The Collapsing Taiwan Relations Act?

Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) William Owens wrote in an English-language newspaper that arm sales is not the best way to solve Taiwan problem. Instead, only by abandoning the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) could the U.S. restore relationship with China and solve the Taiwan problem.

Charles Glaser, a professor at George Washington University, said in an article published in the Foreign Affairs magazine that as Beijing insists that its sovereignty over Taiwan is non-negotiable, the U.S. could only give up Taiwan to avoid potential nuclear wars between the U.S. and China over Taiwan.

Former U.S. ambassador to China and United States Pacific Command Joseph Prueher also agrees that the U.S. should entirely re-examine TRA and arm sales to Taiwan to jump out of the vicious cycle currently entangling U.S.-China relations.

All of the above are some recent comments made publicly by several influential U.S. officials on revising TRA and arm sales. How should we interpret them?

The first thing to note is that the so-called “Taiwan Problem” is defined as a domestic issue in Beijing’s national strategy. Yet it’s also an international conflict. To put it more precisely, when the comprehensive power of China rises, Taiwan becomes a domestic issue, while when the opposite occurs, it becomes an international affair. From 1979 until the early 21st century, it’s usually been the latter: The U.S. definitely had the military strength to intervene with the Taiwan problem, as Taiwan is on the first island chain of the West Pacific Ocean, while China had lacked effective means to counteract.

However, the situation has changed with noticeable concerns. The global trend shows that the U.S. came to its climax in terms of national power after the collapse of the USSR. Yet it was later trapped in the 9/11 terrorist attack and the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq. The financial crisis in 2008 further frustrates the nation’s strength; the Obama administration’s retreating attitude could also extend to the policy on Taiwan straits. Within the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. tries to strengthen the second ($12.8 billion investment in air and marine bases in Guam) and third (garrison stationed in Australia in negotiation with Australian government) island chains in response to the growth of China’s military power. This is obviously related to current changes in Taiwan-China relations. Put simply, China is now no longer helpless against U.S. interventions on problems over the Taiwan Straits. With the developments of new arms, such as the DF-21D, the CJ-10 Cruise missile and the J-20 stealth fighter jet, China altered the long-lasting predicament of not being able to fight against U.S. aircraft carriers. Threats to U.S. military dispatch on the first island chain are also increasing. It’s all these that triggered U.S. military officials and politicians to reconsider policy on Taiwan, including the Taiwan Relations Act and arm sales to Taiwan.

To the two governments on the two sides of the straits, it’s an enormous change. For Beijing, it’s true that they need a strong military presence to resolve the Taiwan problem in the way they wish. Yet politics is also important. The issue Beijing cannot escape is how to win the Taiwanese people’s recognition and convince them of a Chinese identity. And Beijing wouldn’t succeed solely with military strength. A rough move with no mature political conditions could cause even more problems. For Taiwan, no one seems to care about such huge global, regional and cross-strait developments that closely tie in Taiwan’s future. Politicians from all parties have been dull. It’s only less than a year until the 2012 presidental election, yet we hear no comments on these issues from politicians, and there’s been nothing about their proposals or viewpoints on how we should react. President Ma Ying-jeou, Premier Wu Den-yih, Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen and ex-Premier Su Tseng-chang: Have you all noticed these changes?