Brazil and the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Even before the end of the Cold War, nuclear disarmament, the non-proliferation of atomic guns and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes were already concerns in the international community. In 1968, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was negotiated, covering all three of these issues. During the next 40 years, rather than moving toward and ridding the world of the nuclear threat, we had substantial setbacks in the negotiating process.

Breaching the NPT, Israel, India and Pakistan became nuclear powers. North Korea and Iran also want to master the technology to build nuclear devices.

The situation has worsened recently with the fear of terrorist groups having access to nuclear products and materials. This question began to dominate — almost obsessively — the U.S. domestic agenda after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001.

The election of President Obama and the end of the radicalism known in Brazil as “bushiano” made room for Washington to propose additional initiatives on the disarmament issue and also about non-proliferation. The Prague speech about the total elimination of atomic weapons plus the agreement signed in March with Russia to reduce the arsenal of nuclear warheads were tactical gestures from the U.S. to reduce the criticism of its inaction in the disarmament area while increasing the pressure on the non-nuclear countries to contain the risks of proliferation.

The Conference on Nuclear Security, which was convened by the U.S. in April, and the fifth revision of the NPT, which was held in May by the United Nations bodies, were used by the nuclear countries to adopt restrictive measures and resolutions. The disarmament issues, and particularly the one of non-proliferation, have been included as high priorities on the international agenda because of the threat that they represent to global peace and security, especially in light of the development of complex terrorist networks.

For Brazil, which is developing an important nuclear program, this is a matter of great interest. The uranium enrichment plant in Resende (Rio de Janeiro) places Brazil in a small group of suppliers of this product to the rest of the nuclear centers around the world.

The final document of the NPT contains an evaluation of the last ten years and an action plan that reflects, to a large extent, the positions taken by Brazil. The balance of shares in disarmament and non-proliferation confirmed the theory always defended by our country — that both processes are mutually reinforcing and are not therefore necessary to move simultaneously and in parallel with concrete and verifiable actions in both fields.

Along the political angle, perhaps the most important outcome was the decision to discuss the creation in the Middle East of a nuclear-free and WMD-free zone which would be in compliance with the resolution about the subject adopted in the package that extended the NPT indefinitely in 1995 — a resolution that has never been acted upon since.

With regard to the disarmament, although less ambitious than the non-nuclear countries had expected, the action plan contains positive points and, to a certain extent, innovation — like the idea that the reduction of arsenals should cover not only the weapons used but also those stored, and that the reduction process may also involve nuclear weapons that the U.S. has remaining on European soil. Furthermore, although it falls far short of what was required by non-nuclear countries, it championed the idea of initiating negotiations toward a more precise legal framework for nuclear disarmament.

As for non-proliferation, the most important issue for Brazil is the treatment exempted from the implementation of the NPT’s Additional Protocol, with additional requirements for inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on uranium enrichment plants and other facilities related to the nuclear program.

The ambiguous wording of the final document has enabled both Brazil and the U.S. to claim that their concerns were fully addressed. Instead of declaring the Additional Protocol mandatory (as the nuclear powers wanted), it was established, according to Brazil, as a voluntary document. The conference recognizes that this is a pattern of checking only for the countries that signed and implemented the Additional Protocol. The protocol, therefore, cannot be considered as an IAEA safeguard.

Our interpretation does not coincide with that of other nuclear countries, especially the U.S., which claims that, for the first time, an official document of the NPT recognizes the Additional Protocol, along with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, as being the advanced standard of NPT’s verification.

Brazilian positions were served in regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well. Among them is the recognition that the options for energy and peaceful uses of nuclear power are sovereign and therefore should be respected, including those related to the development of the nuclear fuel cycle.

The results of the NPT review meeting are a positive step, but they are limited.

However, the issue of more intrusive IAEA inspections, which are of interest to Brazil, and the decision to turn the Middle East into a nuclear-free zone will remain without global consensus for a long time.

The author was the Brazilian ambassador to the United States from 1999–2004.