U.S. China Policy Team Change: ‘China Hands’ Out, ‘Japan Hands’ In

Published in Oriental Outlook
(China) on
by Dai Wenming and Zhuo Haochang (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Pak Ng. Edited by Mark DeLucas  .
Recently the Obama administration successively replaced three key officials who have been in charge of the U.S.-China diplomacy for but a very short time. Jeffrey Bader, Obama’s chief adviser on China policy, will soon leave the White House and return to the Brookings Institute, the Washington think tank where he worked previously. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, whose responsibilities have focused on Chinese affairs, has been planning to return to the academic community. Some time ago, Jon Huntsman, the U.S. Ambassador to China, also announced his resignation; Gary Faye Locke, a Chinese-American who has been the Secretary of Commerce, will be replacing him.

Among these three people, both Bader and Huntsman are typical “China hands” who speak Chinese fluently, have had dealings with China for years and have established deep connections. Although Steinberg does not specialize in research on China-related issues, he has also been working in foreign policy study circles for many years. He is the author of the "strategic reassurance” policy on China and has adopted two Chinese girls as his daughters.

What concerns people more is that the successors to Bader and Steinberg are all “Japan hands.” Bader’s position as the White House National Security Council's Senior Director of Asian Affairs will be assumed by his assistant, Daniel Russell, the former U.S. General Council to Osaka and Kobe in Japan. It is also reported that Steinberg’s successor will be Kurt Campbell, who is the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He is equally familiar with Japanese affairs.

Does this mean that United States' decision making on policy on China will be guided by the “Japanese clique” instead of the “Chinese clique?” Will this have any influence on the U.S.-China relationship during the second half of Obama's term?

“This could be just an coincidence, but could also represent other arrangements.” Professor Zhang Jiadong in the Center for American Studies in Fudan University told Oriental Outlook. “This round of personnel changes could just be Obama’s attempt to reconsider his policy on China.”

How significant will this change’s influence prove on U.S. policy on China after the three “China hands” have departed? We must first clarify one question: How is the U.S. policy making team on China formed?

Zhang Jiadong told reporters from Oriental Outlook that in the United States the national system is divided among the executive, legislative and judicial powers and that the departments involved in decision-making on Chinese policy mainly belong to the executive and legislative branches. Besides the White House and related administrative departments, associated members in both the House of Representatives and the Senate also participate in decision-making regarding Chinese policy. However, generally speaking, for the moment “U.S. China policy decision makers” mainly refers to the president and the executive branch.

Among them, the core level consists of those White House advisers who directly provide suggestions to the president. Many of them are not on the U.S. official names list or well-known to the public — they are just private advisers, though very influential. In addition, there are advisers involved with China-related issues in the White House administrative system, including the White House Asian Affairs Director at the National Security Council, who can also directly affect the president. The National Security Council is one of the most important diplomatic policy decision-making organs for the U.S. president. When the president handles important diplomatic affairs, he often has to convene meetings with the National Security Council.

The second level consists of governmental entities responsible for Chinese affairs, such as the U.S. State Department (comparable to the Chinese Foreign Ministry). The Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the U.S. State Department is the official who directly oversees foreign policy related to China at the State Department.

The third level is the Pentagon, the U.S. Defense Department, which is also an important participant in the China policy decision-making process.

It is worth mentioning that although the U.S. State Department has a very strong reputation, its size is not very significant among administrative departments in the U.S. government. The Pentagon, however, is a very powerful department — its annual budget is already up to hundreds of billions of dollars, and it employs up to around two million people.

“For example, if China’s vessels crashed with U.S. vessels at sea, the Navy would vigorously appeal within the Pentagon that the U.S. should be tough on China. Then, this opinion would be brought to the president through channels in the Defense Department, thus affecting the president’s decisions,” Zhang Jiadong said.

Fourth includes other departments that exercise any influence on Chinese policy, of course, such as the intelligence departments made up of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Information gathered and put together by these two departments has significant influence on the U.S. president’s decisions.

Thus it is clear that the three high ranking officials who resigned this time did indeed occupy core positions on the U.S.’s China policy decision-making team. However, these departures are not decisive in the complicated U.S-China relationship. Professor Zu Mingquan of the Center for U.S. Studies at Fudan University told Oriental Outlook that as China and the United States stand today, there are already a lot more people and departments who have joined in the decision making process on Chinese policy. “The Departments of Commerce, Science and Technology, Agriculture and Labor all have exerted more and more influence on Chinese policy decision-making. The power to lead the making of diplomatic policy has been distributed to multiple administrative departments.” It is not decided by just few people alone.

The “Japanese clique” takes over: A coincidence or an arrangement?

After the “China hands” leave, the “Japan hands” take over all aspects of the work. Is this just a coincidence or is it a deliberate arrangement?

Zhang Jiadong thought that there could be factor of coincidence, because it is known that the United States has a very limited reserve of highly trained diplomats, so the selection of such talented people draws from a relatively small circle. “China hands” have directed the first half, and now the “Japan hands” have taken over the second half.

At the same time, he thought that this round of personnel changes might just be Obama’s attempt to reconsider his policy on China — letting people who thoroughly “know China” very well to participate directly in decision-making on China policy is not usually something that is seen as a bonus in the United States' complicated political arena.

“If you can speak Chinese and have been to China, then Americans will suspect your loyalty to the United States. More often than not, people who ‘know China’ well are more anti-China and strongly uphold their stand against China inside the U.S. This phenomenon often appears in United States’ foreign policy,” Zhang Jiadong said.

Zu Mingquan also maintains the same perspective: “If one seems to have a very intimate relationship with China, then one is more willing to make this a clear-cut relationship. For example, every time Gary Faye Locke faces ethnicity related questions on public occasions, he always emphasizes his identity as an American. In our country, certain people feel that Chinese-Americans and Chinese experts would be more moderate and friendly, but such an expectation is very difficult to realize in reality.”

Looking at it from another point of view, it is also possible that these core advisers have made the attempt to change Obama. People in the United States now have given Obama a new name: “George W. Obama,” meaning that Obama’s diplomacy has become more and more like Bush Jr.’s.

“Some people who resigned might have first entered Obama’s administration with the expectation that Obama would be a president who was multilateral, moderate, would contract internationally and be able to handle diplomacy well. However, now many of Obama’s international actions seem to indicate that he was forced to walk Bush Jr.'s path. For instance, American troops have stayed a little longer in Iraq, more were invested in Afghanistan’s army, and troops were sent to attack Libya. These actions were in contradiction with many people’s ideologies when they first joined the administration.”

Is this bad news for the U.S.-China relationship?

As the three “China hands” depart, and two “Japan hands” and Gary Faye Locke, a Chinese-American ambassador, walk center stage and take charge of the co-existence of two major countries for the second half of Obama's term, the crucial question asks: Is this good news or bad news for the U.S.-China relationship?

The matter indeed seems worrisome.

As some experts have pointed out, Gary Faye Locke’s status as a Chinese-American might make him to less free to act on certain key issues. “As the U.S.-China relationship is placed on a basis of mutual distrust, sending over a Chinese-American ambassador could mean that promises will be made but not kept,” Zhang Jiadong said.

In regard to the other two people, Daniel Russel’s Japanese is fluent, and he was the American General Council to Osaka and Kobe in Japan. The Associate Press called him directly a “Japan hand” and Bader a “China hand” and thought that both were distinguished.

Before Kurt Campbell joined the State Department, he was employed at the Pentagon, and was a high ranking official in the Defense Department responsible for Asian and Pacific affairs during the Clinton administration. He reportedly guided the redefinition of the Japanese-American military alliance while he was in office.

The Associated Press indicated at the time when he was confirmed to join the State Department that “[a] State Department official said that if Campbell assumes the post, it would be favorable to Japan as he could serve as a counterweight to Clinton, who some in Japan fear would lead the United States to tilt toward China.”

But, all the experts who have accepted Oriental Outlook’s interviews thought that we should not simply divide the so-called “China hands” and “Japan hands.” The U.S.-China relationship will not significantly change just because of this; and certain personnel changes “may not be a bad thing but rather helpful” to the future development of the U.S.-China relationship.

Zu Mingquan said, “In the past we often saw that objective and friendly assessments from these ‘China hands’ did not really reflect the state of the development of the U.S.-China relationship. On the one hand, ‘the more one knows about China, the more anti-China one is’ is a common phenomenon. On the other hand, diplomats must first represent and safeguard their country's interests: Personal specialty, background, behavior and likes and dislikes are stringently restricted by their country's foreign policy."

It seems that the U.S. side has a similar point of view. Bader, who is soon to be relieved from duty, accepted Oriental Outlook’s interview when he first took office and emphasized “The United States' policy on China always has a strong continuity. All seven U.S. presidents since President Nixon have been constantly fixing and perfecting this concept. The similarities between every president’s policy are greater that their differences. Therefore, I don’t believe that Obama will deviate from this policy.”


“这一轮人事调整,也许是奥巴马重新思考对华政策的一个尝试---让非常‘知华’的人来直接参与对华政策的决策,在美国这个复杂的政治大背景中,往往并不一定是加分的事”

最近,在很短的时间内,奥巴马政府相继撤换了掌管美中外交的三名核心人物。奥巴马的对华政策 首席智囊杰弗里·贝德即将离开白宫,回到之前供职的华府智库布鲁金斯学会。侧重负责中国事务的副国务卿詹姆斯·斯坦伯格计划再回学术界。在此之前,驻华大 使洪博培也宣布离任,由华裔的商务部长骆家辉接任。

三人之中,贝德和洪博培会说流利的中文,与中国打交道多年,渊源深厚,是典型的“知华派”。斯坦伯格虽然不是专事中国问题研究,但也在对外政策研究界供职多年,是对中国“战略再保证”(strategic reassurance)政策的提出者,还领养了两名中国女儿。

更引人关注的是,贝德和斯坦伯格的继任者,却均是“知日派”。贝德的白宫国家安全委员会亚洲 事务高级主任一职将由他的副手、前美国驻日本大阪、神户总领事丹尼尔·拉塞尔取代。斯坦伯格的继任者则据称是库特·坎贝尔,后者目前是负责东亚和太平洋事 务的助理国务卿,同样谙熟日本事务。

这是否意味着,美国对华决策层将由“知华派”走向“知日派”主导?对奥巴马任期后半程的中美关系是否会产生影响?

“这一点上既可能是巧合,也有可能是其他安排,”复旦大学美国研究中心副教授张家栋对《瞭望东方周刊》说,“但这一轮人事调整,也许就是奥巴马重新思考对华政策的一个尝试。”

美国对华决策层是怎样构成的

三位“知华派”高官的离开对于美国对华政策影响有多大,首先需要厘清一个问题---即美国对华决策层是怎样的一个架构。

张家栋告诉本刊记者,在美国行政、立法、司法三权分立的国家系统中,涉及对华决策部门的主要是立法与行政。除白宫及相关行政部门以外,参众两院相关的委员也会参与对华决策。但目前一般意义上讲的“美国对华决策层”,主要指的是总统与行政部门。

这其中,最核心的层面是白宫内直接向总统提供建议的顾问们。他们中的很多人不在外人熟知的美 国官员名单上,只是私人顾问,但影响力非常大。另外还有白宫行政序列中涉华问题的顾问,比如白宫国家安全委员会亚洲事务主任,对总统也有直接影响。国家安 全委员会是美国总统外交决策最重要的机构之一,总统在处理重大外交事件时,常常要召开国家安全委员会会议。

其二是涉华事务的政府部门,比如美国国务院(相当于中国外交部)。美国国务院中负责东亚和太平洋事务的副国务卿是国务院内直接掌管对华外交的官员。

第三,五角大楼,即国防部,也是对华政策的一个重要博弈方。

值得一提的是,美国国务院虽然名声很响,但在美国政府行政部门中规模并不算大,而五角大楼却是势力很大的部门,每年光预算就有几千亿美元,工作人员有一两百万之多。

“比如中国与美国在海上有船只冲撞的时候,海军就在五角大楼内部大肆呼吁要对华强硬,再把这个意见通过国防部渠道反映到总统那里,影响总统的决策”,张家栋说。

第四,影响对华政策的当然还包括情报部门,如中央情报局和联邦调查局,其汇总的信息对美国总统的决策也有很大影响。

由此可见,本次离任的三位高官确实处在美国对华决策层的核心位置,但在复杂的中美关系中,并 非是决定性的。复旦大学美国研究中心教授朱明权也告诉《瞭望东方周刊》,中美走到今天,已经有越来越多的人和部门加入到对华政策的决策中来,“商务部、科 技部、农业部、劳工部等都对对华政策的决策产生了越来越明显的影响,指导外交政策制定的权力分流到多个行政部门”,并非由几个人单独决定。

“知日派”接手,是巧合还是安排

“知华派”走了之后,“知日派”全面接手---是巧合,还是刻意的安排?

张家栋认为,这一点上可能有巧合的因素---要知道,美国的高端外交人才的储备是很有限的,在挑选人才的时候是在一个相当小的圈子里进行的,“知华”的人主导了上半场,下半场就轮到了“知日”的人。

他同时认为,这一轮人事调整,也许是奥巴马重新思考对华政策的一个尝试---让非常“知华”的人来直接参与对华政策的决策,在美国这个复杂的政治大背景中,往往并不一定是加分的事。

“你会讲汉语、到过中国,美国人就会怀疑你对美国的忠诚度。往往是越‘知华’的人越要反华,越要在美国国内高举强硬的反华立场,这是一个美国对外政策里面经常出现的现象。”张家栋说。

朱明权也持同样的观点。“一个是越是看上去与中国关系密切的人就越想要与中国撇清关系。你看骆家辉每次在公开场合碰到相关提问都会先强调自己美国人的身份。国内部分人感觉华裔和知华派会对中国更温和、更友善,这种预期实际上是很难实现的。”

从另一个角度来看,也存在可能是这些核心智囊“主动调整了奥巴马”。现在在美国,人们给奥巴马取了一个新名字叫做“George W Obama ” ,意思是说,奥巴马外交上越来越像小布什了。

“辞职的一些人在最初进入奥巴马政府时可能期待着奥巴马是一个多边主义的、温和的、从国际上 收缩的、有能力做好外交的总统。但是现在奥巴马在国际上的许多行为似乎是被迫走到了小布什的道路上去。比如在伊拉克的驻军还要长一点,还要投入更多到阿富 汗的军队上去,出兵攻打利比亚。这和很多人开始加入政府的理念有所不同。”

对于中美关系来说是坏消息吗

更关键的问题是,随着三位“知华派”的离去,两位“知日派”和一位华裔大使骆家辉将走上前台,掌舵奥巴马第一任期下半程两个大国的相处。对于中美关系来说,这是好消息,还是坏消息?

事情听上去确实让人有些担心。

如专家指出,骆家辉的华裔身份可能使他在某些关键问题上放不开手脚。“在中美关系目前这种相互不信任的基础上,派一个华裔做大使可能会是口惠而实不至的。”张家栋说。

另两人中,丹尼尔·拉塞尔日语流利,曾任美国驻大阪和神户总领事。美联社在新闻稿中曾将他直接称为“日本通”,称贝德为“中国通”,认为两人分野明显。

库特·坎贝尔在加入国务院之前曾在五角大楼供职,是克林顿政府中负责亚洲和太平洋事务的国防部高官,据称在任上主导了日美军事同盟的重新定义。

美联社在他确认加入国务院之初时称,“一位国务院官员说,如果坎贝尔出任这个职务(助理国务卿),对于日本是非常有利的,因为日本不少人担心国务卿希拉里会使美国倒向中国,而坎贝尔是个平衡力量。”

但接受本刊采访的专家们都认为,对所谓“知华派”和“知日派”不应该简单区分,中美关系并不会因此发生重大转折,而且人事调整一下,对未来中美关系的发展“不一定是坏事情,也许还有益”。

朱明权说:“我们过去常常看到的这些‘知华派’对中国的客观、友好评价并不能真正反映美中关 系的发展情况。一方面‘越知华越要反华’的现象屡见不鲜。另一方面,外交官首先代表和维护的只可能是本国的利益。个人的专业、背景、行为、好恶是严格受到 国内制定的对外政策的限制的。”

在这一点上,似乎美国方面也持同样的观点。即将卸任的贝德在履新之初接受《瞭望东方周刊》专访时强调:“美国对华政策一直有很强的延续性。从尼克松总统以来的7任美国总统都在不断地修缮以及完备这种理念,各位总统的政策相似性要大于相异性。所以,我并不认为奥巴马会偏离这种方针。
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