Is the U.S. Presidential Model a Fit for Turkey?

A debate about restructuring presidential powers in Turkey is nothing new. Turgut Özal (former Turkish Prime Minister and former Republic President) also focused on such a restructuring. However, Özal’s and current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s proposals for increased presidential power, it has been suggested, have been only a means to criticize Turkey’s current system of governmental organization. The correct approach to governmental reform would be to examine any proposed restructuring of power in light of current Turkish laws and practices.

The single most successful version of a powerful presidential branch can be found in the United States, a result of the distinctive structure of the country’s founding laws and evolving practices. The founding fathers of the United States instituted the presidential executive branch of its government in its 1787 Constitution, inspired by the limitations of the British monarchy. Since the U.S. does not have an aristocratic class, an elected President was proposed rather than a king. In other words, the presidential branch of its government is a result of converting from a limited monarchy to a republic.

The organization of the U.S. executive branch stems from a lack of confidence in a balance between monarchical and legislative power. The founding fathers distrusted legislators as a result of laws passed by British Parliament to the detriment of its colonies. They doubted a sovereign ruler due to their experience of King George III’s exercise of power to retain colonies under its dominance. They envisioned a system in which the legislative and executive branches operate independently while still having the power to monitor each other.

The U.S. model of checks and balances is the greatest assurance of its democracy, as well as their civil rights and liberties. In his book, “American Democracy,” Alexis de Tocqueville claims that the U.S. system balances out any extremism. According to several authors, a powerful judiciary was the key in founding democracy in the U.S. We see that the U.S. governmental system is a division of powers implemented, during the birth of the nation, by its founders according to their experiences and their existing circumstances.

For good or ill, Turkey has more or less been governed by a Parliamentary system for approximately 90 years. There are old habits and settled institutions as a result of these 90 years of political structure. It is not easy to replace or eradicate such traditional governmental functions. New institutions would have to be formed and the entire legal infrastructure revised to implement a more powerful presidential position. It is debatable whether such a fundamental change in Turkish government would function any better than the current system.

For example, can executive decisions be truly independent from those of the legislative body? Or can an independent judiciary be formed in between the executive and legislative powers? The ruling party in Turkey is not in a position to implement a more democratic culture. Even putting aside a genuine separation of powers, existing political powers in Turkey cannot abide even mild separation of powers, wishing to concentrate all the power of any political unity within themselves.

Turkish society faces two risks in a democratic reorganization of its political power. First, lacking an effective system of checks and balances, an increase in presidential power may easily lead to a dictatorship. It is highly likely that any check and balance system would be impotent, given the dominant authoritarian tendency of Turkish society and politics. The main reason for the Justice and Development Party of Turkey (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP) to consider presidential reorganization is its belief in the ineffectiveness of the current system to lead the country toward increased faith in a democratic society. How, then, would AKP tolerate the even tougher system of checks and balances necessary to implement U.S.-style presidential authority?

The second risk is the high probability of political stalemate when the President and the Legislative majority are from different political parties. We should not brush aside this risk in a country like Turkey, where the culture of political consensus is young and quite weak.

Radical change will not be easily accepted by existing political powers. How should such change be carried-out? Following an election, even if a party holds the majority of seats in the Parliament, that ruling political party cannot attempt to implement a complete restructuring of the Turkish system of governance. Absent broad political consensus, such a move cannot be considered a democratic approach, especially when we take into account that many votes will not be carried out in Parliament as a result of the 10% threshold. The question is: How democratic would it be for a single party to administer such a crucial change?

All of the above issues point toward a path of designing reforms to correct the defects of the current structure. I will touch on these reforms in a future article.