From FDR to Barack Obama

Published in Xinhua
(China) on 25 December 2009
by Ya-Wei Liu (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Yaqing Wen. Edited by Brigid Burt.
After Barack Obama's visit to China, the Chinese government and media largely regarded the visit as symbolizing the beginning of the best era of Sino-American relations in history. According to the views of many Chinese scholars, China is now on an equal footing with the United States.

Whether this judgment is valid cannot be concluded at this point. To better review Obama's policy regarding China, one must apply the lessons learned from history to the current situation. This perspective will take into account how U.S. presidents treated China (before and after the establishment of the republic), the cause of their domestic and foreign policy in regards to their strategies in dealing with China, and the effects of these policies in China.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected in 1933 and died in office in 1945. In his 12-year reign, his countless policies regarding China were enormously influential: He staunchly opposed the Japanese invasion of China, though he could do little because of the U.S.'s isolationist policy; He opened the door for leaseholds in China, which forced Chiang Kai-shek to remain committed to his resistance; After Pearl Harbor, the U.S. entered World War II, and Roosevelt assigned Joseph Stilwell to direct the KMT army but later had him recalled because of pressure from Chiang; At the Yalta Conference, in exchange for the Soviet Union’s agreement to declare war on Japan, he betrayed China's interests on a large scale; He was curious to understand the Communist Party and sent U.S. observers specifically to Yan'an, but because of his busy schedule and traditional anti-Communist sentiments, there was no rigorous pursuit of diplomatic relations; During World War II, the Chinese Communist Party knew that it could not influence U.S. policy toward China. Instead, party leaders thought that what would finally sway the United States was not their ideology, but their potential power.

After Roosevelt's sudden death, Harry S. Truman hurried to succeed him. Soon after, he ordered the nuclear attack on Japan. After Japan surrendered, Truman was troubled by U.S. policy toward China. His personal sentiments and ideology made him a supporter of Chiang Kai-shek. Pragmatically speaking, other than financial and military support, there was not much he could do. In addition, he also firmly believed that a united, peaceful and democratic China was beneficial for the interests of the United States, Asia and the world. Thus, Truman immediately ordered General Marshall to mediate the crisis between the Communists and the Nationalists, who were on the verge of violence. After the Communists and Nationalists concluded the Double Ten Agreement, Marshall reported back to Washington. The moment he left, infighting began among members of the Nationalist party. Chiang Kai-shek's eventual downfall was irreversible, and the American people would have never agreed to send troops to China. Truman could only wait until the dust settled.

Mao Tse-tung's “leaning to one side” policy, the clamor raised by McCarthyism in the U.S. and Truman's decision to interfere in the Korean War set aside diplomatic interaction between China and the United States for more than 30 years.

President Truman was succeeded by Dwight D. Eisenhower. During his eight years, Eisenhower successfully neutralized the dangers of the First Taiwan Straits Crisis. But at the same time, he made the United States an ally and guardian of Taiwan. His secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, said that the hope for China to evolve into a peaceful country will be placed on succeeding generations.

Following Eisenhower in office were two democrats: John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. Both had to face accusations that they did not persecute or block the worldwide communist movement rigorously enough. They also had to face the charge that they had lost China. Because of these allegations, they were required to indicate clearly their absolute irreconcilable differences with Beijing and the communist revolution of its leaders. Though Johnson disliked wantonly engaging in military ventures, increased pressure from the Republicans caused him to drag the U.S. into the mire that was the Vietnam War.

In 1968, when Johnson decided not to seek re-election, anti-war sentiments in the United States were at a peak. The U.S. sent troops to Vietnam out of fear of the “Domino Effect” of Chinese Communists sweeping Southeast Asia. It could not extricate itself from the Vietnam situation without China's help. However, Democrats were already known for “appeasing the Communists,” so even though Johnson wanted to establish diplomatic relations with China, he didn't have the guts to do so. For Republicans, dialogue with Beijing was political suicide.

In 1969, Richard Nixon was elected into office. He implemented “Vietnamization” to deal with the Vietnam Era. At the same time, the relationship between China and the Soviet Union worsened. Washington and Beijing began their tentative interaction. Many people believed that Nixon's visit to Beijing was for the sole purpose of reaping certain benefits for the United States. After the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, Nixon visited China in February 1972 and signed the first agreement between the United States and China in Shanghai.

Following the Watergate scandal, Nixon had no choice but to resign. His successor, President Gerald Ford, also visited China but was constrained by opposition from conservative powers. Under pressure from lobbyists for Taiwan, normalization of relations between the U.S. and China could not be achieved, not even when Ford lost to Jimmy Carter in 1976.

Carter entered the White House by the grace of the Watergate scandal. In 1949, Carter had witnessed that infighting in China was drawing to an end. [Editor’s Note: Carter had first visited China in 1949 as a naval officer.] He did not understand why the United States could not establish diplomatic relations with China, disliked the conservative attitudes of Congress regarding foreign relations, and did not buy the Taiwan Lobby's statements. He authorized the extremely anti-Soviet United States National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to negotiate with the Chinese government. On Dec. 15, 1978, the two parties signed the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. Two days later, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee convened in Beijing.

In 1979, on the eve of Chinese New Year, Deng Xiaoping accepted Carter’s invitation to visit the United States. This visit aroused pro-China sentiments in the U.S, and soon after, China counterattacked Vietnam in self-defense. The Republicans did not spare Carter and took him to the Supreme Court. Congress accused Carter of selling out an ally and forced the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act. Republican candidate Ronald Reagan also accused Carter of betraying national interests.

Carter lost to Reagan in the next election. The outbreak of the Iranian Revolution prevented Carter from visiting China during his term. He has been the only U.S. president since before Nixon’s term not to have made the trip over to China. However, Carter often said that Nixon’s visit was truly ground-breaking and acknowledged that there is only one China. He was also the first American president to formally recognize the People’s Republic of China.

In 1982, President Reagan visited China and signed the third communiqué. At the time, Reagan was most preoccupied with taking down the Soviet Union and destroying the Berlin Wall, so he was willing and did yield to China's concerns. To Reagan, Moscow was the most stubborn and most dangerous enemy. Unexpectedly, he agreed to solve, once and for all, the problem of the United States' arms sales to Taiwan.

George Bush Sr. became president in 1989. Bush had been the second, unofficial ambassador to China before the normalization of relations, so Sino-American relations should have seen a lot of progress during his term. They were, however, at their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic ties. Bush withstood pressure from Congress and from the people, and let his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft secretly visit Beijing to meet with Deng Xiaoping.

Bush had indeed made strong efforts to maintain interaction with China despite pressures from the West. But during his last year in office, in order to win more votes, he approved the sale of hi-tech fighter jets, thereby unscrupulously destroying the communiqué that Reagan had built with China.

After Clinton was elected, "anti-China" policies and incidents came one after another: The U.S. government linked the most favored nation trade status with China's human rights issues; Every year, the State Department publicly denounced China's behavior on human rights and religious issues; During negotiations, the U.S. government deliberately made things difficult for China; it did not permit China to join the WTO quickly and without problems; An American warship illegally harassed, held and searched the Chinese cargo ship Yinhe; Congress approved an invitation for Li Denghui to visit the United States; U.S. military deployed two aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Strait; American Olympic Organizing Committees voted against China's right to host the 2000 Olympics; An American B-2 bomber destroyed the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia.

Of course, Clinton was not a die-hard anti-China fanatic. His policy toward China became increasingly more pragmatic. In 1998, his visit to China was the first made by a U.S. president in nine years. In Beijing, Clinton reiterated the United States’ “Three No's” principle on Taiwan. He also approved China's entry into the WTO during his term. Clinton’s behavior may be the most classic example of an American politician saying one thing during his campaign and doing something completely different while in office.

In 2001, after barely winning the election, George Bush Jr. made it clear that if mainland China dared to force reunification with Taiwan, the United States would make every effort to defend Taiwan. Soon after, an American spy plane bumped into a Chinese Navy aviator's fighter jet. The U.S. flight crew was detained and Sino-American Relations were confronted with an immense challenge. Though the incident was settled with an apology from the United States, Bush and the U.S. military held a grudge. The future of Sino-American relations depended on many variables.

9/11 fundamentally changed Bush's policy toward China. Sino-American relations transformed from strategic competition in 2001 to mutual concern for common interests in 2005. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea, and the climate change crisis put Washington and Beijing in the same boat. They were now obligated to collaborate for their common goals. Sino-American relations were beginning to be renewed.

Obama entered office in 2009. Obama's United States is no longer the same United States as it was under Clinton or Bush. Since China and the United States established diplomatic relations in 1979, Obama is the first U.S. president to visit China during his first year in office. Before his visit, Chairman Hu had already met with him three times, in London, New York and Pittsburgh. Also, Obama has expressed that Sino-American relations are the United States’ most important bilateral relations. Obama's greatest accomplishment from his visit is most likely the signing of a joint statement with China. This statement made the United States’ consideration and concern for China's interests clear. It addressed how easy it is to change the current situation between China and the United States by dealing with differences of opinion, concrete issues and questions of equality.

The balance of power is determined from the 76 years that lie between FDR and Barack Obama, as well as from 13 presidential policies toward China, diplomatic interactions with China, and domestic policies influencing China. The following conclusions can be roughly drawn:

1. The relationship between the U.S. and China is truly unique. The most notable characteristic of their relationship today is the suspicion that Americans want to "change" and "use" China. Their policies all stem from the interests of the United States and rarely take into consideration the concerns and interests of China. The inseparable, yet unmanageable relationship has always been influenced by ideology, but the motivating incentive behind the relationship is the practical interests of each country.

2. Since 1933, the United States has influenced China politically, economically and socially far more than China has influenced the United States. The American presidents with the biggest influence were Truman, Nixon, and Carter. Truman's interference in Korea in 1950 prevented peace in the Taiwan Strait; Nixon's groundbreaking trip in 1972 opened the door to diplomatic relations between the United States and China. Carter's decision in 1978 gave China the peaceful environment and technology transfer that enabled reform and an opening up to the outside world, utilizing funds and the convenient circumstances that came from abroad. As the United States' hegemonic powers decrease and China's powers increase, China's influence on the United States will also rise.

3. By taking into account the history of interaction between the two countries, Americans do not view the Chinese with animosity. However, they do not hold them in high regard either, perhaps due to the long-standing defect of racism among the descendants of the generally haughty Anglo-Saxon race. After China's abrupt rise to power, this belittling attitude may turn into distrust and fear. If China cannot properly utilize and guard its current prowess, conflict may arise with the United States; and conflict with the United States can mean large setbacks to China's development.


奥巴马总统访华后,中国官方和媒体多认为奥巴马总统访问是一个标志性事件,证明中美关系进入有史以来的最好阶段。用一些中国学者的话说,中美已经可以平起平坐,讨价还价了。这样的判断是不是说到点子上了,目前应该说没有定论。笔者觉得有必要从历史的角度考量中美关系,才能更好地反思奥巴马的中国政策。历史地看待中美关系的一个视角是看看新中国成立之前和之后美国总统在任内都对中国做了什么,他们决策的外交和内政诱因是什么,对中国起到了什么作用。

小罗斯福从1933年当选总统一直干到1945年去世,在位12年多,对中国决策无数,影响深远。他坚决反对日本对中国的侵略,但是由于国内的孤立主义甚嚣尘上而无能为力;他向中国开启了租借大门,使得蒋介石得以坚持抗战;珍珠港事件之后,美国进入第二次世界大战,小罗斯福派史迪威指挥国民党军,后迫于蒋的压力撤换了史迪威;他在雅尔塔峰会上为了换取苏联对日宣战,大规模地出卖了中国的利益;他有了解共产党的好奇心,并专门派人去延安,但是忙碌和传统的反共心态阻止了他对中共展开积极外交。二战期间中共不能左右甚至影响美国的对华政策,但中共领导人心里清楚,最后可以打动美国的不是自己的主义,而是自己的实力。

小罗斯福猝死,杜鲁门匆匆接班,不久下令对日本进行核打击。日本投降后,杜鲁门总统为中国政策犯难。从感情和意识形态上讲,他支持蒋介石;从现实政治分析,除了军事和经济援助,他没有太多的牌。此外,他也坚信一个统一、和平和民主的中国对美国好,对东亚好,对世界好。眼看国共就要刀枪相向,杜鲁门紧急授权马歇尔将军到中国斡旋。国共双方谈成“双十协定”后,马歇尔去华盛顿报捷,他前脚走,国民党就发动内战。最终蒋介石的颓势无法挽回,而美国人民那时根本不会同意出兵中国,杜鲁门只好采取了等“尘埃落定”的观望态度。毛泽东的“一边倒”政策,美国国内麦卡锡主义的甚嚣尘上和杜鲁门决定干预朝鲜内战使得中美关系一下搁置了30年。

接替杜鲁门总统的是艾森豪威尔。 8年期间,艾森豪威尔总统成功地化解了台海炮战引发的危机,但是也让美国与台湾结成防卫联盟,他的国务卿杜勒斯说把和平演变中国的希望寄托在中国第三代和第四代人身上。

之后是两任民主党总统,肯尼迪和约翰逊。由于民主党人背着对世界性的共产主义运动绞杀和封堵不足的黑锅和丢失中国的罪名,他们必须明确表示与北京和它所领导的共产主义革命不共戴天。二位总统虽然不愿意穷兵黩武,但是迫于共和党的压力,把美国拖入了越南战争的泥潭。1968年约翰逊决定不寻求连选连任时,美国国内反战运动风起云涌。美国出兵越南是害怕中共席卷东南亚的多米诺骨牌效应,要从越南解套不能没有中国的帮助。但是,民主党有“亲共”的前科,约翰逊即使有与中国建交的想法也没有敢跟中国开谈的胆量。跟北京对话对民主党人来说是政治自杀。

1969年,尼克松当选总统,开始着手实施越南战争越南化的计划。与此同时,中苏关系恶化,华盛顿和北京开始谨小慎微地接触。有不少人认为,尼克松去北京不过是打点国家利益。1972年2月,尼克松来到中国,并在上海签署了中美开始缓和关系的第一份公报。尼克松由于水门事件的丑闻不得不辞职下野。他的继任者福特总统虽然也出访了中国,但是迫于美国保守势力的反对和台湾院外集团的压力,直到他1976年在大选中败于吉米·卡特,中美不能实现邦交正常化。

卡特借水门事件的东风入主白宫。卡特1949年在中国沿海目睹中国内战的尾声。他不理解美国为什么不能与中国建交,不喜欢国务院在外交事务上的因循守旧,更不买台湾院外活动集团的账。他授权极为反苏的国家安全顾问布热津斯基与中国政府谈判。1978年12月15日,双方签署了建交公报。两天后,中共十一届三中全会在北京召开。1979年大年三十,邓小平应卡特总统的邀请出访美国,在美国掀起中国热。之后不久,中国开始对越自卫反击战。共和党人不能饶恕卡特,把他告上了最高法院;国会亲台成员谴责卡特出卖盟友,强行通过了《台湾关系法》;共和党1980年的总统候选人里根大骂卡特两面三刀,出卖国家利益。卡特在选举中败于里根。由于伊朗革命的爆发,卡特是自尼克松以来唯一没有能够在任内出访中国的美国总统。卡特常常说,尼克松的确有破冰之旅,承认只有一个中国也是事实,但是他是第一位说这个中国是中华人民共和国的美国总统。

1982年里根总统到了中国,并签署了中美关系的第三个公告。当时,里根总统最为关注的是如何拖垮苏联,推倒柏林墙,愿意并且对中国做出让步,并出乎意料地同意一劳永逸地解决美国向台湾出售武器的问题。对里根来说,莫斯科是最为顽固和最为危险的敌人。

老布什1989年出任总统。作为美国与中国建交前的第二任非正式大使,中美关系在老布什任内应该有长足的进步。不料,1989年中美关系坠入建交以来的最低谷。布什顶住美国国会和民间的压力,让自己的国家安全顾问斯考克罗福特秘密访问北京并与邓小平会晤。老布什不顾西方压力与中国保持接触功不可没,但他在任内最后一年为了拉选票批准向台湾出售美国先进战机,肆无忌惮地破坏了他的前任里根与中国签署的8·17公报。

克林顿当选之后,“反华”政策和事件接二连三:美国政府把贸易最惠国待遇与中国的人权挂钩;国务院每年公布中国在人权和宗教信仰自由方面的表现;美国政府在谈判中刁难中国,不允许中国顺利和及早进入WTO;美国舰船对中国货轮“银河号”进行非法骚扰和裹挟;美国国会通过决议邀请李登辉访美;美军派出两个航母编队进入台湾海峡;美国奥组委投票反对中国主办2000年奥运会;美国B- 1轰炸机投弹炸毁了中国驻南斯拉夫大使馆。当然,克林顿并不是死心塌地的反华派,在对华政策上也越来越务实。1998年,时隔9年之后,美国总统再度访华。克林顿在北京重申了美国对台的“三不”政策,并在任内批准了中国加入WTO。克林顿可能是美国政客选举时讲一套,执政后搞另一套的典型范例。

2001年小布什勉强当选总统不久就明确表示如果大陆敢于武力统一台湾,美国会竭尽全力保卫台湾。不久,美国间谍飞机与解放军海军航空兵的战机相撞,美军机组被扣押,中美关系面临巨大挑战。撞机事件虽然以美方道歉而获得解决,布什总统和美国军方对中国怨恨骤增,中美关系的未来发展充满了变数。9·11恐怖分子对美国本土的袭击从根本上改变了布什的对华政策,中美关系从2001年前后的战略竞争者变成了2005年前后的利益攸关者,美国在伊拉克和阿富汗的战事,朝鲜和伊朗的核问题和控制气候转暖的需要将华盛顿和北京挤上了一条船,同舟就要共济。中美关系出现了新的小阳春。

2009年,奥巴马入主白宫。奥巴马的美国已不是克林顿或者小布什的美国。奥巴马是中美1979年建交之后在就任第一年就出访中国的美国总统。在他到来之前,胡主席已经与他在伦敦、纽约和匹兹堡三次晤面,奥巴马也曾表示中美关系是美国最重要的双边关系。奥巴马访华的最大成就可能是与中国签署了联合声明。这个公报既表明美国对中国核心利益的关注,也挑明了中美之间的分歧,务实,平等,可操作性很强。

从小罗斯福到奥巴马,前后76年,13位总统的对华政策对中国的外交和内政都有举足轻重的影响。我们大致可以得出以下初步结论。

(1)美国和中国的关系的确特殊,这个在今天更为显著的性质的主要表现就是美国人有“改变”和“利用”中国的嫌疑,而这样的政策基本都是从美国的利益出发,很少考虑中国人的情感和利益。中美剪不断、理还乱的关系一直受意识形态的影响,但是每次双边关系的重大转折的诱因都是实际的国家利益。

(2)从1933年起,美国对中国的政治、经济和生活的影响远远大于中国对美国的影响,其中对中国影响最大的美国总统分别是杜鲁门、尼克松和卡特。杜鲁门1950年的干预朝鲜战争的决策使得台海不能统一;尼克松1972年的破冰之旅打开了中美关系的大门;卡特1978年的决定使中国从一定程度上有了进行改革开放的和平环境和技术转让、利用国外资金的便利条件。随着美国霸权地位的相对萎缩和中国国力的相对提升,中国对美国的影响也将梯次上升。

(3)从历史上看,美国人并不仇视中国人,但也不太看得起中国人,这可能是总是高高在上的盎格鲁—撒克逊民族后裔的老毛病。在中国崛起之后,之前的看不起就可能会转化成不信任和恐惧。如果中国不能很好地把握和看待自己的崛起,或许会与美国交恶,而与美国交恶有可能对中国的发展产生重大的影响。
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