Practical Verification Measures Crucial in U.S.-Russia Nuke Negotiations

In December, the United States and Russia postponed the signing of a new nuclear arms reduction treaty—which they had been aiming to conclude within the year—to 2010.

The parties have already agreed, in a larger framework, on the extent of reductions in nuclear weapons delivery systems, such as strategic warheads and missiles. However, the negotiations have been extended because they have not reached a compromise on the technological problem of how to count those weapons, and on the inspections and verification procedures necessary to ascertain whether they have indeed been reduced.

The new treaty is to be the successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START1), which the United States and the then-Soviet Union signed in 1991 and which expired on December 5, 2009.

The fate of the new treaty will be of great significance to nuclear arms reduction throughout the world. For the sake of taking a concrete step towards the “world without nuclear weapons” that President Obama is pursuing, we urge both the United States and Russia to work to conclude the treaty and bring it into force as quickly as possible.

According to presentation materials by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the U.S. State Department, there are approximately 2200 strategic nuclear warheads deployed in the United States and about 2800 in Russia, and about 1200 delivery systems such as ballistic missiles in the U.S. versus about 820 in Russia.

At a summit meeting in July, both countries agreed on a general framework that (1) limits nuclear warheads to 1500 to 1675, and (2) limits delivery systems such as ballistic missiles, submarine-mounted missiles, and bombers to 500 to 1100.

Different expectations by each country were behind the failure to come to a final agreement by year’s end: Russia hopes to close the gap with the United States’ nuclear weapons through the development of new strategic missiles, and the United States insists on a stringent regime for nuclear arms inspections.

Specifically, Russia’s opposition to inspections of its production and testing data for new models of missiles (as the United States has proposed), and its demands that the United States put an end to its missile defense program, have been cited as sticking points.

In order to preserve its power of deterrence, Russia feels an urgent need to avoid calls for a provisions in the new treaty that would reveal the level of its missile technology to the United States.

On the other hand, the United States remembers the bitter experience of two post-START1 treaties that were concluded to no practical effect.

The reduction treaty concluded in 2002 under President Bush (the Moscow treaty) was a hollow effort due to its lack of verification measures, and START2, which was concluded by the Clinton administration in 1993, did not win congressional approval due to its concessions to Russia and so did not enter into effect.

President Obama must not make the same mistakes in approaching the successor to START1. Verification measures that bring arms reduction into the open are essential to reliably reduce nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons.

Even though negotiations will extend into the new year, we would like to see the United States and Russia implement treaty terms that allow for stringent mutual inspections. This ought to be a spur to the progress of nuclear arms reduction throughout the world.