Getting Involved without Getting Dirty
Published in Maariv
(Israel) on 20 March 2011
by Nadav Eyal (link to original)
The West’s airborne attack was intended mainly to fulfill its obligations without getting dirty.
Contrary to the slogans, the offensive in Libya is not meant merely to ensure that the no-fly zone is observed, unless Libyan tanks have suddenly grown wings. Last night they suffered the first missile fire from French bombers. The essence of the West’s operation is to cut off the rapid advancement of Gadhafi’s troops toward Benghazi, on their way to executing what the colonel terms cleansing the city “house by house,” and what the rest of the world calls crimes against humanity.
Extraordinarily, it is the European superpowers that are spearheading these actions. Until a week ago, President Obama still opposed any military involvement in Libya, and for obvious reasons: America is engaged in two wars at the moment, in Afghanistan and Iraq, and its military forces are stretched to the edge of their ability.
From a strategic standpoint, American entry into an internal confrontation in a Muslim Arab country would lead to two immediate consequences: the distancing of the Europeans from the intervention (they would be happy to have the Americans do the job for them), and a political strike against the Obama administration inside the United States (more than 50 percent of Americans strongly disapprove of the involvement in Libya).
This, naturally, leaves us with a key question: Why? Why does the West not let Gadhafi regain control over East Libya and thus induce a renewed stability that would result in a badly needed drop in oil prices? What’s the rush for David Cameron, struggling with the faltering British economy, or Nicolas Sarkozy, repeatedly kicked in the polls, to initiate military intervention in Libya? And why did the United States, in the end, agree to get onboard?
The answer is complex. In principle, Western public opinion rebels against the brutal repression displayed by Gadhafi. The Libyan ruler has turned himself into an absolute villain in the story of the Arab revolutions; unlike Ben Ali and Mubarak, he has used especially repulsive tactics in order to preserve his power.
The possibility that his death squads will perform a mass slaughter in Benghazi greatly disturbs European leaders; Libya is in their backyard. Cameron, Sarkozy and Zapatero would be asked by their voters what they had done to prevent these atrocities — and they would most likely be without reply. Furthermore, they would be asked what they had done to prevent the massive surge in emigration of hundreds of thousands of Libyans, refugees of genocide, to Europe.
A Little Push from the West
Of course, there are also interests involved. Gadhafi has made himself a leper in the world’s eyes. Let’s assume that he wins — could democratic leaders like Cameron or Sarkozy carry on normalized relations with him again? Would the U.K. again enable British Petroleum to funnel billions to the Gadhafi family?
As for the United States, would it be able to continue its policy of rapprochement with someone who promised that the blood of civilians would be spilled on the streets? Clearly, the answer is negative. Whether for idealistic reasons or domestic political ones, the leaders of the West have terminated their romance with Gadhafi and his family.
His possible victory in Libya would result in the central country of the region, the world’s 12th largest oil exporter, being ruled by a man and family boycotted by the Western world. Gadhafi would promptly remember his old friend, Venezuela, and new friends, like Iran. And of course — global terrorism.
This is a hard endgame for the United States and Europe to swallow, so they have arrived at the decision that it’s impossible to allow, politically and in other ways, Gadhafi’s total victory. Let’s be precise: They concluded that it pays for them to try the last military resort before the worst case scenario comes true.
There is only one problem with the selected measure: it’s been mostly checked to do only the bare minimum. Depending solely on aerial involvement is likely to prolong the conflict, cause more casualties and finally, entail a more profound military intervention. As Benjamin Friedman of the Cato Institute put it, “No-fly zones commit us to winning wars but demonstrate our limited will to win them. That is why they are bad public policy.”
These aerial strikes are primarily a way for the West to show that it’s getting involved without deeply endangering the lives of its fighters. It’s clear that no one can overtake Gadhafi for the insurgents’ sake; they are going to need to do the dirty work themselves. However, the West is ready to give a little push. But only from the air.
Contrary to the slogans, the offensive in Libya is not meant merely to ensure that the no-fly zone is observed, unless Libyan tanks have suddenly grown wings. Last night they suffered the first missile fire from French bombers. The essence of the West’s operation is to cut off the rapid advancement of Gadhafi’s troops toward Benghazi, on their way to executing what the colonel terms cleansing the city “house by house,” and what the rest of the world calls crimes against humanity.
Extraordinarily, it is the European superpowers that are spearheading these actions. Until a week ago, President Obama still opposed any military involvement in Libya, and for obvious reasons: America is engaged in two wars at the moment, in Afghanistan and Iraq, and its military forces are stretched to the edge of their ability.
From a strategic standpoint, American entry into an internal confrontation in a Muslim Arab country would lead to two immediate consequences: the distancing of the Europeans from the intervention (they would be happy to have the Americans do the job for them), and a political strike against the Obama administration inside the United States (more than 50 percent of Americans strongly disapprove of the involvement in Libya).
This, naturally, leaves us with a key question: Why? Why does the West not let Gadhafi regain control over East Libya and thus induce a renewed stability that would result in a badly needed drop in oil prices? What’s the rush for David Cameron, struggling with the faltering British economy, or Nicolas Sarkozy, repeatedly kicked in the polls, to initiate military intervention in Libya? And why did the United States, in the end, agree to get onboard?
The answer is complex. In principle, Western public opinion rebels against the brutal repression displayed by Gadhafi. The Libyan ruler has turned himself into an absolute villain in the story of the Arab revolutions; unlike Ben Ali and Mubarak, he has used especially repulsive tactics in order to preserve his power.
The possibility that his death squads will perform a mass slaughter in Benghazi greatly disturbs European leaders; Libya is in their backyard. Cameron, Sarkozy and Zapatero would be asked by their voters what they had done to prevent these atrocities — and they would most likely be without reply. Furthermore, they would be asked what they had done to prevent the massive surge in emigration of hundreds of thousands of Libyans, refugees of genocide, to Europe.
A Little Push from the West
Of course, there are also interests involved. Gadhafi has made himself a leper in the world’s eyes. Let’s assume that he wins — could democratic leaders like Cameron or Sarkozy carry on normalized relations with him again? Would the U.K. again enable British Petroleum to funnel billions to the Gadhafi family?
As for the United States, would it be able to continue its policy of rapprochement with someone who promised that the blood of civilians would be spilled on the streets? Clearly, the answer is negative. Whether for idealistic reasons or domestic political ones, the leaders of the West have terminated their romance with Gadhafi and his family.
His possible victory in Libya would result in the central country of the region, the world’s 12th largest oil exporter, being ruled by a man and family boycotted by the Western world. Gadhafi would promptly remember his old friend, Venezuela, and new friends, like Iran. And of course — global terrorism.
This is a hard endgame for the United States and Europe to swallow, so they have arrived at the decision that it’s impossible to allow, politically and in other ways, Gadhafi’s total victory. Let’s be precise: They concluded that it pays for them to try the last military resort before the worst case scenario comes true.
There is only one problem with the selected measure: it’s been mostly checked to do only the bare minimum. Depending solely on aerial involvement is likely to prolong the conflict, cause more casualties and finally, entail a more profound military intervention. As Benjamin Friedman of the Cato Institute put it, “No-fly zones commit us to winning wars but demonstrate our limited will to win them. That is why they are bad public policy.”
These aerial strikes are primarily a way for the West to show that it’s getting involved without deeply endangering the lives of its fighters. It’s clear that no one can overtake Gadhafi for the insurgents’ sake; they are going to need to do the dirty work themselves. However, the West is ready to give a little push. But only from the air.