Washington Pushes for Limiting Tactical Weapons
Published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta
(Russia) on 29 December 2010
by Andrei Terekhov (link to original)
Moscow is in no rush, but the national security of Russia is at stake.
American experts are discussing the prospects for reducing the Russian and American arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons. One of their proposals is to impose an overall limit on all components of the nuclear deterrence forces, both strategic and tactical, at 2500 warheads for each side. The U.S. administration plans to begin discussing the problem of tactical nuclear weapons next year. However, Moscow is in no rush. The national security of Russia is at stake.
Until recently, tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) were outside of the international legal field. In 1972, when Moscow and Washington signed the first arms limitation treaty, SALT-1, the U.S. refused to include TNWs in it; the treaty only regulated strategic weapons with a range of more than 5500 kilometers.
In 1987 the INF Treaty was signed, eliminating an entire class of Soviet and American nuclear missiles with a range from 500 to 5500 kilometers. But it's only recently that the Americans have started discussing limiting tactical nuclear weapons — nuclear aircraft bombs, tactical-class missiles, mines and other ammunition.
Yesterday, The Washington Post raised the problem of disparity in tactical nuclear weapons between the U.S. and Russia. The newspaper quotes a Republican senator from Idaho, Jim Risch, who tried unsuccessfully to insert the tactical weapons issue into the START preamble: “I hope and I urge that the president, the State Department and all the others involved will pursue this issue aggressively and quickly once we have this treaty behind us.” Risch states that Russia has 3800 TNW units, while the U.S. has no more than 500.
But resolving the issue "quickly" is clearly not going to happen, no matter how bold the ideas offered by the Americans are. For example, consider The New York Times’ citation of the opinion of former State Department official Steven Pifer on the problem of tactical munitions. He suggests that Russia and the U.S. should impose an overall limit on the strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons components at a rate of 2500 units for each side. Then, according to Pifer, Moscow and Washington could reduce their arsenals at their discretion, while an exact parity in strategic or tactical weapons would not be required. It is possible that the Obama administration is trying, through the community of experts and the press, to probe the opinion of Russian experts, politicians and the public on this issue.
Nezavisimaya Gazeta asked former chief of staff of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel-General Viktor Esin, to comment on the situation. “TNW is a specific component of nuclear weapons. For Russia it is a tool for regional deterrence. For Americans, it is not. That's why an agreement on tactical nuclear weapons would be possible between NATO and Russia. There are other nuclear states besides the U.S. in NATO — Britain and France. The British don't have their own tactical nuclear weapons, but the French do, one example being carrier-based aircraft TNW. Ideally, China and other countries should also be included in the negotiations,” the expert explains. It is not a secret that China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea all have tactical nuclear weapons. Therefore, there are several components in the equation. The simplified approach of only aiming at an agreement between the U.S. and Russia will lead to a dead end.
According to expert estimates, the United States has about 200 units of tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. Those are various modifications of B-61 gravity bombs. The second component of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons is Tomahawk cruise missiles. Washington said in the nuclear review that Tomahawk nuclear warheads will be gradually dismantled, leaving only gravity bombs. That is logical; the U.S. does not need to deter Mexico or Canada. Russia, in its turn, is concerned about the conventional weapons superiority of its neighbors on the west (NATO) and on the east (China).
According to Viktor Esin, at the present stage China is unlikely to participate in negotiations with Russia and NATO on reducing tactical nuclear weapons. Therefore, if and when Moscow talks with NATO on this issue, it is not likely to agree to parity with the block in absolute numbers of tactical weapons. Talking about parity with NATO about the number of tactical nuclear weapons in the European part of Russia is a different matter. However, there are many problems concerning that as well: for example, the vast majority of Russian carriers of tactical nuclear weapons are dual purpose. “Operational-tactical range Iskander missiles can be used both with nuclear and conventional warheads. The same applies to aviation. Therefore, imposing restrictions on the carriers is going to be difficult. It is necessary to introduce a limit on the number of nuclear warheads, and that's unprecedented. So there is not going to be quick progress,” said the Nezavisimaya Gazeta source.
Prior to starting the negotiations, the parties must do their homework. Moscow has repeatedly and clearly pointed out to Washington that prior to any consultations on tactical nuclear weapons, the Americans should withdraw all of their TNWs from European countries — Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey and Germany — to their territory. Also, there needs to be an agreement on basic principles: If the Americans insist on Russia and the U.S. having an equal number of tactical nuclear weapons, there's not going to be a conversation. It is obvious that the U.S. has to change its approach to the negotiations, since all arms talks with Moscow so far have been exclusively on the basis of parity. Another basic principle is that the negotiations have to be between NATO and Russia, instead of bilaterally, concluded Esin.
American experts are discussing the prospects for reducing the Russian and American arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons. One of their proposals is to impose an overall limit on all components of the nuclear deterrence forces, both strategic and tactical, at 2500 warheads for each side. The U.S. administration plans to begin discussing the problem of tactical nuclear weapons next year. However, Moscow is in no rush. The national security of Russia is at stake.
Until recently, tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) were outside of the international legal field. In 1972, when Moscow and Washington signed the first arms limitation treaty, SALT-1, the U.S. refused to include TNWs in it; the treaty only regulated strategic weapons with a range of more than 5500 kilometers.
In 1987 the INF Treaty was signed, eliminating an entire class of Soviet and American nuclear missiles with a range from 500 to 5500 kilometers. But it's only recently that the Americans have started discussing limiting tactical nuclear weapons — nuclear aircraft bombs, tactical-class missiles, mines and other ammunition.
Yesterday, The Washington Post raised the problem of disparity in tactical nuclear weapons between the U.S. and Russia. The newspaper quotes a Republican senator from Idaho, Jim Risch, who tried unsuccessfully to insert the tactical weapons issue into the START preamble: “I hope and I urge that the president, the State Department and all the others involved will pursue this issue aggressively and quickly once we have this treaty behind us.” Risch states that Russia has 3800 TNW units, while the U.S. has no more than 500.
But resolving the issue "quickly" is clearly not going to happen, no matter how bold the ideas offered by the Americans are. For example, consider The New York Times’ citation of the opinion of former State Department official Steven Pifer on the problem of tactical munitions. He suggests that Russia and the U.S. should impose an overall limit on the strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons components at a rate of 2500 units for each side. Then, according to Pifer, Moscow and Washington could reduce their arsenals at their discretion, while an exact parity in strategic or tactical weapons would not be required. It is possible that the Obama administration is trying, through the community of experts and the press, to probe the opinion of Russian experts, politicians and the public on this issue.
Nezavisimaya Gazeta asked former chief of staff of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel-General Viktor Esin, to comment on the situation. “TNW is a specific component of nuclear weapons. For Russia it is a tool for regional deterrence. For Americans, it is not. That's why an agreement on tactical nuclear weapons would be possible between NATO and Russia. There are other nuclear states besides the U.S. in NATO — Britain and France. The British don't have their own tactical nuclear weapons, but the French do, one example being carrier-based aircraft TNW. Ideally, China and other countries should also be included in the negotiations,” the expert explains. It is not a secret that China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea all have tactical nuclear weapons. Therefore, there are several components in the equation. The simplified approach of only aiming at an agreement between the U.S. and Russia will lead to a dead end.
According to expert estimates, the United States has about 200 units of tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. Those are various modifications of B-61 gravity bombs. The second component of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons is Tomahawk cruise missiles. Washington said in the nuclear review that Tomahawk nuclear warheads will be gradually dismantled, leaving only gravity bombs. That is logical; the U.S. does not need to deter Mexico or Canada. Russia, in its turn, is concerned about the conventional weapons superiority of its neighbors on the west (NATO) and on the east (China).
According to Viktor Esin, at the present stage China is unlikely to participate in negotiations with Russia and NATO on reducing tactical nuclear weapons. Therefore, if and when Moscow talks with NATO on this issue, it is not likely to agree to parity with the block in absolute numbers of tactical weapons. Talking about parity with NATO about the number of tactical nuclear weapons in the European part of Russia is a different matter. However, there are many problems concerning that as well: for example, the vast majority of Russian carriers of tactical nuclear weapons are dual purpose. “Operational-tactical range Iskander missiles can be used both with nuclear and conventional warheads. The same applies to aviation. Therefore, imposing restrictions on the carriers is going to be difficult. It is necessary to introduce a limit on the number of nuclear warheads, and that's unprecedented. So there is not going to be quick progress,” said the Nezavisimaya Gazeta source.
Prior to starting the negotiations, the parties must do their homework. Moscow has repeatedly and clearly pointed out to Washington that prior to any consultations on tactical nuclear weapons, the Americans should withdraw all of their TNWs from European countries — Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey and Germany — to their territory. Also, there needs to be an agreement on basic principles: If the Americans insist on Russia and the U.S. having an equal number of tactical nuclear weapons, there's not going to be a conversation. It is obvious that the U.S. has to change its approach to the negotiations, since all arms talks with Moscow so far have been exclusively on the basis of parity. Another basic principle is that the negotiations have to be between NATO and Russia, instead of bilaterally, concluded Esin.