China’s Multi-Faceted Nuclear Policy
Published in Die Zeit
(Germany) on 10 April 2010
by Frank Sieren (link to original)
(Germany) on 10 April 2010
by Frank Sieren (link to original)
Translated from
by Ron Argentati.
Edited by .
It’s already been established that Obama has vision. But he has also learned that it isn’t easy to convert those visions into reality. That will be the case at the upcoming nuclear summit in Washington even more so than it was at the Copenhagen environmental summit. The concerns are equally great: in Copenhagen, it was about saving the world from environmental catastrophe. Now the concern is that nuclear materials might fall into the wrong hands.
Seen policy-wise, one is aware that the battle lines this time aren’t as clearly drawn as previously. But the greatest chasm still runs between the United States and China. The Chinese cleverly draw a difference between the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the means of achieving those goals. They are in full agreement with the goals, but differ from most western nations on how best to achieve them: they put more stock in possible NPT punitive actions against wayward countries.
Their position becomes less mysterious when one considers that China has close political and economic ties with two of the four nations who have yet to become signatories to the NPT but that are nonetheless suspected of developing or already possessing nuclear weapons. The countries are Pakistan and North Korea. The two remaining renegade nations are Israel and India. Additionally, China is the superpower with the best contact to the NPT signatory nation of Iran, the nation currently causing the most global concern. China’s relations are closest with Iran and Pakistan, furthest with their closest geographical neighbor, North Korea.
Up to now it’s been clear that China considers good relations with these countries more important than any fragmented chorus for non-proliferation. The central issues are either basic security interests, as is the case with next-door neighbors Pakistan and North Korea, or economic interests, as is the case with Iran, who supplies China with oil and natural gas.
It's obvious that China's position is weakening the strategy of the NPT. They maintain, however, that they are not unique in giving their own political interests priority in the matter, saying that a world superpower closes its eyes to Israel on the same issue out of political interest. That was the diplomatically correct phrasing used, but it was clear that reference was being made to the United States. Above all, in Iran’s case the Chinese take an open position while supporting western goals. He Yafai, China’s new ambassador to the United Nations said in Geneva, “Iran as an NPT member certainly is entitled to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. But Iran should not develop any capability that can produce nuclear weapons. That would be very destabilizing."
But China has its own ideas about how Iran should be prevented from attaining that capability. They would first exhaust all other possibilities before resorting to sanctions. Nothing has changed in that regard, even if they’re willing to talk to the West regarding such sanctions. He Yafei says China has been talking to Iran constantly and urging the country to agree to IAEA proposals. The proposal envisions swapping Iran’s low-enriched uranium for nuclear fuel to be used in their reactors. Iran is objecting, saying it wants to enrich its own fuel. In the United States and European Union, they’re saying that enough is enough.
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi sees it differently. He again emphasized recently that he didn’t consider sanctions as a “fundamental solution.”
China will consider sanctions when all other options for a diplomatic solution have been exhausted, or in the case that Iran unilaterally breaks off negotiations. Why the Chinese have become more flexible in recent days is clear: they want to secure their energy supply without diplomatically isolating themselves.
But the fact remains that when uncertain the Chinese will always consider their own economic interests more important than the enforcement powers of the NPT. Especially when they need not be concerned about countries in the Middle East that feel threatened by Iran. Israel doesn’t play a central role in Chinese foreign policy, and China has good relations with most of the Arab states. On the other side, oil and gas producing Arab states don’t want to risk offending their potentially largest customer. They therefore comment very cautiously on China’s unique path toward the NPT as regards Iran.
Even Turkey, at the moment not a permanent member of the UN Security Council, leans toward the Chinese position, as Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan recently assured German Chancellor Angela Merkel, saying Turkey’s good economic relations with China shouldn’t suffer. The Brazilians, likewise not a permanent member of the Security Council, are also similarly inclined to support China. The Russians remain skeptical and wavering. But nothing more. As regards North Korea, China considers the status quo as the lesser of all evils. China sees no alternative to the “six-party negotiations.” When it comes to North Korea, the West can’t ignore China.
As far as its own nuclear arsenal goes, China is unlikely to listen to reason despite the fact that the International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm is convinced that China continues to arm. According to the Swedish institute, China is the world’s only nuclear power that continues to add to its stockpile, albeit at a very low level. Ninety five percent of global nuclear weapons are controlled by the United States and Russia. China is said to have increased its stock of nuclear warheads from 161 in the year 2007 to 186 since then. Peking is also building four new nuclear submarines capable of launching missiles with nuclear warheads.
Thus far it appears that State and Party Chief Hu Jintao doesn’t consider it necessary to incline toward America’s position at the upcoming summit. The West has very little leverage. Hu will use the summit to show the United States yet again that America’s global influence is in decline and that China also has support for its positions. The United States, on the other hand, will try to prevent that with all their strength. It’s likely that both sides will lose sight of the real issues and that the summit will conclude as unsatisfactorily as did the environmental summit in Copenhagen.
Seen policy-wise, one is aware that the battle lines this time aren’t as clearly drawn as previously. But the greatest chasm still runs between the United States and China. The Chinese cleverly draw a difference between the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the means of achieving those goals. They are in full agreement with the goals, but differ from most western nations on how best to achieve them: they put more stock in possible NPT punitive actions against wayward countries.
Their position becomes less mysterious when one considers that China has close political and economic ties with two of the four nations who have yet to become signatories to the NPT but that are nonetheless suspected of developing or already possessing nuclear weapons. The countries are Pakistan and North Korea. The two remaining renegade nations are Israel and India. Additionally, China is the superpower with the best contact to the NPT signatory nation of Iran, the nation currently causing the most global concern. China’s relations are closest with Iran and Pakistan, furthest with their closest geographical neighbor, North Korea.
Up to now it’s been clear that China considers good relations with these countries more important than any fragmented chorus for non-proliferation. The central issues are either basic security interests, as is the case with next-door neighbors Pakistan and North Korea, or economic interests, as is the case with Iran, who supplies China with oil and natural gas.
It's obvious that China's position is weakening the strategy of the NPT. They maintain, however, that they are not unique in giving their own political interests priority in the matter, saying that a world superpower closes its eyes to Israel on the same issue out of political interest. That was the diplomatically correct phrasing used, but it was clear that reference was being made to the United States. Above all, in Iran’s case the Chinese take an open position while supporting western goals. He Yafai, China’s new ambassador to the United Nations said in Geneva, “Iran as an NPT member certainly is entitled to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. But Iran should not develop any capability that can produce nuclear weapons. That would be very destabilizing."
But China has its own ideas about how Iran should be prevented from attaining that capability. They would first exhaust all other possibilities before resorting to sanctions. Nothing has changed in that regard, even if they’re willing to talk to the West regarding such sanctions. He Yafei says China has been talking to Iran constantly and urging the country to agree to IAEA proposals. The proposal envisions swapping Iran’s low-enriched uranium for nuclear fuel to be used in their reactors. Iran is objecting, saying it wants to enrich its own fuel. In the United States and European Union, they’re saying that enough is enough.
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi sees it differently. He again emphasized recently that he didn’t consider sanctions as a “fundamental solution.”
China will consider sanctions when all other options for a diplomatic solution have been exhausted, or in the case that Iran unilaterally breaks off negotiations. Why the Chinese have become more flexible in recent days is clear: they want to secure their energy supply without diplomatically isolating themselves.
But the fact remains that when uncertain the Chinese will always consider their own economic interests more important than the enforcement powers of the NPT. Especially when they need not be concerned about countries in the Middle East that feel threatened by Iran. Israel doesn’t play a central role in Chinese foreign policy, and China has good relations with most of the Arab states. On the other side, oil and gas producing Arab states don’t want to risk offending their potentially largest customer. They therefore comment very cautiously on China’s unique path toward the NPT as regards Iran.
Even Turkey, at the moment not a permanent member of the UN Security Council, leans toward the Chinese position, as Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan recently assured German Chancellor Angela Merkel, saying Turkey’s good economic relations with China shouldn’t suffer. The Brazilians, likewise not a permanent member of the Security Council, are also similarly inclined to support China. The Russians remain skeptical and wavering. But nothing more. As regards North Korea, China considers the status quo as the lesser of all evils. China sees no alternative to the “six-party negotiations.” When it comes to North Korea, the West can’t ignore China.
As far as its own nuclear arsenal goes, China is unlikely to listen to reason despite the fact that the International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm is convinced that China continues to arm. According to the Swedish institute, China is the world’s only nuclear power that continues to add to its stockpile, albeit at a very low level. Ninety five percent of global nuclear weapons are controlled by the United States and Russia. China is said to have increased its stock of nuclear warheads from 161 in the year 2007 to 186 since then. Peking is also building four new nuclear submarines capable of launching missiles with nuclear warheads.
Thus far it appears that State and Party Chief Hu Jintao doesn’t consider it necessary to incline toward America’s position at the upcoming summit. The West has very little leverage. Hu will use the summit to show the United States yet again that America’s global influence is in decline and that China also has support for its positions. The United States, on the other hand, will try to prevent that with all their strength. It’s likely that both sides will lose sight of the real issues and that the summit will conclude as unsatisfactorily as did the environmental summit in Copenhagen.