Japan Must Share the United States’ Stance Toward China
Published in Sankei Shimbun
(Japan) on 3 February 2010
by (link to original)
The U.S. Department of Defense has released the first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of the Obama administration. The report harbors frank suspicions regarding the speed and purpose of China’s military build-up and calls strongly for a response based on cooperation with its allies.
For an Obama administration that has evinced a certain appetite for cooperation with China, the report can nevertheless be seen as a move towards a heightened state of vigilance and raising the alert in matters of security.
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s administration should come to the same realization and reflect it in its meetings on strengthening the alliance with the United States — starting with the prompt resolution of the problem surrounding the relocation of the Futenma Airbase in Ginowan, Okinawa.
The Quadrennial Defense Review is a long-term, 25-year indicator for national defense strategy. Started in 1997, the most recent iteration is the fourth. It shifts the foundation of national defense from a “two major theater war” strategy to preparation for prompt action against a multitude of situations, including terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and calls for the U.S. to adjust to changes in the security environment due to the rise of China, India and other powers.
What is important for Japan, as a U.S. ally, is to note the mention of the military buildup and designs of China, whose global presence is on the rise.
Though the U.S. hopes China will play a constructive role in the international community, it has pointed to concrete examples of an unprecedented, “long-term and comprehensive military modernization” by China—such as medium-range missiles, attack nuclear submarines, large-area air defense, cyber-based and space-based attack capabilities, construction of aircraft carriers, etc.—and in no uncertain terms demonstrated a wariness of China, pointing to “a number of . . . questions regarding [China’s] long-term intentions.”
While it avoided naming names, the report also gave significant treatment to China’s “anti-access strategies” — the Chinese military’s ability to prevent U.S. reinforcements from approaching in case of a confrontation with Taiwan.
Because Chinese cooperation is indispensable for the U.S. to tackle problems such as the economy and a nuclear North Korea or Iran, the report does not refer to it as a “threat” or “rival.” However, considering last year’s report on “the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” which underlined “limited transparency,” and the recent sale of U.S. weapons for Taiwan’s self-defense, the U.S. seems to be advertising how much of a threat it considers China to be.
The report also emphasized the need to cooperate with Asian allies such as Japan and South Korea. In the face of the U.S. saying it “will continue to implement the bilateral Realignment Roadmap agreement” with Japan, it goes without saying that cooperation is essential.
High-level talks on strengthening the alliance between Japan and the U.S. have begun. However, how much does the Hatoyama administration, which has allowed the Futenma problem to fester, share in the United States’ view of China and its strategy for its alliance with Japan? We want to see the administration deepen our alliance with the U.S. and act in Japan’s national interests to improve Japan’s security.
For an Obama administration that has evinced a certain appetite for cooperation with China, the report can nevertheless be seen as a move towards a heightened state of vigilance and raising the alert in matters of security.
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s administration should come to the same realization and reflect it in its meetings on strengthening the alliance with the United States — starting with the prompt resolution of the problem surrounding the relocation of the Futenma Airbase in Ginowan, Okinawa.
The Quadrennial Defense Review is a long-term, 25-year indicator for national defense strategy. Started in 1997, the most recent iteration is the fourth. It shifts the foundation of national defense from a “two major theater war” strategy to preparation for prompt action against a multitude of situations, including terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and calls for the U.S. to adjust to changes in the security environment due to the rise of China, India and other powers.
What is important for Japan, as a U.S. ally, is to note the mention of the military buildup and designs of China, whose global presence is on the rise.
Though the U.S. hopes China will play a constructive role in the international community, it has pointed to concrete examples of an unprecedented, “long-term and comprehensive military modernization” by China—such as medium-range missiles, attack nuclear submarines, large-area air defense, cyber-based and space-based attack capabilities, construction of aircraft carriers, etc.—and in no uncertain terms demonstrated a wariness of China, pointing to “a number of . . . questions regarding [China’s] long-term intentions.”
While it avoided naming names, the report also gave significant treatment to China’s “anti-access strategies” — the Chinese military’s ability to prevent U.S. reinforcements from approaching in case of a confrontation with Taiwan.
Because Chinese cooperation is indispensable for the U.S. to tackle problems such as the economy and a nuclear North Korea or Iran, the report does not refer to it as a “threat” or “rival.” However, considering last year’s report on “the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” which underlined “limited transparency,” and the recent sale of U.S. weapons for Taiwan’s self-defense, the U.S. seems to be advertising how much of a threat it considers China to be.
The report also emphasized the need to cooperate with Asian allies such as Japan and South Korea. In the face of the U.S. saying it “will continue to implement the bilateral Realignment Roadmap agreement” with Japan, it goes without saying that cooperation is essential.
High-level talks on strengthening the alliance between Japan and the U.S. have begun. However, how much does the Hatoyama administration, which has allowed the Futenma problem to fester, share in the United States’ view of China and its strategy for its alliance with Japan? We want to see the administration deepen our alliance with the U.S. and act in Japan’s national interests to improve Japan’s security.