Questions For The Propaganda Machine

Generals are accustomed to being taken at their word. We’d like to follow suit.

When 15,000 NATO troops began their advance on the Afghan city of Marjah with the mission of eliminating the Taliban, NATO troop commander General Stanley McChrystal commented, “We’ve got a government in a box, ready to roll in.”

We’ve heard all that before. When the U.S. Army drove the Taliban out of Kabul in 2001, it replaced them with a government that proved to be anything but “ready to roll in.” First, it had to make a detour to the St. Petersburg Conference, where Western nations ensured it was dedicated to democracy, human rights and constitutional government. What actually rolled in, however, was a government run by Hamid Karzai, who quickly proved to be the patron saint of a corrupt clique dedicated to rigging elections. That’s why it’s entirely appropriate to now ask what the government General McChrystal is bringing with him looks like. Who will be in charge? What are their backgrounds? What qualifications do they have? Who are their relatives? Are they Pashtuns, Tajiks or Hazaras? Or will it be a mixture of all of the above?

These are questions the citizens of Marjah would probably ask if they had the opportunity to ask them. The struggle will take place in their city. But these are questions that should also interest us since the bottom line is that the next government will be put into power by Western soldiers.

One must assume that McChrystal has confidence in the next government because it will be an integral part of his new Afghan strategy, which will be tested first in Marjah. But since McChrystal is certainly aware of the extent of the corruption in Afghanistan, he’s unlikely to have any illusions. How will he be able to trust the politicians he’s trucking into Marjah? How can he risk the lives of his soldiers for them? The answer is: He has no alternatives.

He probably doesn’t have much faith in their integrity, but he probably has a good deal of faith in their bribe-ability. That seems to be the central theme in NATO’s new Afghan strategy: One need only offer them enough money to keep them from defecting to the Taliban.

But what will NATO do if the Afghans take the money and stick with the Taliban?