Eradicating the Taliban from Afghanistan: Obama’s Test

Obama chose to turn the battle in Afghanistan into his own war, and thereby gave up joining the liberal-conservative coalition that assumes that ignoring troubles is a rational solution.

These are decisive days for Barack Obama’s presidency. Yesterday, when The Washington Post reported on the NATO forces’ offensive in the Helmand province in Afghanistan, the headline read “Obama’s War.” Winner of the Nobel Peace Prize and commander in chief of the U.S. armed forces, Obama is the one who decided to focus on Afghanistan as the most important sphere in battling global terrorism.

This was a very difficult and dangerous decision, possibly the most difficult decision that he’s made. Iraq has quieted down (relatively) and in Afghanistan, the NATO forces are bleeding moderately, watching the slow decline of the corrupt Karzai government.

The president of the United States could have chosen to follow the growing and strengthening liberal-conservative coalition that believes if America buries her head in the sand her troubles will pass right over her. Challenges such as an impending victory in Afghanistan — a country that has buried at least three empires — can turn Obama into a modern Lyndon Johnson, another Democratic president with good intentions who was captured by the spell of a failing war.

Nevertheless, Obama chose to turn Afghanistan into his own war, to dispatch another 30,000 soldiers into it, to open a diplomatic campaign to bring in soldiers from other NATO countries and to adopt a completely new strategy created for him by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Not Like Fallujah

Operation “Moshtarak” (“together”) is the broadest military operation since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the first test of the Obama-McChrystal strategy. It is completely different from the strategy of the NATO forces during the George W. Bush period: no more temporarily seizing control in small plots of territory with the simple intention of “killing the most Taliban as possible,” no more quick withdrawals to safe bases and no more “mopping up” in the style of Fallujah in Iraq. “Fallujah is not the model,” Gen. McChrystal said last week.

The New York Times described the new strategy as having mercy on civilians but of course, that is the most positive perspective. NATO’s most significant problem is a widening of Taliban influence throughout Afghanistan. This new operating force is meant to stop and reverse that trend.

The NATO forces, together with the new Afghan army, are working to gain control over the city of Marja, a significant Taliban stronghold in the Helmand province. As opposed to previous times, the goal is not for pointed victories to be followed by withdrawal but rather, to achieve a permanent takeover. A fundamental part of this operation is the preparation by Afghan governmental forces — police, welfare and education services, which will enter the city immediately after NATO gains control. In addition, there will be strict rules of engagement imposed on American and NATO soldiers, in order to avoid harming civilians — a subject that raises constant discontent with the Afghan public.

It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of the attack in Marja as a pilot to the entire American policy in the area. “We’re going to take Marja away from the Taliban,” said Brig. Gen. Lawrence D. Nicholson, commander of the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, yesterday. The result could be “a fundamental change in Helmand and, by extension, the entire nation of Afghanistan.” Nicholson is a military man but behind this attack hides a broader significance: the success or failure of the Obama administration’s strategy on the war on terror and as a result, the way in which Obama’s presidency will be shaped and remembered.