could not be achieved, not even when Ford lost to Jimmy Carter in 1976.
Carter entered the White House by the grace of the Watergate scandal. In 1949, Carter had witnessed that infighting in China was drawing to an end. [Editor’s Note: Carter had first visited China in 1949 as a naval officer.] He did not understand why the United States could not establish diplomatic relations with China, disliked the conservative attitudes of Congress regarding foreign relations, and did not buy the Taiwan Lobby's statements. He authorized the extremely anti-Soviet United States National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to negotiate with the Chinese government. On Dec. 15, 1978, the two parties signed the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. Two days later, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee convened in Beijing.
In 1979, on the eve of Chinese New Year, Deng Xiaoping accepted Carter’s invitation to visit the United States. This visit aroused pro-China sentiments in the U.S, and soon after, China counterattacked Vietnam in self-defense. The Republicans did not spare Carter and took him to the Supreme Court. Congress accused Carter of selling out an ally and forced the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act. Republican candidate Ronald Reagan also accused Carter of betraying national interests.
Carter lost to Reagan in the next election. The outbreak of the Iranian Revolution prevented Carter from visiting China during his term. He has been the only U.S. president since before Nixon’s term not to have made the trip over to China. However, Carter often said that Nixon’s visit was truly ground-breaking and acknowledged that there is only one China. He was also the first American president to formally recognize the People’s Republic of China.
In 1982, President Reagan visited China and signed the third communiqué. At the time, Reagan was most preoccupied with taking down the Soviet Union and destroying the Berlin Wall, so he was willing and did yield to China's concerns. To Reagan, Moscow was the most stubborn and most dangerous enemy. Unexpectedly, he agreed to solve, once and for all, the problem of the United States' arms sales to Taiwan.
George Bush Sr. became president in 1989. Bush had been the second, unofficial ambassador to China before the normalization of relations, so Sino-American relations should have seen a lot of progress during his term. They were, however, at their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic ties. Bush withstood pressure from Congress and from the people, and let his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft secretly visit Beijing to meet with Deng Xiaoping.
Bush had indeed made strong efforts to maintain interaction with China despite pressures from the West. But during his last year in office, in order to win more votes, he approved the sale of hi-tech fighter jets, thereby unscrupulously destroying the communiqué that Reagan had built with China.
After Clinton was elected, "anti-China" policies and incidents came one after another: The U.S. government linked the most favored nation trade status with China's human rights issues; Every year, the State Department publicly denounced China's behavior on human rights and religious issues; During negotiations, the U.S. government deliberately made things difficult for China; it did not permit China to join the WTO quickly and without problems; An American warship illegally harassed, held and searched the Chinese cargo ship Yinhe; Congress approved an invitation for Li Denghui to visit the United States; U.S. military deployed two aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Strait; American Olympic Organizing Committees voted against China's right to host the 2000 Olympics; An American B-2 bomber destroyed the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia.
Of course, Clinton was not a die-hard anti-China fanatic. His policy toward China became increasingly more pragmatic. In 1998, his visit to China was the first made by a U.S. president in nine years. In Beijing, Clinton reiterated the United States’ “Three No's” principle on Taiwan. He also approved China's entry into the WTO during his term. Clinton’s behavior may be the most classic example of an American politician saying one thing during his campaign and doing something completely different while in office.
In 2001, after barely winning the election, George Bush Jr. made it clear that if mainland China dared to force reunification with Taiwan, the United States would make every effort to defend Taiwan. Soon after, an American spy plane bumped into a Chinese Navy aviator's fighter jet. The U.S. flight crew was detained and Sino-American Relations were confronted with an immense challenge. Though the incident was settled with an apology from the United States, Bush and the U.S. military held a grudge. The future of Sino-American relations depended on many variables.
9/11 fundamentally changed Bush's policy toward China. Sino-American relations transformed from strategic competition in 2001 to mutual concern for common interests in 2005. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea, and the climate change crisis put Washington and Beijing in the same boat. They were now obligated to collaborate for their common goals. Sino-American relations were beginning to be renewed.
Obama entered office in 2009. Obama's United States is no longer the same United States as it was under Clinton or Bush. Since China and the United States established diplomatic relations in 1979, Obama is the first U.S. president to visit China during his first year in office. Before his visit, Chairman Hu had already met with him three times, in London, New York and Pittsburgh. Also, Obama has expressed that Sino-American relations are the United States’ most important bilateral relations. Obama's greatest accomplishment from his visit is most likely the signing of a joint statement with China. This statement made the United States’ consideration and concern for China's interests clear. It addressed how easy it is to change the current situation between China and the United States by dealing with differences of opinion, concrete issues and questions of equality.
The balance of power is determined from the 76 years that lie between FDR and Barack Obama, as well as from 13 presidential policies toward China, diplomatic interactions with China, and domestic policies influencing China. The following conclusions can be roughly drawn:
1. The relationship between the U.S. and China is truly unique. The most notable characteristic of their relationship today is the suspicion that Americans want to "change" and "use" China. Their policies all stem from the interests of the United States and rarely take into consideration the concerns and interests of China. The inseparable, yet unmanageable relationship has always been influenced by ideology, but the motivating incentive behind the relationship is the practical interests of each country.
2. Since 1933, the United States has influenced China politically, economically and socially far more than China has influenced the United States. The American presidents with the biggest influence were Truman, Nixon, and Carter. Truman's interference in Korea in 1950 prevented peace in the Taiwan Strait; Nixon's groundbreaking trip in 1972 opened the door to diplomatic relations between the United States and China. Carter's decision in 1978 gave China the peaceful environment and technology transfer that enabled reform and an opening up to the outside world, utilizing funds and the convenient circumstances that came from abroad. As the United States' hegemonic powers decrease and China's powers increase, China's influence on the United States will also rise.
3. By taking into account the history of interaction between the two countries, Americans do not view the Chinese with animosity. However, they do not hold them in high regard either, perhaps due to the long-standing defect of racism among the descendants of the generally haughty Anglo-Saxon race. After China's abrupt rise to power, this belittling attitude may turn into distrust and fear. If China cannot properly utilize and guard its current prowess, conflict may arise with the United States; and conflict with the United States can mean large setbacks to China's development.
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