Bridges: Yes, But Not in Kandahar
Published in Polityka
(Poland ) on 23 June 2011
by Tomasz Zalewski (link to original)
President Barack Obama did not listen to his generals, who wanted to reduce troops by half as many as the announced 10,000.
They argued that the progress made was “fragile and reversible,” and that extra soldiers were needed. But why? To achieve other fragile and reversible successes? Permanent success was achieved in Pakistan, where bin Laden died along with half of the al-Qaida leadership, but this was achieved by unmanned drones and special forces.
The prevailing opinion in Washington is that a military victory over the Taliban is not possible. Barring another attack the size of 9/11, the announcement of the 2012 drawdown and the 2014 deadline for a complete withdrawal will be met. Obama has abandoned the strategy of suppressing radical Islamists with massive force in favor of more traditional methods, using intelligence services and commandos. Negotiations are currently in progress with the Taliban; the Americans are trying to convince them to sever their ties with al-Qaida and pursue peaceful methods.
This is a risky move, since the Taliban might exploit the reduction of American forces to strengthen its own position. The idea that, after 2014, the corrupt government of Hamid Karzai will be an easy foe for the Taliban is very real. There is a real possibility that the country will become divided over tribal and ethnic lines.
The general feeling in the U.S. is that there is no alternative to a drawdown. With debt approaching 80 percent of GDP, the country can’t afford to wage a war that costs $120 billion this year alone. Obama’s opponents have accused him of speeding up the withdrawal to curry favor with the voters ahead of the elections, but the war fatigue rises above partisan lines. The Republican presidential candidates have also called for an end to the war. Why should the United States keep 100,000 soldiers in Afghanistan when they might be useful in other trouble spots around the globe? Bridges have to be rebuilt, but in the U.S., not in Kandahar. That is the popular slogan nowadays.
They argued that the progress made was “fragile and reversible,” and that extra soldiers were needed. But why? To achieve other fragile and reversible successes? Permanent success was achieved in Pakistan, where bin Laden died along with half of the al-Qaida leadership, but this was achieved by unmanned drones and special forces.
The prevailing opinion in Washington is that a military victory over the Taliban is not possible. Barring another attack the size of 9/11, the announcement of the 2012 drawdown and the 2014 deadline for a complete withdrawal will be met. Obama has abandoned the strategy of suppressing radical Islamists with massive force in favor of more traditional methods, using intelligence services and commandos. Negotiations are currently in progress with the Taliban; the Americans are trying to convince them to sever their ties with al-Qaida and pursue peaceful methods.
This is a risky move, since the Taliban might exploit the reduction of American forces to strengthen its own position. The idea that, after 2014, the corrupt government of Hamid Karzai will be an easy foe for the Taliban is very real. There is a real possibility that the country will become divided over tribal and ethnic lines.
The general feeling in the U.S. is that there is no alternative to a drawdown. With debt approaching 80 percent of GDP, the country can’t afford to wage a war that costs $120 billion this year alone. Obama’s opponents have accused him of speeding up the withdrawal to curry favor with the voters ahead of the elections, but the war fatigue rises above partisan lines. The Republican presidential candidates have also called for an end to the war. Why should the United States keep 100,000 soldiers in Afghanistan when they might be useful in other trouble spots around the globe? Bridges have to be rebuilt, but in the U.S., not in Kandahar. That is the popular slogan nowadays.