Obama's Dilemma: To Intervene or to Not Intervene

To the U.S. government, the significance of the Arab youth revolutions and its objectives defies both its understanding and classification.

A senior editor of the Wall Street Journal wrote an article covering the Arab revolutions which bore the shocking announcement, “We’re (almost) all neocons now.” There is no difference between John Bolton or Donald Rumsfeld and the young martyr Mohammed Bouazizi, who set himself on fire in the town of Sidi Bouzid, or any other rebel youth who organized the demonstrations of the hundreds of other engineers who went from a Giza suburb to Tahrir Square in central Cairo on the afternoon of January 25.

Two years ago, many people questioned whether the neo-conservative movement would survive after the departure of President Bush from the White House. So long as dictators and corrupt governments rule Arab countries, the answer seemed to be in the affirmative. Suddenly, Arabs came out three months ago, raising slogans not unlike the emblems brought by neocons. But some of the rebels claimed that the United States hastened to intervene on the West’s behalf in order to encourage another Arab ruler to give up power.

The day has come in which French President Nicolas Sarkozy rivaled British Prime Minister David Cameron in his tough stance against Colonel Moammar Gadhafi, as each tried to prove that he first advocated the military intervention despite the fact that France opposed American intervention in the Iraqi crisis only a few years ago. Interestingly enough, this also coincides with the Arab League assuming the highest level of the decision-making process, wherein they asked openly and without hesitation for the Security Council to adopt a resolution to impose a no-fly zone and heavier sanctions on Libya or to intervene into the state of their fellow league member.

One cannot underestimate the convergence of the wishes of neo-conservatives with those at various levels of Arab leadership, as demonstrated by the decree of the Secretary General of the League only two or three days after the start of the West’s military intervention. Though the exhortations seem soft and lofty, this should not detract from the appeals of the National Council, its role in forming a majority in the Security Council or its approach of a consensus in favor of international intervention.

The harmony also pervades in certain stages of the spreading of the revolution. The revolution generally broke out in Arab countries who were allies of the United States and the West in the global war on terror. Some commentators deliberately focused on Tunisia’s and Egypt’s roles not only because they provided more intelligence than others, but also because they offered the United States the benefit of their documented and confirmed expertise in the field of torture. It was by virtue of the security forces which were equipped with enormous powers to prevent their exposure by the media and prevent the arrival of the international human rights organizations to the sites, tools and agents of torture. Then events spread into Yemen, Tunisia and Egypt. Coincidentally, Yemen was heavily involved in recent operations in the multilateral fight against terrorism and in eliminating Al-Qaeda strongholds.

On the other hand, foreign commentators agreed that these revolutions erupted in countries long due for it — those described as the bloc of moderation in the Arab world rather than those of extremism. Some tried to suggest that the rebels may have met their goal of overthrowing the Camp David Accords and the peace negotiations with Israel, which were supported by moderate forces. I believe that this interpretation does not hold up in the face of the revolution extending to the Arab youth, or in light of the absence of explicit slogans and demands expressed by the demonstrators.

There were many trends that indicate that nothing happens in any region without the involvement of the United States. This idea still pervades within certain circles, and will do so as long as the United States remains among the greatest and most powerful states and has diverse and complex interests in all parts of the world. That which merits the subject of debate in the U.S. role concerns the details of the last part of the history of the rise of fluctuating Arab-American relations.

The raging Arab Revolution did not initially break out without prior preparation or comprehensive premeditated intentions. The “will” of the Arab people and the will of the United States converged both positively and negatively at the same time. In the aftermath of World War I, the will of the Arab people met with the will of the American advocates of the right to people’s self-determination. It was only a few years later when the Arab and non-Arab world was incredibly disappointed as America dropped and withdrew its stance and refused to participate in the shaping of a new world order. This change in attitude betrayed the American reign to which Washington committed before representatives throughout the world. Interestingly, for decades America has believed in the principles that were, in theory, advocated by President Wilson.

In 1956, the U.S. suggested that Washington may have intended to stand in rank with the people rising up in the third world and was perhaps preparing for a confrontation with former colonial outposts. In the fall of that year, America, along with Britain, France and Israel, chose to threaten Egypt with a combined assault in retaliation for the nationalization of the Suez Canal. The Egyptian and American wills eventually met as the three countries withdrew, but only after they obtained the guaranteed demands of Israel.

After a few months during which Egypt believed that U.S. foreign policy shifted radically toward the interests of freedom and independence, President Dwight Eisenhower announced in the spring of 1957 the doctrine bearing his name, which was directed primarily against Egypt and its regional and international alliances.

For over 30 years the Egyptian people lived without any hope of attaining freedom, prosperity and justice because of Washington. America stood with regional alliances, which opposed the freedom and political rights of others, and underestimated the will of the Arab people striving to achieve a just peace for Palestinians and to lift themselves from injustice and the yoke of tyranny. It was clear that the United States preferred to ally itself with governments who joined the War on Terror, strove for the eradication of radical Islam and created a front of modernization whose primary objective pertained to freezing the activities of any resistance.

When the revolution in Egypt broke out on January 25, it became clear to the Egyptian public — particularly to the hundreds of thousands of rebels whom the United States dithered in supporting — that the government was tyrannical, corrupt, repressive and brutal, and that a revolution in Egypt was necessary. A shock came to the rebels after Frank Wisner advised Washington to publicly support Mubarak. America’s stance was not unique; it had demonstrated a similar position earlier regarding Tunisia, the revolution in Bahrain and the turmoil in Oman. This has had a disastrous impact not only in Egypt and other countries in the Arab world, but also in America and Europe, as they acted clearly and promptly toward demonstrations in Libya during the first days of the protests.

The argument extends beyond the American reluctance to support Arab revolutions which demand participation, democracy and respect for human rights. If the United States has acted partially in the policies concerning its own values and principles, then it has inevitably failed to protect them; it will have lost the friendship and support of many governments and will have consequently lost its own influence. Even if the U.S. has done so pragmatically, it has lost its credibility and pragmatism has tarnished America’s image in the world, especially among public opinion, which thereby leads to America’s declining popularity and political esteem. In other words, there is no end to American irresolution.