Balancing China’s Influence

Singapore’s Senior Minister, Li Kuan Yew, has recently accepted a visit from Chuan Qiaoyang, Japan’s editor of the “Morning News” [television show], proposing that America be allowed to balance out “China’s impact” in the Pacific Rim because the Pacific Rim is unlikely to enter a “Post-American age” within the next 30 to 50 years. With regards to military affairs and technology for civilian use, China just doesn’t compare with the United States and China’s purchasing power doesn’t even come close.

This was especially apparent during Li’s trip to America last year, which has been the cause for much criticism from China’s media. Singapore’s media has come to the conclusion that China’s media is trying to incite nationalism, which is obviously inappropriate. Who on earth would want to hear that their own country’s political system is purposely agitating its people in order to “control and balance” the country? Even if “control and balance” was changed to “check and balance,” the topic still conflicts with the facts coming out of China and can’t just be ignored. Surely this doesn’t make Chinese people happy.

However, some people are expressing exaggerated opinions online about Li Kuan Yew, from profound admiration to deep hatred, which are completely unnecessary. Li Kuan Yew said that he isn’t being carried away by a whim, but rather it is a reflection of Singapore. To a great extent it has to do with ASEAN’s long-lasting worldview and strategic way of thinking, which on the practical level, is not lacking in vision. If the Chinese people could be clear on this point, then there would be no need to be sorely disappointed with Li Kuan Yew; really, it is just preparing for a rainy day. Through a more mature attitude and appropriate development strategy with ASEAN, progress will be made towards peaceful relations between China and the rest of Asia. We shouldn’t let little distractions interfere with our vision of the main goal.

In dealing with relationships among major powers, since the second half of the 20th century, ASEAN has gone through three main ways of thinking. One way is that of a non-alignment policy, which is mostly advocated by Indonesia. Another way is neutrality of thought, which was proposed by Malaysia. The last mode is the concept of balancing the major powers. Singapore is the leading advocate of this idea. During the integration process of ASEAN, Singapore’s idea of balancing large nations gradually became the most commonly accepted policy among ASEAN members and has had the most influence.

Singapore and ASEAN’s concept of balancing the major powers has its own background. ASEAN countries have suffered greatly from European colonialism. After World War II, there came another long struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the past, for the majority of the time, Southeast Asia — if not controlled by a particular world power — has existed sandwiched in between powers, making survival very difficult. From this has sprouted a strategy: to assemble the ASEAN countries into a collective competitive circle of major powers. From this, the greatest benefit among ASEAN countries has been realized. On this basis, ASEAN announced its establishment during the Cold War in 1967 and, since then, they have gradually enlarged their scope of influence and increased the level of cooperation.

Simply put, the strategy of balancing large nations has two major implications. First, no one power dominates Southeast Asia. Second, ASEAN serves as a bridge between the major powers. Based on the first point, with regard to geo-strategy, ASEAN is pursuing an ideology of openness. In other words, to be open to all large nations rather than focus on economic security and strategically showing favor to specific countries. When a nation in the region is clearly more influential and powerful than the other countries, it will devote its efforts to increasing cooperation with other world powers, thus balancing the world powers.

Since the 1990s, ASEAN’s association with China has increased as a direct result of this type of thinking. During the time of the Cold War — Japan in an economic way; the United States in economic, security, and strategic ways — had the biggest influence in the region. By balancing America and Japan, ASEAN increased China’s level of fluctuation. For example, by initiating the “10+1” dialogues, in which were negotiations with China to establish a free trade area. However, ASEAN is not merely limited to building relationships with China — it is also interested in developing cooperative relations with India, Japan, America, and even Australia is slowly being drawn into ASEAN’s “East Asia” category.

Given the last point, ASEAN countries are making every effort to organize in a way that they can lead the affairs of East Asia, to gain momentum and influence. With ASEAN as the core, various types of forums and dialogues would be established, increasing ASEAN’s ability to conduct official business and their influence in international affairs, while helping them obtain security.

China needs to be clear about ASEAN’s strategic reasoning when dealing with ASEAN countries. Li Kuan Yew’s request for America to remain in the Pacific to balance China is not to set Southeast Asia against China, but rather the opposite. Once the United States’ influence grows strong in the region, there will inevitably be repercussions to ASEAN, at the same time increasing the intensity of other large nations getting involved in the affairs of the region. Thus, allowing major powers to reach a state of harmonious equilibrium in Southeast Asia. This kind of political game is somewhat like the strategic game Bismark played in Europe during the latter part of the 19th century. This is also the reason Li Kuan Yew is saying, on one hand, “balance China,” while on the other hand, specifically objecting to “surrounding and enclosing” China.

At the same time, we need to understand what Li Kuan Yew meant by “checking and balancing China.” Time and time again, Li Kuan Yew has reminded Americans to put emphasis on the Pacific. This long-term, historical setting has been the [center for] growth and decline in Chinese and American strength in the Pacific Rim.

Since the turn of the new century, America has devoted itself to fighting terrorism and has not placed as much emphasis on East Asia, allowing China’s influence in the region to grow stronger. After Japan’s democratic party took office, they proposed to establish an “East Asian Community,” basically meaning an exclusion of the United States. If China and Japan become too close, and if America loses influence in East Asia, then according to Singapore and ASEAN, this will damage the equilibrium of major powers in Southeast Asia, weakening ASEAN’s centrality and influence in East Asia. This is not a pleasant picture for Singapore or other ASEAN countries.