Obama and the New Nuclear Politics
Published in La Nacion
(Argentina) on 16 April 2010
by Editorial (link to original)
The signal sent to the international community regarding control and reduction of arsenals is unequivocal. During the past weeks, after achieving the well-deserved, invigorating political triumph of United States health care reform, President Barack Obama has taken concrete steps toward the delicate issue of nuclear proliferation; this, during a year marked, domestically, by the mid-term elections of next November, which promise to be more uncertain than he imagined.
First, he agreed to the bilateral agreement of the Russian Federation, which succeeds the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991. He agreed with his counterpart, Dimitri Medvedev, on a new “limit” of 1,550 nuclear weapons in each country.
This is a significant reduction, on the order of 30 percent of the limit that had been established in 2002, in the Treaty of Moscow. As such, the missiles, submarines and bombers, capable of transporting and launching nuclear bombs, will not be able to exceed 700 in each category. It is less than half the limit agreed upon in 1991.
The signal sent to the international community is positive, a break with the sense of immobility or inertia that has been floating over this issue. The new agreement re-establishes the regular, reciprocal inspections suspended last December.
Almost simultaneously, Obama announced modification of the nuclear doctrine of his country. He promises not to use or threaten with nuclear weapons those countries not in possession of that type of weapon.
In any case, the U.S. reserves the right to adjust the new doctrine, consequently retaining the right to use nuclear arms against powers that resort to their use or to chemical and biological weapons.
Also, it should be assumed that they might use nuclear weapons against “non-state” actors, such as terrorist organizations, or against states that have decided not to join in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), such as North Korea, Iran or Syria. Upon confronting this new reality, Russia and China have agreed to discuss the possible imposition of smart sanctions against Iran, a subject about which, until now, they have shared no agreement.
Another important component of the renovation of the North American nuclear politics is the recent “nuclear summit” in Washington, attended by 47 heads of state. It was the most important gathering of world leaders held in the United States since 1945 — surpassing the United Nations.
The objectives addressed are numerous. First, try to detain an accelerated race in which various states seek to become nuclear powers; second, to raise the consciousness of all nations regarding the enormous risk of nuclear arms suddenly falling into the hands of terrorists; third, to assure that the elements required for the manufacture of nuclear arms — plutonium or enriched uranium — are always well-identified and guarded in secure locations; and finally, to provide the necessary impetus to ensure that the forthcoming negotiation of the NPT is not a failure. If this goal is met, the world will be betting on more cooperation than confrontation, and this is good news.
Argentina now has the opportunity to confirm its good image and continue the respected conduct of the last decades in this particular chapter of nuclear energy. Therefore, when the new session on this issue takes place within the next two years in Seoul, the work must have been impeccable and, in turn, commitments must have been met.
First, he agreed to the bilateral agreement of the Russian Federation, which succeeds the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991. He agreed with his counterpart, Dimitri Medvedev, on a new “limit” of 1,550 nuclear weapons in each country.
This is a significant reduction, on the order of 30 percent of the limit that had been established in 2002, in the Treaty of Moscow. As such, the missiles, submarines and bombers, capable of transporting and launching nuclear bombs, will not be able to exceed 700 in each category. It is less than half the limit agreed upon in 1991.
The signal sent to the international community is positive, a break with the sense of immobility or inertia that has been floating over this issue. The new agreement re-establishes the regular, reciprocal inspections suspended last December.
Almost simultaneously, Obama announced modification of the nuclear doctrine of his country. He promises not to use or threaten with nuclear weapons those countries not in possession of that type of weapon.
In any case, the U.S. reserves the right to adjust the new doctrine, consequently retaining the right to use nuclear arms against powers that resort to their use or to chemical and biological weapons.
Also, it should be assumed that they might use nuclear weapons against “non-state” actors, such as terrorist organizations, or against states that have decided not to join in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), such as North Korea, Iran or Syria. Upon confronting this new reality, Russia and China have agreed to discuss the possible imposition of smart sanctions against Iran, a subject about which, until now, they have shared no agreement.
Another important component of the renovation of the North American nuclear politics is the recent “nuclear summit” in Washington, attended by 47 heads of state. It was the most important gathering of world leaders held in the United States since 1945 — surpassing the United Nations.
The objectives addressed are numerous. First, try to detain an accelerated race in which various states seek to become nuclear powers; second, to raise the consciousness of all nations regarding the enormous risk of nuclear arms suddenly falling into the hands of terrorists; third, to assure that the elements required for the manufacture of nuclear arms — plutonium or enriched uranium — are always well-identified and guarded in secure locations; and finally, to provide the necessary impetus to ensure that the forthcoming negotiation of the NPT is not a failure. If this goal is met, the world will be betting on more cooperation than confrontation, and this is good news.
Argentina now has the opportunity to confirm its good image and continue the respected conduct of the last decades in this particular chapter of nuclear energy. Therefore, when the new session on this issue takes place within the next two years in Seoul, the work must have been impeccable and, in turn, commitments must have been met.