A Contest of Two Types of Multilateralism in Chinese and American Foreign Relations

Ever since the American Democratic Party came to power, it has emphasized multilateralism to replace the unilateralism of the Bush administration and stressed the effect of developing “smart power” (the combination of soft and hard power) to improve America’s international environment. It can be said that this new kind of foreign strategy has already succeeded and has given China a new test.

During the Bush administration’s rule, the United States favored unilateralism and advocated preemption, using Internet-type language such as “whoever bothers me, I will hit him.” In just a few short years, America, in one breath, fought the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and at the same time, prepared to get to work on Iran and North Korea. And just like this, America stirred up global unrest, with allies pitted against each other, and America itself also shouldered a heavy burden. Under these circumstances, although China has endured certain pressures, for foreign strategy it has still retained a relatively large space for development.

Now, circumstances have created subtle changes. The American strategies of smart power and multilateralism have already changed America’s external image, improved and strengthened alliances, and those things which had been lost in the past are now gradually being found. In the past year, America has adjusted its relationships with the European Union and NATO; in Asia, it has promoted ASEAN and strengthened anew the American–Japanese relationship and the American–South Korean security alliance. All the successes that American foreign relations have obtained have clearly boosted America’s international status and influence and to a large extent, have made up for the insufficiency of the strength of the domestic economy.

Under today’s circumstances, the relations between the major powers can avoid a zero-sum game but certainly cannot avoid competition. The world is so big that the relevant great powers can peacefully coexist within the same space, but the manner and position of getting along won’t be identical. There are those who want to be leaders, while some are only able to take the position of followers; some want to lead and dominate global and regional order, while some are only able to obey this orderly arrangement — this aspect certainly cannot be said to be absolute equality. If everyone wants to play the role of leader and dominator, peaceful coexistence between the major powers is out of the question, and fighting or even confrontation is unavoidable.

It is precisely this state of affairs that China is now facing. The objective of America carrying on the strategy of multilateralism and smart power is to make friends, cement its own leadership status and continue to dominate the global and regional order. Does China now possess a competitive power that is identical and equal to the United States? Obviously it does not. China’s non-alliance is destined on the use of multilateralism, and significant limitations exist; Chinese hard power and America’s are not in the same magnitude. Even though each has its own specialized skills, soft power must be integrated with America more than smart power; undoubtedly a great disparity exists. This kind of balance of power has settled that China cannot be on a true equal footing with America. On the contrary, to resolve its own significant safety concerns, China won’t be able to do without the support and cooperation of America.

In northeast Asia, to solve the Korean Peninsula issue, China cannot exclude America and also cannot steer clear of the American–Korean and American–Japanese security alliances. Chinese engagement in multilateralism in northeast Asia is mainly reflected in the Six-Party Talks in playing the part of the host nation. Even so, the Six-Party Talks cannot resist the United States–Japan–Korea alliance. America relied on this kind of alliance to establish the cornerstone of carrying out multilateralism in northeast Asia. Although, up until now, it has been difficult to find a more ideal channel of dialogue than the Six-Party Talks, but once the United States, Japan and Korea coordinate positions, this kind of dialogue channel will be put on the back burner. Therefore, how to deal with the future of the two multilateralisms of northeast Asia will undoubtedly be a great test for China, enabling it to begin to coordinate.

In Southeast Asia, ASEAN itself is a product of multilateralism, but China supporting and entering this kind of multilateral mechanism would definitely have certain trade-offs. With respect to politics and economics, China can participate in a period of extensive participation, such as entering into the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and establishing a China–ASEAN free trade area — this will not bring any misgivings. Nevertheless, touching upon the South China Sea dispute, China will have to avoid, and even oppose, a multilateral mechanism and is only able to advocate a “one-on-one” approach to solving problems. This is precisely the Achilles’ heel of China’s strategy in Southeast Asia and is also the most difficult problem of the China–ASEAN relationship. In comparison, it can be said that America is unscrupulous in entering the multilateral mechanism and carrying out multilateralism in this region. Striving for the multilateralization and internationalization of the South China Sea issue is America’s most important goal and is also very easy to reach consensus on with ASEAN. Under these circumstances, although two great powers — China and the United States — have entered the multilateral mechanism of Southeast Asia, there are clear differences in the degree and style of intervention. A contest of two kinds of multilateralism can’t be denied — naturally, this is also a major test for China.

Multilateralism is an important symbol of an era of peaceful development and also an important path for the development of international cooperation. Each nation of the world needs to adapt to this historical trend. But it must be seen that under current circumstances, allied and non-allied multilateralism have different interests and objectives. This needs to stand on top of the fundamental position of national interests and screen and select for it. America has an American multilateralism, and China also has a Chinese multilateralism — between these two both can mutually integrate, but differences that are difficult to bridge also exist. As far as the challenges and tests that American multilateralism brings, China should preserve a clear understanding on strategy. In summary, the lessons learned since last year are to use the appropriate countermeasures as soon as possible.