Japanese Constitutional Reform and the U.S.: My Personal Investigation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance
Published in Sankei Shimbun
(Japan) on 18 October 2010
by Yoshihisa Komori (link to original)
In March 1980 while in attendance at a research presentation at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mr. Jun Etou proclaimed that Japan was in desperate need of a constitutional change. However, he was quickly overwhelmed by the pro-Japanese American group that wished to protect the Japanese constitution. Tadae Takubo, a fellow researcher at the center and a diplomatic critic, recently reminisced on the events surrounding Mr. Etou.
Takubo recalled that right after Etou's address, Richard Finn, a former occupation official in Japan, rushed over to him and demanded why Etou had such extreme views, because at the time the pro-Japan group thought that constitutional change was outrageous.
Even though the Reagan administration was beginning a large-scale reinforcement of Japanese defenses, there was still a group of American scholars specializing in Japan and Asia who joked about Japan getting a permanent free ride. On the surface this meant that Japan could sit back and relax while the U.S. took care of everything. However, underneath it was obvious that they still mistrusted Japan and wanted to take precautions against a military buildup. Therefore, any constitutional revisions dealing with the military was thought of as outrageous.
Actually, Edwin Reischauer, former U.S. ambassador to Japan, came close to this way of thinking. Around that time I asked him about the Japanese constitution, and he replied that Japan might be like a pendulum swinging too furiously. He meant that both Japan's about-face from militarism to democracy and the West's change from rejection to rejoicing happened so suddenly that it would be better to keep the constitution as is. This was just another example of the mistrust toward Japan.
Thereafter I continued to follow the American delegation's attitude toward the Japanese constitution. In 1992 I got the opportunity to question an intelligent member of the U.S. delegation, John Galbraith, over this topic.
Galbraith was well-known for his position as a liberal economist and was the ambassador to India under the Kennedy administration, but he had a rather unique connection with Japan. In October 1945, just after Japan's defeat, he visited the fire-devastated areas of Tokyo as the director of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. While there, he questioned Japan's leaders about their personal experiences during the war.
The survey commission was tasked with investigating the effects of the B29 strategic bombing on the Japanese battle morale along with clarifying why certain decisions were passed down by the Japanese chain of command despite their looming defeat. So both former Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe and former Minister of Home Affairs Kouichi Kido were present at these severe interrogations. Even after this experience, Galbraith had many encounters with Japan as a scholar as well as a diplomat.
When I asked Galbraith about constitutional change, he replied that he was often questioned about the pros and cons of constitutional reform, but his own opinion was clear. Japan should absolutely maintain their current constitution. He believed that if Japan decided to change their constitution it would cause violent unrest and instability in East Asia and the western Pacific region. Just another example of America's distrust toward Japan.
However, one week later I had the opportunity to ask the same questions of Paul Nitze, a high official in both the Reagan and Bush administrations as an advisor on defense and a special advisor on arms control. As a conservative in the Republican Party, he was also a leading figure in strategic issues at that time. It's also interesting to note that he was the vice chairman of the aforementioned inquiry commission.
Mr. Nitze began with a broad grin and a laugh and stated that he was really only familiar with one Japanese word, jirihin (a situation that gradually worsens). He continued his speech in an impartial tone, informing everyone that the pre-war Japanese leaders had no chance of success, peaceful conclusion or even a proper strategy in relation to a war with the West. All Japan had when it decided to start the war was a “gradually worsening situation.”
Concerning the constitution, he quickly stated that the nature of Article Nine(the clause that prohibits an act of war by the state) restricted national sovereignty.
Continuing, he stated that revision is a problem that should be solely left up to Japan and since the only obligation of the U.S. is to preserve alliance relations, they had no need to interject. He emphasized that those who say that Japan will change Article Nine, thereupon re-forming an army and reviving militarism, say it only because they don't trust Japan. If you really believe that Japan has become a democratic nation then there shouldn't be any worry or fear over constitutional change.
Though Nitze and Galbraith both had the same basic experience in Japan, they still developed completely opposite opinions. Behind that we see the fundamental difference between conservatives and liberals.
Takubo recalled that right after Etou's address, Richard Finn, a former occupation official in Japan, rushed over to him and demanded why Etou had such extreme views, because at the time the pro-Japan group thought that constitutional change was outrageous.
Even though the Reagan administration was beginning a large-scale reinforcement of Japanese defenses, there was still a group of American scholars specializing in Japan and Asia who joked about Japan getting a permanent free ride. On the surface this meant that Japan could sit back and relax while the U.S. took care of everything. However, underneath it was obvious that they still mistrusted Japan and wanted to take precautions against a military buildup. Therefore, any constitutional revisions dealing with the military was thought of as outrageous.
Actually, Edwin Reischauer, former U.S. ambassador to Japan, came close to this way of thinking. Around that time I asked him about the Japanese constitution, and he replied that Japan might be like a pendulum swinging too furiously. He meant that both Japan's about-face from militarism to democracy and the West's change from rejection to rejoicing happened so suddenly that it would be better to keep the constitution as is. This was just another example of the mistrust toward Japan.
Thereafter I continued to follow the American delegation's attitude toward the Japanese constitution. In 1992 I got the opportunity to question an intelligent member of the U.S. delegation, John Galbraith, over this topic.
Galbraith was well-known for his position as a liberal economist and was the ambassador to India under the Kennedy administration, but he had a rather unique connection with Japan. In October 1945, just after Japan's defeat, he visited the fire-devastated areas of Tokyo as the director of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. While there, he questioned Japan's leaders about their personal experiences during the war.
The survey commission was tasked with investigating the effects of the B29 strategic bombing on the Japanese battle morale along with clarifying why certain decisions were passed down by the Japanese chain of command despite their looming defeat. So both former Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe and former Minister of Home Affairs Kouichi Kido were present at these severe interrogations. Even after this experience, Galbraith had many encounters with Japan as a scholar as well as a diplomat.
When I asked Galbraith about constitutional change, he replied that he was often questioned about the pros and cons of constitutional reform, but his own opinion was clear. Japan should absolutely maintain their current constitution. He believed that if Japan decided to change their constitution it would cause violent unrest and instability in East Asia and the western Pacific region. Just another example of America's distrust toward Japan.
However, one week later I had the opportunity to ask the same questions of Paul Nitze, a high official in both the Reagan and Bush administrations as an advisor on defense and a special advisor on arms control. As a conservative in the Republican Party, he was also a leading figure in strategic issues at that time. It's also interesting to note that he was the vice chairman of the aforementioned inquiry commission.
Mr. Nitze began with a broad grin and a laugh and stated that he was really only familiar with one Japanese word, jirihin (a situation that gradually worsens). He continued his speech in an impartial tone, informing everyone that the pre-war Japanese leaders had no chance of success, peaceful conclusion or even a proper strategy in relation to a war with the West. All Japan had when it decided to start the war was a “gradually worsening situation.”
Concerning the constitution, he quickly stated that the nature of Article Nine(the clause that prohibits an act of war by the state) restricted national sovereignty.
Continuing, he stated that revision is a problem that should be solely left up to Japan and since the only obligation of the U.S. is to preserve alliance relations, they had no need to interject. He emphasized that those who say that Japan will change Article Nine, thereupon re-forming an army and reviving militarism, say it only because they don't trust Japan. If you really believe that Japan has become a democratic nation then there shouldn't be any worry or fear over constitutional change.
Though Nitze and Galbraith both had the same basic experience in Japan, they still developed completely opposite opinions. Behind that we see the fundamental difference between conservatives and liberals.
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